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INTRODUCTION

With the liberalization of the Japanese beef
market in April of 1991, the opportunities for expansion of
beef exports to Japan from the United States improved
dramatically.

This paper will examine the potential for

economic gain in the Japanese beef market and the ability of
a Montana beef enterprise to participate in that burgeoning
market.

The productive capacity of Japan itself, the

competitive position of other beef-exporting countries and
domestic U.S. companies, and the demands of the Japanese
consumer will be addressed in an effort to assess the
comparative advantage of the Montana enterprise in question.
With the Japanese market framed as such, specific steps
which the Montana producer may take in order to augment its
competitive position will be recommended.
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PART I

BEEF CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN —

A FRAMEWORK
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CHAPTER 1
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CATTLE IN JAPAN

The Japanese derive the name of their country from a
Chinese phrase meaning "the source of the
sun,"...[which] describes the country's geographical
position east of China.
The word "Japan" came from
Marco Polo's attempt to render the Chinese
pronunciation of the phrase in Italian after his return
from China in the 13th Century.
The Japanese
themselves, however, usually give the characters a
sound that is rendered in English as "Nihon."
Reported in "Farmline" (Farmline 1990, 12).

Buddhism and Shintoism, the primary religious practices
in Japan for centuries, shaped much of the social fabric of
Japanese society.

One of the tenets of this fabric was a

prohibition against the consumption of beef.

As a result,

very little beef was consumed in Japan for 1,200 years.
Soldiers, however, were considered a special class, and as
such were not subject to the restrictions of the general
populace.

Japanese military leaders believed that beef gave

their soldiers strength and would feed beef to their troops
in preparation for battle.

Many soldiers consequently

developed a taste for beef, which returned with them to
civilian life.

Because the civilian population still

considered the cooking and eating of beef to be sacrilegious
and a desecration of the house, these "discharges" would
3
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heat plowshares over hot coals and cook beef outside.
Hence, "sukiyaki," which literally means "plow cooking," was
born (Lunt 1991, 2b).
Sourced from the Asian mainland via the Korean
peninsula, cattle were introduced to Japan as draft animals
for the cultivation of rice sometime around the second
century.

Because of the rugged terrain of the Skikoku

region, movement of cattle from this import area was
restricted.

As a result, cattle were found in small,

isolated areas with essentially closed populations (Lunt
1991, 3b).
In 1635 imports of additional cattle were prohibited by
mandate of a shogun.

Some 200 years later (1854) the

prohibition was lifted, and with the Meiji Restoration in
1868 not only was the importation of cattle encouraged, the
ban against eating beef was removed.

A number of breeds,

including Brown Swiss, Shorthorn, Simmental, Holstein and
Angus were then introduced for the purpose of crossbreeding.
Different regions preferred different breeds, which, when
combined with different crossbreeding practices in the
different regions, augmented regional differences in types
of cattle.

These regional differences were reinforced in

1910 when Japan again closed its cow herd to crossbreeding.
A number of distinct breeds are therefore contained within
the Japanese "Wagyu," which is commonly understood to be the
Japanese breed of beef cattle ("Wa" means Japanese or
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5
japanese-style and "gyu” means cattle)

(Lunt 1991, 3b).

This would not be unlike Black Angus cattle in the U.S.,
where many Angus breeders maintain that there is more
variation within the Angus breed than there is between some
breeds.
As a practical matter, the Japanese Wagyu is separated
into two breeds. Black Waygu and Red Waygu.

The red in the

Red Wagyu reflects either Simmental or Korean influence,
depending on the region which is home to the Red Wagyu in
question.

These cattle are generally "beefier" and more

heavily muscled than the Black Wagyu and are more similar to
American beef cattle than are the Black Wagyu.

The Black

Wagyu, likely descended from Brown Swiss, Simmental,
Ayrshire, and possibly shorthorn (interview with Dr. Jerry
Reeves, animal scientist at Washington State University,
June 18, 1992) and which comprise about 90 percent of all
Wagyu (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 13), were used primarily for
draft purposes, for plowing or pulling carts, or as pack
animals.

The draft Wagyu show heavier front quarters than

do the pack Wagyu, which were selected for overall size and
back strength.

As with the Red Wagyu, these differences are

delineated by region and are apparent today.
The livestock industry in Japan was basically
nonexistent prior to the 1950s since cattle were not raised
primarily for consumption.

In fact, most Waygu were

fattened and slaughtered only after serving a productive
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life as a draft animal, hence the mature age of many Waygu
cattle which came to market.

Though initial efforts at

expanding livestock production centered on pork and poultry,
by 1961 government focus shifted to the cattle industry.
Import quotas, price stabilization schemes, and calf
production subsidies were implemented (Khan et al. 1990,
10).

As a result, the number of beef cattle increased from

nearly 1.9 million head to almost 2.7 million head in the
period of 1965 to 1988 (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 14).
This does not include dairy cattle (1.3 million to 2.0
million for the same period).

At most, Japan's cattle

numbers would approach 5 million head at present.

This

compares to roughly 100 million head in the U.S. and 25
million head in Australia.

The dairy industry did not

become significant in Japan until after World War II when
Holsteins were imported in significant numbers.

Though

raised mainly for milk, a major market has been established
for dairy beef in Japan.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN JAPANESE AGRICULTURE

Though the total area of Japan is not as large as
Montana, four large islands and numerous smaller islands
extend in an arc roughly 1,300 miles long, or essentially
the distance from Maine to Florida.

Because 85 percent of

the land mass is mountainous or hilly, leaving 15 percent
(or less) which is tillable, the majority of Japan's 124
million people live in coastal areas (Seim 1990, 123).
Historically, protection of domestic agriculture by the
Japanese government had a major influence on the development
of agriculture in Japan.

As manufacturing developed in

Japan, labor productivity in agriculture fell.

Per-capita

farm income was about 80 percent of non-farm income prior to
1900, but this figure dropped by half —
percent —

in the 1930s.

to less than 40

Thus, to prevent rural poverty

from fomenting social upheaval during the interwar period,
the government instituted policies to relieve rural poverty.
A prominent feature of Japanese agriculture thus became
social policies constructed for the relief of rural poverty
(Hayami 1988, 24).
Government intervention for the support of agriculture.
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however, was nothing new to Japanese society.

As Japan's

industrial strength grew during the later 1800s, in part
based on Japan's successful agricultural development,
comparative advantage shifted to manufacturing.

The

landlord class then became more concerned about protection
for agriculture than about increasing agricultural
production (Hayami 1988, 34).

Consequently, political

lobbying for protective measures became a primary interest
of the landlord class.

Also, as Japan's industrial capacity

developed during the interwar period, rural subsidies were
seen as necessary to maintain cheap food for cheap labor.
Like the landlords, industrialists recognized the need for
agricultural subsidies to prevent peasants from joining the
growing labor movement and the socialist ranks (Hayami 1988,
39).
From 1880 to 1920, through the export of silk and other
commodities, Japanese agriculture served as a major earner
of foreign exchange.

This was consistent with real growth

in agricultural productivity for the thirty-five year period
preceding World War I (Hayami 1988, 29).

However, during

the 1930s the ratio of subsidy to income in agriculture
surpassed that of the non-agricultural sector (Hayami 1988,
39).

A cheap food policy, for the purpose of cheap

industrial labor, was at the root of this inversion.
A major overhaul of the Japanese agricultural economy
occurred after the Second World War with the American
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occupation of Japan.

Wolf Ladejinsky and Robert Fearey, the

principal architects of the occupation's land reform, shared
a belief in Jeffersonian agrarianism with General MacArthur.
Fundamental to Jeffersonian agrarianism was the belief that
private property was a natural right, and that land
ownership, independence, liberty, and citizenship were
connected.

General Headquarters therefore undertook land

reform in an effort to make agrarian communities democratic.
Free elections were enacted to allow rural representation in
the Diet, farmer's cooperatives were organized to add to
their representative power, and absentee landlordism was
virtually abolished, allowing tenant farmers to become feeholders of the land they farmed (Johnson and Fisher 1988,
70).

This was done in part to prevent agrarian unrest,

which might well destabilize Japan's newly established
democracy.

As a result, rural conservatism took root with

small-scale, Jeffersonian owner-operators voicing strong
support for democratic principles and the conservative party
(Moore 1990, 88).
Paramount to agricultural reform was an urgent need to
increase agricultural production, which was done by
increasing incentives to those cultivating the land rather
than increasing the economic stature of landlords.

From

1947 to 1950, 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres @ 2.47
acres per hectare) of farmland were purchased by the
government from landlords and transferred to tenant farmers.
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Farmland under tenancy therefore declined from 45 percent in
1945 to 9 percent in 1955.

Not only were the rights of

tenants on that land which remained under tenancy
strengthened, but tenant rental rates were reduced, both of
which further eroded the power of landlords.

Land holding

was also limited to three hectares in order to prevent a
resurgence of landlordism (Hayami 1988, 45).
The net result was a redistribution of land to a much
broader class of worker-owners.

However, the basic size of

farm units remained relatively stable at approximately one
hectare.

As a result, the small-scale farming enterprises

which typify Japanese agriculture, in spite of the successes
of land reform invoked by the occupation, left Japan at a
distinct competitive disadvantage in terms of producing
agricultural products for the international market place.
During the postwar period, though agricultural
productivity grew quickly relative to that of other
countries, it did not keep pace with growth in Japan's
industrial sector.

Consequently, in spite of the

government's interwar efforts to relieve rural poverty,
income growth in the rural sector failed to match that of
the industrial, urban sector.

Government policy, though

having concentrated on improving agricultural productivity
in the postwar rebuilding period, now shifted to closing the
income gap between farm and urban households.

In spite of

policy directives this gap progressively widened.
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accelerating the migration of farm labor to industrial
centers.

To stem this course, and to strengthen agriculture

relative to the urban sector, the Agricultural Basic Law was
enacted as a national charter for agriculture in 1961.
A fundamental tenet of the Agricultural Basic Law was
to equalize the income potential and standard of living
between farm and non-farm households.

To achieve income

parity, structural adjustments in agriculture were deemed
necessary.

These included expansion of farm size to take

advantage of mechanization and economies of scale, a shift
in production to those commodities which were in greater
demand (e.g., decreasing consumption of rice and increasing
consumption of beef), and improvements to farm
infrastructure and technology (Hayami 1988, 77). Though the
law ultimately failed to achieve its primary goals, it did
play a significant role in developing the livestock industry
in Japan (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 71).
Also important to note is that the emphasis on largerscale farming operations took precedence over concern about
ownership issues, essentially defining a course for
agricultural policy which differed from the concerns of the
postwar reform movement.

To help attain a larger-scale

agriculture, the three hectare upper limit on farm size was
eliminated in 1970 (Moore

1990, 190).

in spite of this,

Japanese agriculture remains one of the smallest-scale
agricultural industries in the world (average farm size has
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remained relatively constant at 1.15 hectares —
acres —

throughout the twentieth century).

about 2.84

Comparatively

speaking, the average European farm is 15.3 hectares, and
the average American farm, 175 hectares (Moore 1990, 200).
Though the size of the Japanese farm has remained basically
constant throughout the twentieth century, the size of the
average American farm has nearly tripled since 1960 (Moore
1990, 205).
Another important government policy was that of food
self-sufficiency.

Although Japan is one of the richest

countries in the world on a per-capita basis, it is capable
of producing only 48 percent of its food (Wanatabe 1991,
Dl).

The government has consequently instituted measures to

spur domestic production of food stuffs, and as a corollary,
has resisted opening its market to food imports in an
attempt to promote domestic production.
Since the enactment of the Basic Law in 1961,
agricultural assistance has moved away from price support
mechanisms because of the financial strain it imposed on the
national budget and because it encouraged overproduction of
some commodities.
In Japan land is usually inherited intact, with some
modification in recent history, by one heir.

Though family

members are seen as transitory, land is recognized as
permanent property of the household.

For centuries land was

to be preserved by the people for the emperor.

Ultimately

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13
this gave way to ownership of land by landlords, and, as
described above, this then evolved into ownership by the
farmers themselves.

Largely the result of the postwar

occupation, the practice of dividing land among multiple
heirs became acceptable, which has led to fragmented land
ownership (Moore 1990, 66).

Throughout, land has

traditionally held a key position in the structure of the
household.
In many rural areas, and often in response to
industrial development, land prices have risen in real
terms, making agricultural land an attractive investment and
encouraging families who own land to retain its ownership.
This has become increasingly important with the aging of the
Japanese population, and the return of older couples to the
farmstead.
Since the early Meiji period, with the rise of
manufacturing Japanese farmers have looked to off-farm
employment to augment farm income.

From 1884 to 1939, about

30 percent of all farms were operated by part-time farmers
(Moore 1990, 97), known in Japan as "weekend farmers."
Postwar land reform temporarily reduced this percentage, but
with the manufacturing opportunities generated by supplying
the U.S. military during the Korean War the trend toward
off-farm employment accelerated.
This trend has continued to present-day, and in large
measure Japan's stellar industrial growth was made possible
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by the availability of stable rural labor.

With increased

mechanization, not only did farmers find themselves less
dependent upon hired labor, but they were also able to
pursue off-farm wage labor themselves.

Much of Japanese

manufacturing is based on subcontracting to decentralized
plants, many of which are located in rural areas because of
the quality of labor found there.

This has resulted in an

increasing proportion of part-time farms and non-farm income
for the farm household.
Two problems have surfaced in recent years regarding
succession of the typical Japanese farm.
problem."

One is the "heir

The other is the "bride problem."

Finding heirs

to carry on farm operations, and the duties of the household
line commensurate with that position, is becoming
increasingly difficult due to out-migration from farm areas
by young farmers.

In addition, the greatest problem in 1987

was finding wives for male heirs.

Some rural communities

resorted to recruiting brides from the Philippines and other
countries to fill this vacuum (Moore 1990, 193).
The net effect is the aging of the rural sector.
Inheritance and household succession are likely the main
problems facing rural Japan in the 1990s (Moore 1990, 272).
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CHAPTER 3
RURAL POLITICAL STRENGTH IN JAPAN

NOKYO is the common term for the association of
Japanese agricultural cooperatives.

Cooperatives were first

formed in Japan in 1899 in response to the declining
economic stature of agriculture vis-a-vis the growing
Japanese industrial sector.

In the 1890s, farm income

accounted for nearly one-third of the national income.
After World War I, with the formation of a national
marketing system the number of farm-related cooperatives
doubled (Moore 1990, 138;.

Then, after World War II, the

occupation forces abolished the old cooperative system and
formed voluntary, democratic cooperatives free of landlord
control.

NOKYO was also given the right to perform banking

activities, and with the Agricultural Cooperative Union Law
of 1947, NOKYO was granted quasi-governmental status and the
formal right to represent farmers in negotiations with the
government.

Because of this, NOKYO is considered to be one

of the most powerful interest groups in Japan.
Within NOKYO there are a number of different
cooperatives engaged in different activities, including
marketing of various farm products, selling numerous
15
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supplies to co-op members, credit and insurance businesses,
political lobbying, and banking.

The Agricultural Central

Bank of Japan, the quasi-governmental financial arm of
NOKYO, was ranked sixth in the world in deposits in 1988
(Moore 1990, 137).
Norinchukin, the co-op's principal bank, has assets of
$260 billion, more than Citicorp, and is the largest
supplier of funds to Japan's short-term money markets.
Yet another Nokyo arm is a huge Japanese insurer, with
$2.2 trillion of coverage in force — double that of
Metropolitan Life (Eisenstodt 1991, 84).
In 1988, NOKYO cooperatives received $5.6 million in
government subsidies (Economist 1988a).

In 1991, NOKYO had

assets of $447 billion (Eisenstodt 1991, 84).

Much of

NOKYO's financial strength derives from its control of 95
percent of Japan's rice crop (Moore 1990, 154).
Within NOKYO there are more than 4,300 general
cooperatives representing 380,000 employees, 5.5 million
members, and 2.5 million non-farm associate members (Hayami
1988, 46; Moore 1990, 142; Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 101).

In

1991 NOKYO had one employee for every three "real" farms,
compared to one employee for every six farms in 1975
(Eisenstodt 1991, 84).

In addition to the general

cooperatives there are some 4,700 specialized cooperatives
representing specific interests, such as dairy cooperatives
and citrus cooperatives.

Semi-government functions, such as

channeling low-interest loans, have also been assigned to
certain cooperatives (Hayami 1988, 46).

About 70 percent of

all agricultural loans either originate from or are
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administered through NOKYO (Moore 1990, 154).

The NOKYO

structure is similar to Japanese industrial groups, known as
"keiretsu," where the various cooperatives are linked
through a central bank.
NOKYO has been successful in securing substantial
agricultural price supports through its political influence.
Rural Japan has a disproportionate amount of political
power.

While the farm population decreased during Japan's

industrial growth, commensurate adjustments in rural
electoral districts were not made.

This has essentially

given a disproportionate political weight to rural areas in
the number of rural representatives in the National Diet.
In some instances, the disparity has been as high as one to
three —

that is, one rural vote carries a weight equivalent

to three urban votes.

In the 1986 election, more than twice

as many votes were needed to elect a representative to the
House of Councillors^ from a non-farm district as it did
from an agricultural region (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 66).
The spread of part-time farming, and the return of retirees
to the family farm, has contributed to this pattern by

^The Diet, Japan's parliament, is comprised of the House
of Representatives (the Lower House), and the House of
Councillors (the Upper House).
The Japanese constitution
provides for an executive branch (the Cabinet, consisting of
a Prime Minister and about 20 other Ministers of State who are
appointed by the Prime Minister), a legislative branch (the
National Diet), and a judicial branch (the court system).
Agriculture is represented in the Cabinet by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (Johnson and Fisher 1988,
63—64).
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slowing the decline in rural population.
The increase in the number of part-time farmers has
been especially significant.

Because of the demands on

their time from off-farm employment, and the fact that they
are small-scale producers, part-time farmers are more
dependent upon the convenience of marketing through and
buying from agricultural cooperatives than are full-time
farmers.

By-and-large they are high-cost producers and

loyal, quiet followers of NOKYO.

As such, part-time farmers

have become NOKYO's economic and political power base
(Hayami 1988, 91).
As political spokesman for rural Japan, NOKYO has
political power that reaches far beyond its membership
numbers.

With their conservative roots the rural districts

vote as a conservative block, which has provided a political
foundation for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
In order to retain that support, the LDP has been receptive
to NOKYO's demands for protective measures.

The

ideologically conservative LDP has held a majority in the
House of Representatives since 1955 largely because of its
rural power base and alliance with NOKYO.
The "World Food Crisis" of 1973-5, which led to sharp
increases in world food prices, and, in 1973, the U.S.
soybean embargo and the "oil shock," all reinforced the call
by NOKYO for greater agricultural protectionism.

Japan's

national security, it was argued, depended upon its ability
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to be self-sufficient in food production, and to be selfsufficient domestic production had to be protected from
foreign competition (Johnson and Fisher 1988,

132).

Food

security through food self-sufficiency became the rallying
cry.
NOKYO has proven to be an indispensable vote-getter for
the LDP as well as a source of lucrative employment for
retired bureaucrats.

Because of this, NOKYO; the Ministry

of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF); and the
ruling LDP became known as the "iron triangle."

This

triumvirate has been known to block any attempts to reduce
agricultural protection and government subsidy, even when
proposed reforms stood to benefit the farmers themselves,
because of the potential for reduction in the economic and
political power of the "iron triangle."
Aside from its political power, on an operations level
some would argue that the cooperatives have been
instrumental in modernizing the beef industry in Japan.
Because cooperatives provide much of the feed concentrates
used in cattle raising, and because they provide credit,
veterinary care, and marketing services, it is questionable
if the beef industry in Japan would have developed to the
extent that it has without NOKYO's services.

This is

augmented by the fact that cooperatives operate an
increasing proportion of slaughter plants and have
significant involvement in the preparation and distribution
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of beef cuts.

The Waning of Rural Power in Japan
Because it was once so, we Japanese believe that rice
is the lifeline of Japan.
But we do not have to grow
rice here.
Like the lacoccas of the U.S., Japan's rice
farmers influence politics, distorting the economy and
crimping the quality of life in our country.
Kenichi Ohmae, McKinsey & Co's managing partner in
Japan (Ohmae 1992, AID).
To support its bureaucracy, NOKYO must charge high
prices for its commodities —

prices which are as much as 30

percent higher than prices charged by private Japanese
companies, which in turn are higher than prices charged by
U.S. companies (Eisenstodt 1991, 84).

As a result, Japanese

farmers pay some of the world's highest prices for an
assortment of agricultural inputs.

Because of NOKYO's

ubiquitous presence in rural Japan, and its integral part in
Japan's rural social fabric, most farmers find it less
appealing to shop elsewhere than to bear the higher prices
of NOKYO's products.

However, a concern is mounting in

rural Japan that NOKYO is out for itself first and for the
farmer second.
In addition, the LDP is becoming less dependent on the
rural farm vote as it gains support in urban areas.

It also

recognizes the necessity of shifting its political power
base to urban areas consistent with changes in demographics
and voting district reform.

In fact,

...with as many as three out of five LDP members being
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elected by voters who are litereally dying out, party
officials know it cannot be much longer before they
will have to dump the farmers in favour of the wageearning city dwellers (Economist 1991, 32).
The government, and by inference the ruling party, is
also finding it increasingly difficult to fully support
NOKYO and its demands for market protection and subsidies
because of budget constraints and a rising consumer voice
for cheaper food stuffs.

As of 1991, 30 percent of a

Japanese family's disposable income was spent on food,
nearly double that of the U.S.
for Europe)

(17 percent for the U.S., 20%

(Economist 1991, 32).

The Japanese consumer is

increasingly aware that the cost of its restrictive trade
policies is borne by them.

Prices for many consumer goods

have not reflected the 40 to 50 percent appreciation of the
yen, and the commensurate increase in Japanese purchasing
power, since 1985 (Meltzer 1990, D8). As a result, the
standard of living of the average Japanese family has not
kept pace with Japan's rise in economic power.

In 1989,

Japan's Economic Planning Agency reported that
...typical consumer goods were an average of 40 percent
higher in Tokyo than in New York.
The items that were
far more expensive in Japan were all subject to
government regulation (Ishihara 1991, 98).
For instance, surcharges on some cuts of imported beef were
as high as 90 to 100 percent (Eaheart 1991, 14).
Haruo Maekawa, a former governor of the Bank of Japan,
made the following observation in 1988:
The main objective of all [government] ministries used
to be to foster or protect the producer.
That is why
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our economic structure became export oriented.
It was
not to improve the quality of the life of the
people....
The government is now focusing on the
quality of life.
That's why the whole structure of the
economy is changing (Jameson and Redburn 1988, 17).
Consistent with the waning power of NOKYO is this process of
change to a more consumer-sensitive economy.

The attitude

that the consumer need not suffer so that producers may
prosper seems to be increasingly prevalent in modern-day
Japan.
As a result of changes in Japan's political power
structure, the "iron triangle" is being redefined as well.
Still composed of three institutions (bureaucracy, the
ruling party, and special interest groups), the
representation of those special interest groups and the
bureaucracy has changed.

MAFF is no longer included as a

component of the "iron triangle's" bureaucracy^, and
special interest groups have expanded to give more
representation to economic organizations which are
independent of rural constituencies (Kihl et al. 1990, 100).
NOKYO has also faced mounting criticism from the
Japanese business community for obstructing agricultural
reform, and for impeding Japan's endeavors to reposition
itself in the global economy consistent with its economic
stature.

Big business has also called for liberalization of

^The bureaucracy of the new "iron triangle" consists of
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MITI), and the Economic Planning Agency (Kihl et
al. 1990, 100).
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food imports in order to contain cost-of-living expenses for
their urban employees (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 87).
Internal pressures to relieve the political and
economic expense of agricultural protection are augmented by
external pressures from food-exporting countries, most
notably the United States.

Known as "gaiatsu," or foreign

pressure, Japanese politicians often use pressure from
foreign governments to institute change which they recognize
as necessary yet politically unpopular.

In this way special

interests are overridden, the national interest is served,
and Japan's leadership escapes blame.
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CHAPTER 4
PROTECTION OF THE JAPANESE MARKET

The Japanese government has authorized 3,600 shops to
sell imported beef, but many receive so little of it
that they limit sales to three hours a day.
Some offer
only 3 3 pounds a day.
Phil Seng, President and CEO of the U.S. Meat
Export Federation (Jameson 1988, 18).

The nominal rates of agricultural protection, defined
by the percentage by which domestic (Japanese) producer
prices exceed the border price (the price at which exporting
countries can place their products at the border of the
importing country), are compared as follows for 12
commodities, including beef;

Table 1
Nominal Rates of Agricultural Protection (Percent)

JPN
US

1955

1960

1965

18

41

69

2

Source:

1

1970
74

9

11

1975

1980

1984

1986

76

85

102

210

4

0

6

6

Hayami 1988, 6-7.

As demonstrated by these figures, the Japanese farmer

24
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enjoys a substantially greater degree of market protection
than does his American counterpart.

Resistance to high food

prices softened as industry became more capital-intensive
and information-dependent and less reliant upon cheap labor
during Japan's postwar "economic miracle" (Hayami 1988, 15).
The agricultural lobby was therefore able to provide its
markets with a degree of protection among the highest in the
world.

Furthermore, though protection for manufacturing

declined as this sector left the "infant-industry" stage,
protection for agriculture was increased in order to arrest
its economic decline (Hayami 1988, 23).
Commensurate with Japan's industrial growth was a rise
in affluence among Japan's urban population.

The share of

food as a percentage of the consumer's budget declined from
60 percent in the early Meiji period to about 30 percent in
1988 (Hayami 1988, 19), which lowered the resistance of the
consumer to high food prices.

Strong protests by consumers

to increasing levels of agricultural protection were
therefore seldom made, let alone orchestrated.

Protective

measures were not without their impact, however.

In 1988

market protection forced the Japanese to pay from three to
six times the world price for beef, wheat and rice.

It was

estimated that protection added as much as $61 billion, or 4
percent of personal consumption, to food purchases
(Economist 1988c, 31).
Protective measures took three forms:

(l) border
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protection,

i.e., import quotas (quantitative restrictions),

tariffs, and levies;

(2) price supports, which establish

floor and ceiling prices, usually set higher than market,
and controlled by the release of food stocks from storage by
the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIFO), a
government agency; and (3) subsidies, or direct payments
from the government to agricultural producers.
Through the price stabilization program, LIFO, which
also administers import quotas for beef, has been able to
maintain wholesale prices for domestic beef at levels two to
four times that of the equivalent import price (Johnson and
Fisher 1988, 35). In order to reduce input costs to beef
producers, among a host of government-sponsored activities
has been the establishment of a feed-price stabilization
fund, low-interest loans for capital expenditures including
the purchase of livestock, the development of public lands
for livestock grazing, and a rice diversion program to shift
productive land from rice crops to feed crops which
essentially provides cheaper feed to cattle producers
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 40-41).
As a percentage of the agricultural budget, subsidies
command the largest share, rising from 49 percent in 1960 to
62 percent in 1984 (Hayami 1988, 57).

Subsidies to

agriculture in Japan have risen relative to agricultural
subsidies in other industrialized countries.

The tax-burden

imposed on farmers in Japan also appears to be considerably
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less than that of Japan's non-farm population.

Within farm

households, in 1983 on-farm income was taxed at half the
rate of off-farm income (Hayami 1988, 61).
Market protection in Japan has afforded the producer a
degree of subsidy which is among the highest in the world,
and in so doing has sheltered much of Japanese agriculture
from international competition.

Coupled with tight beef

supplies and a continued appreciation in the yen, beef
prices in Japan have been kept substantially above world
parity.
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CHAPTER 5
LIBERALIZATION OF THE JAPANESE BEEF MARKET

.. .When asked about cheaper beef coining into his
market...one of the Japanese hosts [replied]..."What
would happen in Scotts Bluff, Nebraska, if the
Australians came in and started selling beef for 30
cents a pound.
Would they get out alive?"
Laura Sands, reporting for Beef Today (Sands
1988, 17).

As Japan developed its modern industrial economy in the
1950s and fueled its economic growth largely through
exports, its domestic markets were not opened to foreign
products in like amounts.

Substantial trade imbalances with

many of its trading partners developed as a result.

This

situation was seen as increasingly inappropriate with
Japan's relatively new status as a global economic power.
It was also increasingly expensive for the government to
continue subsidizing a relatively inefficient agricultural
economy.
The Nakasone government sponsored the Maekawa
Commission Report, published in 1986, to recommend policy
directives which the government could undertake to rectify
this situation.

The report acknowledged that Japan's

economy was structured around exports and that there was an
...urgent need for Japan to implement drastic policies
of structural adjustment and to seek to transform the
28
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Japanese economic structure into one oriented to
international coordination (Kihl and Jacobsen 1990,
96).
The report specifically called for structural changes in
Japanese agriculture, emphasizing that
...efforts should be made toward a steady increase in
imports of products (with the sole notable exception of
rice) whose domestic prices and the international
market price differ markedly (Kihl and Jacobsen 1988,
96).
À second Maekawa Commission Report was published one
year later (1987) which recommended, among other items
promoting agricultural reform, the following:
1.

Promoting agricultural policy that gives full
consideration not only to producers but also to
consumers and the food industry.

2.

Reducing the differential between Japanese and
overseas prices and achieving stable foodstuff
supplies at popularly acceptable prices by
improving productivity and promoting imports as
appropriate.

3.

Making Japanese production more rational and
more efficient and holding border adjustment
measures to a minimum for nonrice products (Kihl
and Jacobsen 1988, 97).

During this period the Japanese government was
pressured by the Reagan administration to relax its beef
import quotas.

Frustrated by the lack of progress,

in 1986

the U.S. requested that the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) rule on a number of Japan's restrictive
measures,
beef.

including the legality of its import quota for

In 1987 the GATT ruled in favor of the U.S. in ten of

twelve agricultural commodities, with beef as one of the
ten.

Subsequently, agreement with the Japanese government
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concerning liberalizing its agricultural imports was reached
in 1988 with the Beef Market Access Agreement (BMAA).

The

BMAA called for a gradual increase in Japan's import quota
over a three-year period, after which import quotas would be
replaced by an ad valorem tax, which would decrease over a
three-year period.
Specifically, imports would increase by 60,000 metric
tons in each of 1988, 1989, and 1990.

On April 1, 1991, the

quota would be replaced by a 70 percent ad valorem tax,
which would fall to 60 percent as of April 1, 1992 and 50
percent on April 1, 1993.

Subsequent reductions in the ad

valorem tax will be subject to negotiation in the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN).

Should beef

imports exceed 120 percent of the previous year's imports,
an additional 25 percent tariff would be charged.

After

April 1, 1994, safeguard measures will be determined by the
GATT.

The agreement also called for the Livestock Industry

Promotion Corporation (LIPC) to cease its involvement in
Japan's international beef trade effective April 1, 1991
(Kihl and Jacobsen 1988, 108-109).
Under the quota system, imported beef was subject to a
25 percent tariff, but when combined with additional
surcharges a total charge of 75 to 100 percent was common by
the time the product reached the market place (Cullison
1991, 3A).

As a result of lower prices and greater

availability, in the initial months of market liberalization
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sales of chilled U.S. beef (volume) nearly doubled.

At the

beginning of liberalization, only 15 percent of U.S. beef
sales in Japan were of chilled beef.

Within the first three

months that percentage had reached 29 percent, with the
expectation that 50 percent of U.S. beef sales in Japan
would be of chilled beef within one year (Pendley 1991, lA).
In total, within the first month of liberalization U.S.
beef exports to Japan rose 13.7 percent, most of which was
chilled beef (Davies 1991, 7 A ) . By August of 1991 (the first
year of liberalization), though exports of chilled U.S. beef
continued to exceed those of previous years, total imports
of U.S. beef declined by 27 percent in July and August over
the same two-month period of 1990.

This was due to a

reduction in exports of frozen beef, attributable to surplus
frozen beef stocks in Japan (Cattle Fax 1991).
The beef import quota had been the primary means by
which beef prices were maintained within their designated
stabilization bands (defined by floor and ceiling prices,
set by LIPC).

Since the beef industry has been less

developed than the poultry or pork industries in Japan,

it

has been given the highest degree of protection through a
system of quotas, tariffs and levies since 1964.

Import

quotas were set by MAFF biannually, and were divided between
a general quota and special quotas, with each containing
further subdivisions.

Nearly 90 percent of the general

quota was administered by LIPC, with the remaining 10
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percent administered by private entities, primarily traders
and beef-processors.

Special quotas were implemented to

satisfy some special interests, namely the hotel quota, the
school lunch quota, the Okinawa quota, and the boiled beef
quota.
Beef import quotas in metric tons for selected years
were :

Table 2
Import Quotas (Metric Tons)
Japan Fiscal

General

Special

Year

Quota

Quota

Total

1975

75,000

10,000

85,000

1980

119,000

15,800

134,800

1985

141,400

17,600

159.000

1988

253,600

20,400

274.000

1989 est,

309.250

24.750

334.000

1990 est.

364.250

29.750

394.000

Source:

Johnson and Fisher 1988, 98.

The removal of the quota and the cessation of LIPC's
involvement, which will add flexibility to importing and
distributing beef in Japan, signaled a major step by the
Japanese government toward opening its domestic beef market
to foreign competition

The LDP leadership has recognized

the inconsistency of promoting liberalization of foreign
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markets for manufactured goods while maintaining a highly
protected domestic market for agricultural commodities.

To

develop a consistent trade policy, and to demonstrate its
ability to cooperate as a major world economic power, the
government agreed to open its agricultural markets.

The

government has also acknowledged that its goal of food selfsufficiency, given its limited resources,

limited factors of

production, and limited economies-of-scale, is not practical
(Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 110).

Also,

"the rapidly

increasing demand for beef in Japan has forced the
government to allow imports to increase over time to keep
prices from increasing significantly above the established
stabilization range" (Wahl et al. 1991, 119).
However, in spite of a downward trend in wholesale
prices of meats purchased prior to liberalization and held
in cold storage in anticipation of higher prices, initially
retail prices either remained unchanged or increased.
Citing increased labor and rent expense, prior to
liberalization retailers were reported to be "gouging the
consumer by increasing profit margins to as much as 40-50%
from the traditional 30-35%" (Parker and Scandurra 1991).
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CHAPTER 6
JAPAN'S AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY

Nowhere...is the greying of Japan happening faster than
down on the farm.
In 1960 half of Japan's farming
population were still under 42 years old.
By 1990 the
median had soared to 60 — retirement age for the rest
of Japan.
Demographers reckon that, by 2000, as much
as a third of Japan's farming population will have died
of old age.
Reported in "The Economist" (Economist 1991,
32).
It appears that, among the seventeen industrial
economies, Japan is the only country which has a growth
rate of labor productivity smaller for agriculture than
for industry.
Cornelius van der Meer and Saburo Yamada,
Japanese Agriculture. A Comparative
Economic Analysis (Hsiao 1991, 976).

Nearly 250,000 farmers are involved in the beef
business in Japan (about 0.2 percent of Japan's population;
about 2 percent of all farm workers; and about 2.7 percent
of all full-time farmers), most of whom raise Wagyu cattle.
Seventy percent of Japan's beef production, however, is in
the dairy industry, which raises and fattens Holstein steers
and sells cull cows for beef consumption as secondary
activities to milk production.

Beef production is generally

a sideline to milk production, with most producers owning
about ten head.

Nearly 66 percent of all producers (Wagyu
34
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and dairy) have less than five head.

All told, less than 4

percent of aggregate gross agricultural production in Japan
is provided by beef cattle (Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 108).
Consistent with Japan's rise to industrial prominence
in the postwar period, 15 percent of Japan's Gross National
Product (CNF) was produced by agriculture, which employed 25
percent of the population shortly after World War II.

Both

figures dropped considerably by 1985, with less than 5
percent of the population employed by agriculture (and less
than 1 percent of Japan's population employed on the farm —
including less-than-half-time and more-than-half-time
workers) producing 4 percent of Japan's GNP (Hayes et al.
1990, 208).

According to Richard Moore, however, 16 percent

of Japan's total population was involved in farming in 1985,
down from 45 percent in 1950 (Moore 1990, 11).
In either case, the trend is noticeably downward in
terms of population involved in agriculture and contribution
to Japan's GNP.

As previously described, increased farm

mechanization, coupled with higher-wage opportunities in
manufacturing, led to an out-migration of labor from the
farm sector to the industrial sector (Hayes et al. 1990,
208).
Though agriculture's productivity continued to decline
relative to that of manufacturing in the postwar period,
per-capita farm income increased faster than non-farm
income.

In 1930, the typical Japanese farm household earned
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32 percent of the non-farm household.

By 1980, the figure

had risen to 115 percent, attributable to agricultural
subsidies and market protection and to an increase in offfarm income in farm households (Hayami 1988, 22).

Off-farm

employment has therefore accomplished a primary objective of
the Agricultural Basic Law of 1961, that is, income parity
between farm and non-farm households.
In 1950 there was an unusually large number of farms in
Japan because of an influx to the farming community from
urban areas and from overseas territories shortly after
World War II.

However, as employment opportunities grew in

off-farm occupations, the farm household replacement ratio
(inheriting males/farm households) fell from 85 percent in
1950 to 2 percent in 1985 (Hayami 1988, 78-79).

The

implication of this is that the number of farms in Japan
will fall from 4.3 million in 1985 to roughly 80,000 within
one generation, barring a return to farming by male core
workers who are presently leaving for off-farm employment
(Hayami 1988, 106).

Whether this means that smaller farms

will get larger (through land purchase or lease), and hence
more "viable," or be sold into non-agricultural uses is
problematic at this point.
However, though many members of farm households found
more lucrative employment off the farm, due to the
decentralized structure of Japanese industry many of these
workers did not have to leave the farm to secure that
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employment.

Rather, they remained on the farm in a part-

time capacity.

Nonetheless, the net effect has been a

reduction in the number of farms, the number of viable
(i.e., full-time and self-sustaining) farms, and the number
of farmers, as shown below.

Part-time I refers to those

farms with farm income larger than off-farm income.

Part-

time II refers to farms with farm income smaller than offfarm income.

Table 3
Numbers of Japanese Farms and Farm Workers

rio.ooos)

1960

1970

1980

1985

1985/1960

farms.(# )...
Total
viable

6057
521

5342
353

4661
242

4376
232

.72
.45

Workers ( # )
> 1/2 time
< 1/2 time
Total

1454
312
1766

1025
522
1547

697
557
1254

636
527
1163

.44
1.69
.66

208
204
194
606

83
180
271
534

62
100
304
466

63
78
297
438

.30
.38
1.53
.72

Farms (# '1
Full-time
Part-time I
Part-time II
Total
Source :

Hayami 1988, 81 -82.

As the above information indicates, though the number
of workers whose primary vocation was farming decreased by
more than half from 1960 to 1985, the number of workers
partially involved in farming increased by over 50 percent
in the same time period.

There has, however, been a net
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decrease in the number of farms and the number of farmers of
roughly one-third, and part-time farms have replaced viable
farms as the dominant force in rural Japan.

By 1991, the

number of full-time farmers for whom agriculture is their
sole source of income was reported as being no higher than
470,000, or less than half-of-one-percent of Japan's
population (Economist 1991, 31).

Farmers who are classified

as full-time comprise about 5 percent of all Japanese
farmers (Reid 1990, H4).

From 1975 to 1990, the number of

households for whom farming is their major source of income
declined by 40 percent to about one million.

"Full-time

farming families earn $24,000 a year from agriculture;
adjusting for inflation, that's less than what they earned
ten years ago"

(Eisenstodt 1991, 84).

The allure of off-farm income is evident in the
following figures:

Table 4
Japanese Farm Income
Year

On-Farm Income (A)

I960
1970
1980
1985

$980
$2,210
$4,140
$4,635

Source:
Note:

Total Income (B)
$1,950
$6,920
$24,320
$30,065

A/B (%)
50.2%
31.8%
17.0%
15.4%

Moore 1990, 15.
Average pre-1986 exchange rate (1978-1985) of 230
yen per dollar was used.

The salient point is that, by 1985, only 15 percent of
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a farm household's income came from farming.

Off-farm

income has become an increasingly dominant factor in the
Japanese family's ability to retain and work its farm.
The typical Japanese farm family of the 1990s consists
of a head-of-household who commutes to an off-farm job and
who farms only on weekends, and a wife and old parents who
farm full-time.

The introduction of small, ten-or-less

horsepower "hand tractors" has allowed women and the elderly
to perform many farm functions without the help of ablebodied men.

Demographically the age structure in Japan is

rising, most noticeably in life expectancy.

In the 1930s

the average life expectancy of the Japanese was about 50
years.

In 1985 this increased to 75 years for men and 80

years for women.

With this labor source available for

farming, and the off-farm employment opportunities available
for heads-of-household, many farm families have been able to
retain ownership of their farms.

This has, however, had the

unintended effect of impeding growth in the viable-farm
sector of the farm economy.
Additional motive for retaining farm ownership has been
the security inherent in owning land as well as the
investment value of the property itself.

The value of

tillable farm land has increased dramatically in recent
years for several reasons.

One is Japan's relatively high

population density and mountainous terrain, which limit the
supply of raw farm land.

Another is the tendency to keep
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the ownership of farm land in the family, which limits the
amount of farm land available for sale.

Yet another

involves agricultural subsidies, which tend to be
capitalized into the value of farm land.

The high cost of

arm land has contributed to the lack of expansion, via land
purchase, in the number of viable farms.
The farm expansion that has occurred has done so
primarily through land leasing rather than land purchase.
Economy-of-scale has been an objective of Japanese
agricultural policy since the Basic Law and has become
increasingly important as wage rates have escalated.
Basically, where leasing does occur, large farms have become
larger and small farms smaller as small farmers lease land
to large farmers.
sporadic.

Even so, most landownership patterns are

That is, even at their relatively small size,

most Japanese farms are comprised of non-contiguous parcels.
Therefore, as larger farms expand through lease
arrangements, those leased parcels are often isolated
tracts.

The scattered ownership of larger farms effectively

limits any economy-of-scale through the use of large
machinery.
With an elderly labor force entrenched on family farms,
expansion of viable farming units by younger,
entrepreneurial farmers is greatly restricted.

Therefore,

the ability of agriculture to attract, retain and reward
some of Japan's more promising managerial talent is
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unlikely.

Unless the comparative advantage of full-time

farmers is increased relative to that of part-time farmers,
the ability of Japanese agriculture to be internationally
competitive is doubtful (Hayami 1988, 110).
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CHAPTER 7
BEEF PRODUCTION IN JAPAN

Japanese Wagyu beef production is as much an art form
as it is agriculture.
Toshikazu Tanaka, marketing director for the
U.S. Meat Export Federation in Tokyo (Yates
1989).

If surplus rice paddies were converted to feed-crops or
to beef-cattle forage, it is estimated that domestic beef
production in Japan could double by the year 2025 (Khan et
al. 1990, 14). Even if it did, domestic production would not
accommodate anticipated demand.

Because of Japan's low

self-sufficiency in beef production, imports are a necessary
variable in the equation of consumer demand and beef supply.
Japan expanded its imports after 1954, beginning with frozen
grass-fed beef brisket from Australia and New Zealand.

In

1986, the first shipment of chilled grain-fed beef (eightyeight carcasses) was imported by Japan (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 37).

By 1987 beef imports had expanded to nearly

50,000 tons valued at about $900 million, which made Japan
one of the world's five largest importers of beef (Khan et
al. 1990, 14).

Commensurate with the development of beef

imports was the expansion of Japan's domestic production
42
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capabilities.
As mentioned previously, Waygu and dairy cattle are the
two primary sources of domestic beef production in Japan.
Known for its ability to produce high-quality beef
(simplistically, the greater the marbling the higher the
quality since flavor is largely derived from marbling),
Wagyu is raised under very careful, deliberate methods in
order for the carcass to marble to its full potential.

The

typical Japanese producer, who is raising Wagyu for Japan's
premium market would follow the following procedures:
restricted movement, either confined to small pens or
tethered in barns; long feeding periods at slow rates of
gain (relative to U.S. standards), often feeding the animals
for 18 to 20 months (as opposed to 5 months in the U.S.
commercial feedlot industry) with slaughter at 27 to 29
months of age (as opposed to a 17- to 19-month average in
the U.S.); feeding hand-mixed, carefully measured feeds to
each animal twice daily to ensure complete consumption;
massaging and grooming; and, in some instances, feeding the
animals beer as an appetite enhancer.

As a result, beef

with twice as much marbling as steaks grading U.S. Prime is
brought to market.
factors:

Marbling is caused primarily by four

genetics (Wagyu is best), length of feeding period

(longer is better), maturity (older is better), and sex
(female is better)

(Reeves et al. 1991, 10b).

Wagyu calves are often fed concentrated rations as a
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supplement to milk beginning at two to three months of age.
They are weaned at eight to ten months and sold as feeder
calves (if not retained to be fed by the breeder) or as
replacements to other breeders.

The majority of the calves

are marketed individually at special calf auctions which
occur every couple of months and last from two to three
weeks.
The more intensive feeding period for Wagyu calves
begins at ten to fifteen months of age.

In the early 1960s

the calves were fed for about twelve months.

In the 1980s,

this period was more than doubled in an attempt by producers
to increase the degree of marbling.

The motive was to push

their cattle to qualify for the highest meat grades, which
sell at substantial premiums.

This length of feeding period

is expected to continue but is not expected to increase due
to the biological limits of Wagyu, which, given current
technology, appear to have been met (Wahl 1989, 9).
The "ideal" feeding method involved feeding Wagyu
heifers till almost thirty-six months of age.

These cattle,

representing less than 5 percent of all Wagyu, are fed by
growers who specialize in producing top-grade Wagyu beef.
Each grower usually fattens one or two head at a time,
preferring heifers to steers (but not restricting the
operation to heifers only).

Special rations,

involving a

gradual increase in the energy level of the feed during the
feeding period, is fed until the animal is finished (Johnson
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and Fisher 1988, 22).

In extreme cases, the animal is fed

for up to six years (Hayes 1990, 5).
Because of the difference in age and length of feeding
period from the typical U.S. feeder, the live weight of
Wagyu at slaughter will average about 1400 pounds compared
to 1050 pounds for the U.S. feeder.

This translates to

about an 800 pound Wagyu carcass, up from a carcass weight
of about 460 pounds in 1960.

When compared to U.S.

production costs, Japanese Wagyu is two to 2.8 times more
expensive to raise (Khan et al. 1990, 18).

Wagyu carcass

weights have dropped slightly since 1981 as a result of
government efforts to decrease production costs (Wahl 1989,
1 1 ).
Despite the financial reward for raising this type of
beef and the effort expended, very few carcasses reach the
top Japanese beef grades.

From 1980 to 1990, only 5 to 7

percent of all Wagyu steers graded in the two top categories
(Supreme and Superior)

(Khan et al. 1990, 18).

Only 1 to 2

percent graded in the top category (Wahl 1989, 11).
The second sector of Japan's beef industry is less
radically different from the U.S. beef industry.

Dairy

cattle are fed for 12 to 13 months (still more than double
the U.S. feeding period) and are slaughtered from about 1450
to 1475 pounds.

After being fed to feeder-calf weights on

farms which specialize in raising calves, the calves are
sold to feedlots where they are finished

(i.e., fed high-
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concentrate rations for up to 13 months), at which time
their carcasses are similar to U.S. Choice.

Though dairy

cattle are slaughtered at heavier weights than Wagyu they do
not grade as well.

Under the old Japanese beef grading

system, only one-half-of-one percent to 1 percent of dairy
carcasses reached the Excellent grade (the number three
grade, with Superior number two and Supreme number one)
(Khan et al. 1990, 18; Wahl 1989, 12).
Though dairy beef is not as profitable per unit as
Wagyu, it is cheaper to raise and is better suited to
econoraies-of-scale.

As Japan's beef market has diversified,

dairy beef caters to an increasing market for less exclusive
and less expensive cuts.

As a result, at least until

recently there has been a general downward trend in the
production of Wagyu in Japan.

Wagyu accounted for 60

percent of total domestic beef production in 1965.

By 1987

Wagyu's share of domestic production had slipped by half, to
under 32 percent (approximately 177,000 tons).

Conversely,

dairy beef increased from 900 tons in 1965 to about 375,000
tons in 1987 (Khan et al. 1990, 18-19).
Despite efforts by the Japanese government to encourage
beef production, the Wagyu herd decreased from 2.3 million
head in 1962 to a low of less than 1.4 million head in 1972.
By 1986, the Wagyu herd had recovered to over 1.6 million
head, well below its 1962 level.

Much of the reason for the

decline in herd numbers was attributable to high feed costs.
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which led to a sharp drop in the profitability of raising
Wagyu (Wahl 1989, 9).
Whereas the Wagyu herd has decreased, the dairy herd
has increased —

from less than 1 million head in 1962 to

about 3 million head in 1986.

The dairy industry has also

cut unit costs of production —

something which the Wagyu

sector has not been able to accomplish (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 36).

Because milk production is profitable, calves

are considered a byproduct and contribute less than 10
percent to dairy revenue.

Table 5
Wagyu and Dairy Cattle Numbers in Japan
Wagyu (1, OOOs)

Dairy (1, OOOs)

Year

Total

Cow
Herd

Feeder
Cattle

Total

Cow
Herd

Feeder
Cattle

TOTAL

1962
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1986

2337
1568
1573
1427
1478
1662
1657

1309
733
714
645
633
632
618

1027
835
859
782
845
1030
1009

1145
1318
2042
2296
2907
3080
3068

729
885
1245
1275
1457
1460
1418

416
434
797
1021
1450
1620
1650

3482
2886
3615
3723
4385
4742
4725

Source:

Wahl 1989, 12, 14, 16.

Of particular importance is the reduction in the
breeding base of the Wagyu herd, those cattle which produce
premium beef in Japan, by more than half, and a
corresponding increase, by a factor of two, in the breeding
base of the dairy herd.
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While the number of beef cattle (a combination of Wagyu
and dairy cattle) has increased from about 1.9 million head
in 1965 to over 2.6 million head in 1988, the number of
farms which raise beef cattle has decreased from 1.4 million
to about 260,000 in the same time period (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 14).

This has meant that the number of cattle per

farm has increased by a factor of ten, from less than two
head per farm to over ten head per farm (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 14).

About 85 percent of Japan's beef herd is on

farms of less than ten head (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 15).
While the number of dairy cattle has increased from
about 1.3 million head in 1965 to over 2 million by 1988,
the corresponding number of dairy farms has decreased from
381,600 to about 71,000.

Likewise, the number of dairy

cattle per farm has increased from just over 3 head in 1965
to nearly 29 head by 1988.

Approximately 58 percent of

dairy farms have between 10 and 50 head (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 16).
Some researchers consider Japanese dairy beef to be
similar to imported beef.

Others insist that they are

markedly different, and that Wagyu is distinctly different
from either.
in Japan.

Under this perception beef is not a commodity

Each beef product has its own characteristics and

its own market, and is priced accordingly.

As reported

below, the farm price for cattle has shown a steady increase
for the survey period.

Wholesale price of Wagyu is about
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twice that of dairy beef, and at the retail level Wagyu has
commanded about a 70 percent premium since 1980.

The

relative prices (in yen per kilogram) appear as follows:

Table 6
Wholesale and Retail Beef Prices in Japan
Retail

Wholesale
Year

Wagyu

Dairv

Waavu

Dairv

1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1986

510
843
1640
2161
2158
2180

410
589
1166
1272
1249
1292

1079
1783
3470
4572
4565
4612

867
1246
2467
2691
2642
2733

Source;

Wahl 1989, 15

As a point of reference, the retail prices convert to
the following dollars per pound:

Source:

Year

Waavu Retail

Dairy Retail

1970
1980
1985
1986

$2.25
$9.13
$8.66
$9.47

$1.57
$5.38
$5.01
$7.33

Calculated from preceding table using average peryear exchange rates.

The average farm size in Japan has basically remained
constant since 1908, ranging between 1.0 and 1.2 hectares
(about 2.5 to 3 acres).

Within this average, as a
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percentage of total (i.e., the number of farms less than
one-half hectare, the number of farms from one to two
hectares, the number of farms larger than five hectares,
etc.) the number of farms within different size classes has
not changed appreciably within the same time period.

The

largest category has been farms less than half a hectare
(with few exceptions, consistently near 40 percent of all
farms have been smaller tha" half a hectare), and the
smallest category has been farms greater than five hectares
(with few exceptions, consistently between 1 and 2 percent)
(Hayami 1988, 27).

Essentially, then,

...a large number of inefficient mini-sized farms
incompatible with the introduction of modern laborsaving technologies has been preserved, especially in
the rice and beef sectors to which the strongest
protection has been given (Hayami 1988, 73).
This becomes apparent when compared to the output per
farm worker in the U.S., where economies-of-scale are
pervasive.

Though the output per farm worker in Japan is

about one-tenth that of the U.S., conversely, output per
unit of land in the U.S. is about one-tenth that of Japan,
reflecting a Japanese agriculture which is more intensive
than that of the U.S.:
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Table 7
Farm Output, U.S. and Japan
Output per Male Worker^
U.S.
Japan
Source:

Output per Hectare

285
28

1.2
12.2

Hayami 1988, 75.

If the government's sheltering of agriculture is to be
removed, then for the full-time farmer to generate an onfarm income equivalent to that of off-farm workers, laborsaving technology must be implemented.

The problem for

Japanese agriculture then becomes the structural impediments
to increasing scale economies.

Given the lack of progress

in this regard throughout this century in spite of
government policies designed to remove those impediments, it
appears as though little progress in real terms in
agricultural production in Japan is imminent.
The implications of this for the beef industry in Japan
are poignant. Part-time and elderly workers, which make up
the bulk of Japan's agricultural labor force, usually focus
on rice farming "because it is a very stable crop offering a
high return on only intermittent labor without much
managerial effort" (Hayami 1988, 90).

It would not be

unreasonable to conclude that, in terms of units produced.
^Output is in terms of wheat units, equivalent to one ton
of wheat into which other agricultural products are converted
according to the ratios of their prices relative to the price
of wheat (Hayami 1988, 75).
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the Japanese beef industry may support only moderate growth
in the foreseeable future.

In terms of profit, however, in

light of a growing demand for beef the industry itself may
benefit even as imports command an increasing share of the
market.
Although the production of beef in Japan has shown a
steady increase, from 2.9 million head and 14 2,000 carcass
tons in 1965 to 4.7 million head and 559,000 carcass tons in
1986, Japan's domestic beef industry remains a relatively
insignificant component of Japan's economy (Johnson and
Fisher 1988, 9).

In 1986, "the value of beef production

accounted for only about 4 percent of the gross value of
agricultural output" in Japan (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 10).
In other words, beef production accounted for about onetenth of 1 percent of Japan's GNP in 1986.
By 1987, domestic beef production accounted for less
than 70 percent of beef supplies, down from 96 percent in
1960 (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 11, 17).

The following table

compares domestic production with import volume:
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Table 8
Volume of Japanese Beef Production and Beef Imports
1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

555.3
220.4
775.6
28.4
n/a

558.6
262.0
820.6
31.9
+5.8

564.9
319.0
883.8
36.1
+7.7

569.8
379.7
949.5
39.9
+7.4

547.8
495.9
1043.6
47.5
+9.9

f1000s tons)
Japan Production
Import Volume
Total Supply
Import/Total (%)
Percent Change
Source:

AGSMS 1991 , 3.

Though modest increases in domestic production were
seen in 1986 through 1988, it is significant that domestic
production registered a decrease in 1989 from 1988 in spite
of a nearly 10 percent increase in total beef supply.

This

is illustrative of the growing role which beef imports play
in total beef supply.

Specifically, domestic production

declined about 1.3 percent from 1985 to 1989, while beef
imports increased 125 percent and total supply increased
about 35 percent —

all of which occurred while Japan's

population increased about 1.8 percent (from 121.049 million
in 1985 to 123.255 million in 1989)
1991, 15).

(Statistical Handbook

Beef imports, then, are commanding an increasing

share of an increasing market in relative as well as
absolute terms.

That is, not only are there more people,

but more of those people are eating beef (or, those people
who are eating beef are eating more of it) and more of the
beef being eaten is imported.
The relative decline of the traditional Japanese beef
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breed and the emergence of dairy-steer-fattening as a
growing element of beef production is likely the most
significant development in the Japanese beef industry in
recent years (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 17).

As of 1987,

dairy beef accounted for roughly 70 percent of Japan's total
domestic beef and veal production.

In the 1960s, slaughter

of Wagyu and dairy beef were about equal in terms of numbers
of cattle.

Twenty years later, about twice as many dairy as

Wagyu cattle were raised for slaughter (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 17).
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CHAPTER 8
DISTRIBUTION OF BEEF IN JAPAN

It is true that even Agatha Christie's Hercule Poirot
would be baffled by how goods in Japan get from the
factory or farm to the consumer.
Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan That Can Say NO
(Ishihara 1991, 97).
Price increases that result when Jeep Cherokees are
shipped across the Pacific are an even bigger mystery
than the Bermuda Triangle.
Lee lacocca (paraphrased), The Wall Street
Journal (Chandler 1992).
Today, there's a labor shortage in Japan, yet at least
300,000 people working in the distribution system are
said to be completely redundant.
Matasaburo Kazeno, Journal of Commerce and
Commercial (Kazeno 1990).

For the domestic beef producer in Japan, there were
generally three distribution channels available.
channels were:

These

(1) the traditional channel, controlled

largely by the "butcher's guild," which distributed about 10
percent of domestic supply;

(2) auction or central markets,

which slaughter and auction carcasses, and which provide
producers direct access to wholesale markets, distributed 25
to 30 percent of the beef supply; and

(3) meat processors,

which slaughter, cut, and package beef, and which allowed
producers to bypass wholesale markets, distributed 60 to 65
55
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percent of supply (Hayes 1990, 231).
Imported beef was distributed according to the quota
system, and was further complicated by specific procedures
pertaining to its purchase and sale.

The quota system not

only made the importing of beef to Japan quite complicated
for exporters, it was also cumbersome for user-groups in
Japan who were often required to source their beef from
different quota allocations.

Under the quota system only

thirty-six trading companies and twenty-nine user
associations were allowed direct participation in the import
market, which essentially allowed that market to be
monopolized (Khan et al. 1990, 60).

With the dissolution of

the quota structure and the disengagement of LIPC, this
monopoly will disintegrate, and over time, imported beef
will become more available to a broader range of wholesalers
and retailers at more reasonable prices.
Retailers of foodstuffs and drinks account for over 40
percent of all retailers in Japan, by far the largest
category of retail store (JETRO 1990, 70).

Though purchases

of beef by a retail outlet directly from the foreign
supplier is now possible, the use of wholesalers is expected
to continue because of their attendant services, such as
custom cuts and frequent delivery.

Wholesalers may also

offer the retailer a significant degree of comfort with
their control over quality of product.

This may be

especially true for the restaurant market.
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Meat processors in Japan have a wide distribution
system, which may position them to become a major force in
the distribution of chilled beef.

Increased sales are

expected to follow increased distribution since one reason
Japanese consumers do not buy beef is simply its lack of
availability, especially in smaller meat shops.

Since 76

percent of meat shop supplies are provided by cooperative
associations, it may be advisable for exporters to work
through these cooperatives in order to penetrate this
market.
However, for larger retail outlets like hotels,
restaurants and supermarkets, direct sales bypass markups
imposed by a myriad of middlemen within the Japanese
distribution system.

With fewer markups, retail prices

should decline, and with a price-quantity elasticity greater
than o n e , the amount of beef imported should increase (i.e.,
as price declines, quantity purchased should increase by a
greater amount).

With the quota and tariff restrictions of

the pre-April 1, 1991 Japanese beef market, prices of
imported beef in Japan were almost four times U.S. export
costs by the time the beef was purchased by the consumer
(Khan et al. 1990, 67).
Top-grade domestic beef sold for as much as (the
equivalent of) $54 per pound in Japan in 1988.

At its

cheapest, popular beef (for which most imported beef would
qualify) could be found for $9 per pound (Khan et al. 1990,
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67).

By inference, the cost to the importer of that same

product (popular beef) would be about $2.25 per pound.
Historically the Japanese government had maintained that
without high prices the domestic beef producer would fall
victim to foreign competitors, and Japan's food security
would suffer as a result.

In terms of direct monetary gain,

however, the primary beneficiaries of Japanese pricing
schematics were wholesalers and retailers within the
Japanese distribution system (Khan et al. 1990, 67).

With

price being an important consideration in the market for
table beef (i.e., home

consumption), to the extent that the

gap between import cost and retail price can be narrowed by
the gradual removal of protective measures and a less
cumbersome distribution system, product demand should
increase.
Historically, trading companies have played an integral
role in the development of Japan's import and export
markets.

Japan emerged from a two-hundred-year-period of

global isolation during the Meiji era.

In the 1870s Japan's

business community agreed to concentrate trade functions
within a relatively small group of specialized companies.
This was felt to be necessary in order to overcome language
barriers and to work through Japan's unfamiliarity with
international trade practices (JETRO 1990, 93).

Given

Japan's reputation as being a nation of shrewd traders,
speculation would allow that this was a wise step.
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The trading companies were able to tap into and
maintain international trading networks which identified
export opportunities for Japanese manufacturers and allowed
those businesses to purchase raw materials at favorable
rates.

Since then trading companies have, in the view of

the Japanese, promoted the smooth flow of trade.

The

benefit that trading companies have is partially found in
their volumes of trade, which lead to lower unit costs and
more efficiency in product distribution than would otherwise
be the case (JETRO 1990, 93).
There are approximately 8,500 classified trading
companies in Japan (JETRO 1990, 93).

Though the size of

these companies varies dramatically, smaller, specialized
trading companies handle smaller volume products (like
premium beef) which may require sophisticated marketing.
By-and-large, in addition to developing trade flows, which
is vital since trade is their source of revenue, trading
companies act as intermediaries between exporters and
importers.

Among other activities, trading companies handle

much of the necessary paperwork, obtain favorable trade
financing, supervise transportation, arrange insurance and
storage, and provide useful information (JETRO 1990, 94).
With market liberalization and the end of the quota
system, beef exporters were given the opportunity to trade
directly with retailers.

However, bypassing intermediaries

in the distribution system has not proved easy to beef
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exporters.

Unless the exporter can form its own outlets in

Japan, the traditional structure might well prove to be the
best avenue for product distribution.

High labor and land

costs, a shortage of truck drivers and other workers
integral to product distribution, and entrenched,
traditional distribution channels, all form barriers to new
outlets.

As a result, established trading companies may

well remain a critical link in the distribution of imported
goods in Japan (Cody 1991b, l A ) .
A critical factor in the distribution of goods in Japan
is that of personal relationships.

These often take years

to develop, and until they are entry to the Japanese market
may well be blocked.

Establishing trust, and a commitment

to the long term, are essential for an exporter to gain
access to the Japanese distribution system, which is
imperative if one is to gain access to the Japanese market.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 9
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE JAPANESE MARKET

[Feeding for the Japanese market is] a much greater
expense, 20 percent to 25 percent higher, but our
restaurant-grade beef will bring $45 to $65 a pound in
Japan.
Here, it's probably $9.
Donald Butler, President of Shasta Foods
International, operator of Monterey County
Cattle Feeders Inc. (La Granga 1990).
At current levels, Japan is importing from all sources
the equivalent in beef of all the feeder cattle in
Iowa, about 1 million to 1.3 million head.
If
predictions come true, within 10 years, they will be
taking the equivalent of all the meat cattle...[that]
Nebraska and Iowa could supply.
Marcia Krings, reporting for Agri-News
(Krings 1991).

Japan is one of the richest countries in the world.
Per capita GNP in Japan in 1988 was $23,365, second only to
Switzerland and Iceland (JETRO 1990, 15).

Personal income

has grown with GNP, resulting in an increase in personal
income in real terms which has fueled an increase in
personal consumption.

The value of Japanese assets have

increased since 1982, which has also encouraged increasing
amounts of personal consumption (JETRO 1990, 15).
The upswing of the personal consumption curve is also
attributable to the increasing numbers of women entering the
61
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work force.

From 1975 to 1988, the number of female

employees increased 43 percent to 16.6 million workers, or
37 percent of the total work force.

This has led to an

increase in the number of double-income households, which
means that wives, who control most personal expenditures in
Japan, have more money to spend than they've had in recent
history.

This trend is expected to continue because of the

tight supply of labor in Japan (JETRO 1990, 16).
In spite of Japan's efforts toward self-sufficiency in
agriculture, Japan is the largest net buyer of farm
commodities in the world.

It is also the largest market for

exports of U.S. agricultural products, accounting for almost
20 percent of total sales of U.S. exports in the past few
years.

Thirty-four percent of Japanese farm imports were

sourced from the U.S. in 1987, and 75 percent of all U.S.
beef exports are imported by Japan.

Second to Canada, Japan

is the largest trade partner with the United States (Kihl
and Jacobsen 1990, 107).
Also of significance is the Plaza Accord of 1985,
whereby the G-7 finance ministers realigned the value of the
yen and the U.S. dollar by allowing the yen a significant
increase in value vis-a-vis the dollar.

Within three years

the value of the dollar was reduced by half with respect to
the yen.

The effect of the Accord on exchange rates can be

seen in the following chart:
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Table 9
Exchange Rates
Yen per U.S. Dollar

Source:

Year

Average

End-of-Year

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

210.44
219.14
226.74
220.54
249.08
237.51
237.52
238.54
168.52
144.64
128.15
137.96
144.79
n/a

194.60
239.70
203.00
219.90
235.00
232.20
251.10
200.50
159.10
123.50
125.85
143.45
134.40
124.85

Statistical Handbook 1991, 158.

The intention of this agreement was to lower the costs
of imports to Japan and raise its costs of exports,
primarily with the United States, in order to correct the
trade imbalance of those two countries.

The appreciation of

the yen has been a major factor in increasing Japan's
imports, and it has increased the purchasing power of the
Japanese consumer.

Because prices of imported goods

declined, more money was available for the consumer to buy
more of everything, not just imports.

Domestic spending has

consequently become the driving force behind growth in the
Japanese economy (Kihl and Jacobsen 1990, 94).
The appreciation of the yen has also made it more
difficult for Japanese producers to cut production costs

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64
relative to other countries (JETRO 1990, 9).

Coupled with a

tight labor market concomitant with the aging

of Japan's

population, segments of Japan's market are likely to become
vulnerable to production in those countries where labor and
input costs are relatively cheaper.

For this

to achieve any

significant dimension, however, Japan must allow its
international competitors to enter its market place in a
more liberalized manner.

As Japan's trade imbalance with

the United States has persisted in spite of the yen's
appreciation, steps toward liberalizing the Japanese market
have been taken (see Chapter 5).

The rise in the value of

the yen, combined with an over-supply of global food
supplies, has widened the disparity between Japanese and
international food prices, which has led to rising demands
from consumers for liberalized food imports.
The removal of beef import quotas effective April 1,
1991, was expected to release a pent-up demand for beef by
an affluent market which is half the size of that in the
United States.

With 124 million people, in terms of total

domestic consumption the Japanese market is the second
largest in the world.

Japan is also one of the two largest

net food importers in the world (the former Soviet Union has
been the other).

Even preceding market liberalization, from

1960 to 1985 the real value of Japan's food imports
increased at an average rate of 13 percent per year, which
is more than three times that of the world total (Hayami
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1988, 2).

Consistent with this is Japan's self-sufficiency

in beef production, which declined from 96 percent in i960
to 69 percent in 1986 (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 11).
Monthly disposable income per household in Japan has
increased from 344,000 yen (about $1,450) per month in 1983
to 406,000 yen (about $3,170) per month in 1988 while food
purchases, though still the largest single budget
expenditure, declined from 21 percent of household
disposable income to 18.4 percent for the same period (JETRO
1990, 34-35).

Similarly, expenditures by Japanese consumers

for eating and drinking in 1988 was 157 billion yen (about
$1-23 billion).

At 27 percent of all expenditures in

leisure-related markets, this was the highest single
category in terms of disposable income spent of any leisure
market (JETRO 1990, 54).
In spite of rising beef prices, beef consumption in
Japan has shown a per-capita increase to roughly 10 pounds
in 1986 (compared to nearly 70 pounds per-capita consumption
in the U.S.) from just under 2.5 pounds in 1960.

This level

is expected to increase to 15 pounds per capita

by 1995

(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 45), or to as much as one-half

of

the per-capita U.S. consumption (interview with Hiroshi
Aoyama, General Manager, Meat Products Department, Nichiro
Corporation, June 17, 1992).

This would eventually place

per-capita Japanese beef consumption
Given the high price elasticity

at 30 to 35 pounds.
of beef in Japan, if
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prices decline as expected with market liberalization, an
increase in consumption should outpace increases in price.
Beef consumption in Japan has increased with the increase in
disposable income.

When quantity consumed is charted

against disposable income, however, elasticity is estimated
to be 1.5, so that with an increase of one unit of
disposable income, consumption will increase by 1.5 units.
Beef consumption, then, is expected to increase at a faster
rate than the increase in disposable income (Khan et al.
1990, 13).
Econometric studies conducted by Thomas Wahl, Dermot
Hayes, and Gary Williams suggest as much:
The estimated expenditure elasticities indicate that
both Wagyu and import-quality beef are luxury goods in
Japan.
The expenditure elasticity of demand for
import-quality beef is also greater than is that for
Wagyu beef.
This result is somewhat surprising because
Wagyu beef is more expensive in Japan than is importquality beef (Wahl et al. 1991, 122-123).
Wahl et al go on to report that, under the Beef Market
Access Agreement (BMAA), beef imports are projected to reach
1.2 million metric tons by 1997, up from an anticipated
394,000 metric tons for 1990.

In view of this, Wahl et al

see an opportunity for U.S. and other beef exporters "to
significantly increase exports to Japan" (Wahl et al. 1991,
125).

While the authors expect the "disappearance" of Wagyu

to change little, they also expect per-capita
"disappearance" of import-quality beef to more than double
by 1997.

Likewise, consistent with the increasing market
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for beef imports in Japan, U.S. producers expect their
exports to more than double by the year 2000 (Parker and
Scandurra 1991).

Dermot Hayes expects the value of U.S.

exports to Japan to also double, but he expects it to do so
by 1993.

With U.S. beef exports valued at $1.1 billion in

1989, anticipated sales should therefore exceed $2.2 billion
in real terms by 2000.
While climbing from 278,000 tons in 1970 to 565,282
tons in 1987, domestic beef production has not kept pace
with consumer demand.

Even with the increase in consumer

demand, meat consumption in Japan lags that of other
countries of similar economic stature.

Though pork is the

meat most often purchased by the Japanese consumer, beef is
nonetheless most frequently named as the meat of choice
among most age groups.

Increases in purchases of U.S. beef

are expected to range from 20 percent to 100 percent
depending upon the cut (Khan et al. 1991, 60).

When and how

much largely depends upon a drop in prices, which is
expected to occur as the ad valorem tax declines.
With the projected increase in Japan's population, the
limited productive capability of Japan's domestic beef
industry, and increasing consumer demand, much of the
growing market for beef in Japan will be satisfied by
imports.

As such, if exports of U.S. beef to Japan double

from $1 billion to $2 billion by 1993 as Dr. Hayes expects,
this market would be equivalent to 10 percent of the U.S.
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beef industry at present value ($20 billion)

(Hayes 1990,

6), or an increase of 12 million people in the U.S.
population (Hayes et al. 1990, 161).

In fact, beef imports

are expected to capture an increasing share of an increasing
market as the affects of market liberalization take hold.
As of 1991, 70 percent of U.S. beef exports, valued at
$1 billion, were shipped to Japan.

In 1989, the U.S.

shipped 850 million pounds of beef and veal to Japan.

This

is equivalent to 1.6 million cattle, or 30,000 head per
week, which is about 4 percent of U.S. production.

As

reported by the U.S. Meat Export Federation, these exports
increased the value of an average U.S. steer by $79 in 1989
(Dorgan 1990, lA) as a factor of increased demand.
Compared to imported U.S. beef, domestic Japanese beef
was roughly three times as expensive in 1990.

Tokyo meat

specialists expect that gap to close, however, as U.S.
suppliers develop their product to meet the requirements of
the Japanese consumer.

As a luxury good, top-quality beef

often escapes the typical consumer search for bargains
(Cullison 1991, lOA).
As reported by the U.S. Meat Export Federation,
Japanese consumption of beef is expected to double or triple
by 2000.

John Harris, a major west-coast beef processor and

exporter of beef to Japan, "sees a fivefold increase in U.S.
beef sales to Japan if the U.S. cattle industry can capture
just half the expansion in purchases by Japanese consumers"
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(Dorgan 1990, lA).

While imported beef accounts for about

40 percent of Japan's annual beef consumption at present, by
the turn of the century that share is expected to fill more
than half of total Japanese demand.

As of 1991, U.S.

imports accounted for about 43 percent of that 40 percent
(Cullison 1991, lOA).
In the Tokyo Wholesale Market on February 1, 1990,
prices of air-freighted chilled carcasses from longerfed US cattle graded B3 varied between 1,200 yen and
1,400 yen per kilogram (Lin and Mori 1991, 104).
With the exchange rate at 144.93 yen-per-dollar on
February 1, 1990, this converts to a range of $3.76 to $4.38
per pound.

In comparison, prices for U.S. prime carcasses

in the U.S. wholesale market for that same date were
approximately $1.20 to $1.25 on a per pound basis*
(telephone interview with Cattle Fax 1992).

This

differential suggests a profit margin in the range of $2.50
to $3.10 per pound in the Japanese market over the U.S.
market.

At the top end of the scale,

in the same year Kobe

beef, or Wagyu raised in the Kobe region of Japan and known
for its superior marbling even by Wagyu standards, sold for
as much as $180 per pound in Japan.

To the extent that

carcass quality can be improved, the upside in terms of

‘This price range is based on adding from $5.00 to $6.00
per hundred-weight to the wholesale carcass price of "Choice
cut-out value," which is a "rule-of-thumb" for determining the
price range of Prime carcasses.
The Choice cut-out value on
February 1, 1990 was $117.53 per hundred-weight for carcasses
weighing 550 to 700 pounds (telephone interview with Cattle
Fax, June 3, 1992).
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price-per-pound is substantial.
Restaurants offer significant potential as markets for
U.S. chilled beef.

Thirty-four percent of Japanese beef

consumption occurs in restaurants (Eaheart 1991, 15).

There

is an estimated one restaurant for every 125 people in
Japan, as opposed to one for every 400 people in the U.S.
(Martin 1991, 158).

More than 41 percent of all sales in

all retail franchise chains occurs in foodservice franchise
outlets (Martin 1991, 158).

Home consumption, however,

remains the largest sector for beef disappearance at 51
percent, yet, at 25 percent, is also the smallest sector for
consumption of beef imports (Eaheart 1991, 15).
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CHAPTER 10
DEFINITION OF PRODUCT

Generally, Japanese consumers claim to judge beef
quality by marbling and tenderness.
However, according
to retailer [sic], price seems to be the most important
factor in judging quality.
A Washington State University Team that
visited Japan in 1989, reported in BEEF
(Vansickle 1991a, 39).

Traditional Japanese dishes require very tender beef.
Tenderness and flavor is largely a function of marbling —
the more intramuscular fat there is (marbling) the more
tender and flavorful the meat.

The Japanese style of

premium beef production, i.e., extended feeding periods for
Wagyu cattle, evolved from this product requirement.

For

instance, sukiyaki is made with paper-thin slices of beef,
cooked in a skillet with vegetables and a special soy sauce.
Shabu-shabu also requires paper-thin slices of beef, which
are dipped into boiling water with seasoned ingredients.
Without a very high degree of marbling, beef cooked in this
manner may produce an offensive odor (especially true with
grass-fed beef) and often becomes tough when boiled or
cooked in high moisture.

The advantage of highly-marbled

beef is with its fat, which tends to seal the natural juices
71
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and promote tenderness by melting around the meat.

The

preference for highly-marbled beef may also be a factor of
conditioning in that Japanese consumers are raised to
believe that the best tasting beef is that of the heavilymarbled Wagyu (Hayes et al. 1990, 169).
In addition to marbling, other important, defining
characteristics of meat quality include freshness (chilled
being much preferred to frozen), color and texture of the
meat, fat color, moisture content ("absence of drip"), and
ultimately, what beef-type the meat is (i.e., Japanese Wagyu
vs. domestic dairy vs. imported).

The degree to which the

product is organic, in the sense of being raised free of
pesticides, additives, and chemical treatment (growth
implants or vaccinations), and processed without the use of
preservatives, are also important considerations for the
Japanese consumer.
Separate from the beef itself, but nonetheless an
important characteristic of the product, is packaging.
Labeling of package ingredients is important in order to
identify (or the lack thereof) any inorganic inputs.

Also,

the size, appearance, and quality of package defines which
type of beef it is.

Small packages are the norm, reflecting

not only the smaller servings which are typical of the
Japanese market but also the relative lack of storage space
(most meat is consumed on the day of purchase because of
limited refrigeration space in the typical Japanese home).
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Nearly half of all meat purchases are between one-half and
one pound, and beef is purchased on an average of once or
twice per week.

Several layers of wrapping, higher quality

materials, and attractive, eye-catching packages are
important to the Japanese consumer.

In fact, it is not

uncommon for the cost of packaging to exceed the cost of
contents in Japan (Khan et al. 1990, 49-50), as it often
does in the United States.
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CHAPTER 11
BEEF GRADING IN JAPAN

Because the quality grade is determined by the lowest
score of the four quality characteristics, carcasses of
the same quality grade often display dissimilar quality
characteristics....Because buyers may place different
values on different yield and quality characteristics,
it is not surprising to see that carcasses of the same
yield and quality grades are priced over a wide range.
Biing-Hwan Lin and Hiroshi Mori (Lin and Mori
1991, 104).

In April of 1988 Japan changed its beef grading system
in an attempt to place less emphasis on marbling in order to
reduce production costs.

As a result, more emphasis has

been given to carcass yield, but as a practical matter
marbling has remained a primary consideration in judging the
quality of a particular carcass.
of six categories.

The old system consisted

In descending order these were:

Supreme, Superior, Excellent, Medium, Common, and Utility.
Marbling scores, ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 5,
were also used to refine each grade.

Japanese graders

considered U.S. Prime to be equivalent to Japan's Excellent
grade, U.S. medium and high Choice were rated equivalent to
Japan's Medium, and U.S. low Choice and high Good were
considered equivalent to Japanese Common (Khan et al. 1990,
74
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17) .
At the time of the above comparison, the U.S. meat
grades were,

in descending order of quality:

Good, Standard, Cutter, and Canner.

Prime, Choice,

Prime, Choice, Good,

and Standard were further delineated as high (+), medium
(absence of + of -), or low (-).

Subsequently, "Good" was

renamed "Select."
Comparison of U.S. grades with Japanese grades would
then appear as follows:

Table 10
Former Japanese Beef Grades and U.S. Equivalents

Source:

Japanese Grade

U.S. Equivalent

Supreme
Superior
Excellent
Medium
Common
Utility

none
none
Prime
High or Medium Choice
Low Choice or High Good
(no poor beef exported)

Khan et al. 1990, 17.

An important difference between the Japanese system and
the U.S. system is the carcass used to determine grade.
While these Japanese grades were determined by cutting the
carcass between the 5th and 6th rib, in the U.S. the
standard has been to cut between the 12th and 13th rib.

The

significance of this is that the meat is generally more
highly marbled at the former cut (5th and 6th ribs), which
has caused U.S. beef to be downgraded in the Japanese market
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(Hayes 1990, 2).
The new Japanese grading system involves three yield
grades, A, B and C, which use a regression equation to
classify yield percentages.

According to Mr. Aoyama

(General Manager, Meat Products Department, Nichiro
Corporation), yield grade refers to the amount of meat
retrieved from a carcass, with 70 percent yield qualifying
as A, 60 percent yield as B, and less than 60 percent as C
(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 1992).

Yield is determined

so that the normal distribution is around the B grade.
Four other classifications, consisting of;
marbling;

(2) meat color and brightness;

(1) beef

(3) meat firmness

and texture; and (4) color, luster, and quality of fat; are
each important measures of quality and are each rated on a
scale of 1 to 5 with 5 being high.

Carcasses in Japan are

now cut between the sixth and seventh rib for the purposes
of grading throughout Japan.
A multiple regression equation, which includes four
carcass measurements, estimates the cutability percentage of
the carcass and assigns a yield score.

Most measurements

are taken between the sixth and seventh rib.

For Wagyu

carcasses, a factor of 2 percent is added to the base
numerical score in the equation, giving Wagyu a slight but
automatic advantage (interview with Dr. Jerry Reeves, June
18, 1992).
There are 12 classifications for marbling (l is low, 12
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is high), with l having no intramuscular fat (similar to
wild meat), and 12 appearing to be peppered with fat, all
intramuscular, comprising as much as 80 percent of the cut.
There are seven colors of meat, ranging from a bright pink
(best) to a deep, ruddy red (worst).

There are also seven

colors of fat, ranging from a bright, pure white (best) to a
yellowish white (worst).

Color assessment for both meat and

fat is by visual appraisal, as are firmness and texture.
Once each of the four classifications are assigned a
number (from one to five), the lowest of those four numbers
is placed with the yield score.

The result is a grade

ranging from Cl (lowest) to A5 (highest).

Out of a possible

fifteen scores, the final meat quality score is the minimum
score which that carcass can be assigned.
When the new grading system was implemented (1988),
quantity of steer carcasses grading in each category in
Japan appeared as follows:
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Table 11
Carcass Grades of Beef Steers in Japan (1988)
Yield Quality

Source :

Meat Quality
1

2

3

4

5

A

A1
0%

A2
3%

A3
8%

A4
11%

A5
6%

B

B1
1%

B2
23%

B3
22%

B4
4%

B5
1%

C

Cl
2%

C2
12%

C3
8%

C4
0%

C5
0%

Johnson and Fisher,

1988, 30.

It is notable that only 33 percent of all domestic
steer carcasses graded in Japan in 1988 were in the B4 to A5
range, which is loosely defined as being of premium
restaurant quality.
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CHAPTER 12
THE JAPANESE BEEF MARKET

Japan is not one general market.
There are many
different segments.
Philip M. Seng, President and CEO, U.S. Meat
Export Federation (Cullison 1991, IDA).

Top quality beef is considered a luxury in Japan and is
generally reserved for special occasions.

This niche

represents about 6 percent of the Japanese beef market, and
is by-and-large unaffected by rising and falling incomes.
Primary users of this type of beef are luxury hotels and
exclusive restaurants, and to some extent, supermarkets
(Khan et al. 1990, 19).
A much larger segment of the market, in the range of 65
to 70 percent, is made up of end-users of popular beef and
can be split into two subgroups: high quality (HQ) beef and
popular beef.

HQ beef is made up of Wagyu which did not

make the top grades and dairy beef which grades as high as
the lesser quality Wagyu.

U.S. grain-fed Prime beef is

generally within this market.

Imported beef (primarily from

the U.S. and Australia) accounts for about 40 to 50 percent
of this market (Khan et al. 1990, 19).
79
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The second subgroup, "popular beef," is made up of the
less-desirable cuts of HQ beef, imported grass-fed beef
(Australia), imported U.S. Choice beef, and the lesser
grades of domestic dairy beef.
The remaining 30 percent of the beef market goes to
beef used in processing, such as beef for sausage and
meatloaf.

Lower beef grades and the less desirable cuts

from higher grades fill this demand (Khan et al. 1990, 20).
It is important to note that the large middle market
has been growing much faster than either the top or bottom
segments in recent years.

An end-user who is cost conscious

and concerned about quality typifies this market segment.
From 1985 to 1989, the cumulative growth in this market was
10 percent (Winkler 1991, 21b).
The Japanese are very cosmopolitan and enjoy a
relatively high percentage of overseas travel, due largely
to the appreciation of the yen and the relative wealth of
the Japanese economy, and a high per-capita savings rate.
As a result, and with the pervasive western influence on
Japanese culture, dietary habits in Japan are changing.

For

instance, as a percent of diet, fat has increased from 8.8
percent in 1955 to 27.4 percent in 1985 (compared to 45
percent fat in the average American diet in 1982).
Likewise, while protein consumption has remained relatively
constant (11.3 percent in 1955 to 13 percent in 1985),
carbohydrates have declined from nearly 80 percent to under
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60 percent by 1985 (Moore 1990, 3).
Another reflection of dietary change is witnessed by a
broadening of cooking styles, including barbecuing or
grilling, stews and curries.

As a result, the need for

highly-marbled beef from the standpoint of odor and flavor
retention is becoming less predominant.
"The total Japanese meat market of 4.7 million tons is
composed of three major submarkets:

beef (19 percent), pork

(42 percent), and chicken (35 percent)" (Khan et al. 1990,
63).

Imports account for 37 percent of the beef market,

20

percent of the pork market, and 12.5 percent of the chicken
market (Khan et al. 1990, 63).
Despite its lesser stature in terms of volume, the meat
of choice for out-of-home consumption by the Japanese
consumer is

beef (Khan et al. 1990, 39, 41).

Beef is

perceived by the Japanese consumer to be healthy and
flavorful.

It is also perceived as a food of choice among

"smart" people (interview with Hidetaka Iwasaki, President,
Nichiro Pacific, Ltd., June 17, 1992).

However, a relative

unfamiliarity with methods of preparation and a relatively
high price hamper more frequent consumer purchases of beef.
When beef is purchased, domestic Wagyu and dairy tend to be
purchased most frequently, followed by imported chilled
beef.

Imported frozen beef occupies the bottom slot.
Price awareness appears to be based on two concerns.

One is that beef is relatively expensive, and given its
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elasticity of demand, when price drops quantity expands.
Another is anchored in Japanese shopping habits.

The

typical Japanese housewife shops frequently, often daily,
and is therefore immediately aware of any price movement.
The reason most often given for purchase of meat imports is
its low price.
Although beef has been expensive in Japan, as the price
of fish increases due to declining supplies, beef is
becoming more price competitive.

According to Mr. Iwasaki,

not only can the Japanese housewife get more variety with
beef than she can with fish for the same price, but she can
also make the table more attractive with beef at a lower
cost (interview with Hidetaka Iwasaki, 1992).
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CHAPTER 13
THE JAPANESE CONSUMER

Therefore, in 10 to 20 years, I believe, the
gastronomic culture of Japan will be exactly the same
as in the United States.
Hiroshi Tanaka, President of Kyotaru Co.,
which operates more than 600 restaurants in
Japan (Nation's Restaurant News 1988).
Still, total rice consumption has been dropping
steadily for decades as the Japanese diet grows more
Western.
In the past 30 years, rice consumption has
gone from 253 pounds per capita to 156 pounds.
Since
1987, in a historic turnabout, meat and dairy
consumption has exceeded rice.
Reported in "The Washington Post" (Reid 1990,
H4).
Japanese beef consumption
in the past decade, about
by imports.
USDA's Economic
BEEF (Vansickle

has grown nearly 50 percent
half of which has been fueled
Research Service, reported in
1991a, 37).

In addition to being one of the wealthiest countries in
the world, with a 1990 population of nearly 124 million
Japan is also one of the most populous (seventh in the
world).

Its population is expected to increase moderately

to a peak of about 136 million in 2013, and the percentage
of people over age 65 is expected to increase from about 10
percent in 1985 to over 22 percent by 2015 (Statistical
Handbook 1991, 15).

Elderly people tend to eat less food in

general and less fat specifically.

They do, however, prefer

83
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high quality protein foods (JETRO 1990, 17), but all-in-all
will probably consume less beef than younger people.
About 43 percent of the population lives within a
fifty-kilometer radius of three metropolitan areas:
Osaka, and Nagoya.

Tokyo,

The average size of the Japanese

household decreased from around five (1920 to 1955) to 3.1
in 1989 (Statistical Handbook 1991, 22).
Due largely to the appreciation of the yen and falling
oil prices, domestic prices in Japan have maintained a
stable trend in recent years.

With 1985 as the base year

(100), by 1990 the Consumer Price Index in Japan was 108.9,
compared to 124.3 for the United States (Statistical
Handbook 1991, 150).

At the retail level, the CPI for food

in Japan increased at a somewhat slower rate, to 102.2 in
1989 and 106.9 in 1990.

The relatively sharp rise in food

prices between 1989 and 1990 was attributed to poor weather
conditions for the pertinent growing season (Statistical
Handbook 1991, 117-118).
From 1975 to 1989, as a percentage of consumption
expenditures food decreased from 30 percent to 24.3 percent.
Consumption expenditure rose 0.5 percent in real terms
(i.e., after adjustment for the rise in CPI) from 1988 to
1989.

Since 1978, with the exception of 1980 and 1981,

family income has increased in real terms each year,
although to varying degrees (from a low of 0.7 percent in
1989 to high of about 4.2 percent in 1982)

(Statistical
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Handbook 1991, 112).
Selective consumption in Japan has increased steadily
since 1982 whereas household purchases of basic necessities
have remained relatively flat.

A trend towards purchases of

goods and services which are different from the norm also
appears to be well established.

Part of this discriminating

market has targeted goods which imply high-status, such as
expensive restaurants and high-quality goods.

This is

reflected in a willingness by the Japanese consumer to pay
high prices for quality food products, such as §35 per pound
for domestic Wagyu beef (JETRO 1990, 20).
Relative to the 1950s, the Japanese are eating less
rice and more meat.

More frequent dining-out has become

common as has increasei frequency of purchase of favorite
foods (JETRO 1990, 21).

In 1988, sales in specialized

restaurants were about 15.5 trillion yen (about §128
billion)

(JETRO 1990, 22).

The number of restaurants in

Japan is expected to increase, and with it the demand for
high-quality, international cuisine (JETRO 1990, 23),
derived in part from an increase in foreign travel among the
Japanese.

Relative to total food expenditure, expenses for

dining out rose to 14.5 percent in 1989 from 9.1 percent in
1975 (Statistical Handbook 1991, 114).
With their high standard of living, a relatively large
percentage of Japanese consumers can afford to be
discriminating buyers, and therefore tend to choose high-
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quality, brand-name products.

In spite of their apparent

homogeneity, the Japanese consumer often selects products
for purchase for the individuality which it may express.
Variety becomes important in these purchase decisions (JETRO
1990, 29), but the product's cost must still be judged to be
reasonable.

As growth in disposable income has slowed in

Japan in recent years, though the middle market has
softened, high-priced high-quality goods as well as cheaper
goods continue to attract consumers.

In fact, the middle

market is losing market share to high-quality products.
Sales of high-quality imported and domestic foods has been
consistent with this trend (JETRO 1990, 36, 38).
Average monthly disposable income for worker households
in Japan was 215,500 yen (about $940) in 1975, of which food
expenditures accounted for 49,800 yen (about $220), or 23
percent.

In 1989 these figures changed to 421,400 yen

(about $3,055) monthly disposable income, of which 76,800
yen (about $557) went to the purchase of food, or 18.2
percent (Statistical Handbook 1991, 117).

In spite of what

appear to be more discriminating, and therefore more
expensive, tastes in food, as a percentage of disposable
income and as a percentage of expenditures, food costs have
declined.

This would indicate latitude in the average

Japanese household budget for the capacity to increase its
purchases of beef once the decision is made to do so.
About half of Japanese women fifteen years old and
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older are employed (Statistical Handbook 1991, 103).
Families with working women tend to save and consume more
because of higher household income, and their families tend
to eat out more frequently.

Housewives control 80 percent

of the income in Japan and give their husbands allowances
which they often spend on business entertainment, which
frequently includes dining out (JETRO 1990, 52).
The abrupt rise in wages of industrial workers,
doubling from 1955 to 1970, and doubling again from 1970 to
1985 (deflated by the CPI) translated into a change in
dietary habits.

Per-capita annual consumption of rice

declined from a peak of 118 kilograms (260 pounds) in 1962
to 80 kilograms (176 pounds) in 1980.

As a percentage of

consumption expenditure in urban, worker households, rice
declined from 10 percent in 1960 to 2 percent in 1980,
reflecting its status as an inferior good consistent with
increases in per-capita income (Hayami 1988, 50, 69).
Changes in food consumption in Japan are indicated in
the following chart;
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Table 12
Changes in Food Consumption in Japan
Percent
Change

Quantity Consumed

1960

1965

1970

1975

I960

1985

1985/
1960

Consumption
(per capita
per day)
Calorie
Protein (g)
Animal
protein (g)

2290

2459

2529

2516

2554

2581

13

70

75

78

80

83

84

20

21

26

31

35

39

41

95

150
115
100
22
5
1.1
6
22
13

145
112
108
29
9
1.5
11
38
20

128
95
114
38
13
2.1
15
50
26

122
88
110
43
18
2.5
14
53
29

113
79
110
39
23
3.5
14
62
34

109
75
108
37
25
4.4
15
67
35

-27
-35
8
68
400
300
150
205
169

Consumption
(per capita
kg/year)
Grains
Rice
Vegetables
Fruits
Meat
Beef
Egg
Dairy prod.
Fresh milk

Source:

Hayami 1988, 117.

Most notable is the increase in meat consumption by a
factor of five in a twenty-five-year-period, and an increase
in beef in the same time frame by a factor of four.

These

were the largest items of increase in per-capita consumption
of all items surveyed by a substantial margin.
In spite of a relatively flat growth rate in total
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caloric intake and a slowing in Japan's population growth,
no significant growth in aggregate demand for food in terms
of calories has occurred.

However, due to rising affluence

in Japan, changes within that overall demand have been
substantial, as reflected by an increase in consumption of
meat and a decrease in the consumption of rice.
Increasingly, Japanese diets are changing to reflect the
influence of western styles and habits, one effect of which
has been a decrease in the use of traditional seasonings.

A

growing share of imported foods within that demand structure
has been significant (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 42).
It is generally accepted that high prices have limited
the consumption of livestock products.

Though real prices

for some livestock products have fallen, real prices for
beef and fish have risen.

Consequently, pork, chicken, and

some dairy products have experienced faster growth rates in
consumption than have beef and fish.

Much of this is

attributable to protectionist policies which have
artificially inflated beef prices.
and pork were roughly equal in 1960.

Retail prices for beef
During the 1980s,

however, beef prices exceeded pork prices by about three
times.

Protectionist trade policies have been responsible

for this misalignment (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 43).
While beef consumption grew from 1.1 kilograms per
person per year (2.4 pounds) in 1960 to 4.6 kilograms (10.1
pounds)

in 1986, pork consumption grew from 1.1 kilograms
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(2.4 pounds) to 10.7 (23.6 pounds), and chicken from 0.8
(1.8 pounds) to 9.8 (21.6) in the same time period (Johnson
and Fisher 1988, 45).

The lower rate of increase in beef

consumption is blamed on restrictions on its availability,
and consequently its high price relative to other meats.
Furthermore, in spite of the apparent increase in per
person beef consumption, Japan's current level remains
less than half that of most industrialized countries
and only about a tenth the quantity consumed in
Australia and the United States (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 44).
As judged by international standards of the optimal
diet in terms of protein, fat, and carbohydrates consumed,
the Japanese diet has essentially achieved the optimum.
Changes in dietary habits will therefore occur in response
to changes in taste, cooking practices, and food preference
rather than as an attempt to improve the diet as a whole
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 44).
A seasonal pattern in the type of beef consumed is
evident.
slices,

Premium grade Wagyu, purchased in paper-thin
is most popular in mid-winter and in April and May,

when sukiyaki and shabu-shabu are cooked for festive
occasions.

In the summer, when barbecuing and grilling are

popular, lower grade domestic beef and the bulk of imported
beef are purchased (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 45).

With a

broadening in cooking practices these distinctions may blur,
however.

For example, cooking steaks at home that are as

well prepared as those in restaurants appeals to Japanese
housewives.

To do so, those housewives have indicated that
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they would like to learn new cooking methods ((Khan et al.
1990, 39).
To the Japanese consumer, domestic beef and imported
beef are two separate commodities, as different as, say,
pork and lamb (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 46).

The beef

market in Japan is highly segmented, with each segment
displaying different price and income elasticities.
Imported beef is often further segmented according to
source.

Imported beef may therefore not serve as a close

substitute for domestic beef (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 46).
However, this assessment did not take into account chilled,
grain-fed beef imported from the U.S.

To the Japanese

consumer, freshness is tantamount to quality.

In addition,

even when it was imported as frozen, U.S. grain-fed beef
qualified for the top end of the middle market, otherwise
defined as "high quality beef," a market which was judged to
be relatively insensitive to price because of the lack of
substitutes (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 47).
In 1987 the Australian Meat and Live-Stock Corporation
identified five market segments;

"(1) high-class hotels and

restaurants, and retail and supermarket outlets;

(2)

middle- class hotels and restaurants, and retail and
supermarket outlets;

(3) lower-class restaurants and fast

food outlets; and (4) manufacturing, ham and sausage small
good industries"

(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 48).

Some up-scale western markets were included in the
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"high class" category, in spite of the fact that domestic
Wagyu was this segment's primary meat source.

Western-style

restaurants also made up part of the "middle class" market,
serviced in part by imported grain-fed and chilled beef.
It is assumed that demand for imported beef will
increase as prices fall.

Greater availability of beef

should also lead to its greater utilization outside the
home.

Finally, consumption of beef is expected to increase

at a faster rate than that of pork and chicken, and should
eventually exceed pork and chicken in total consumption
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 138).
Specifically, total consumption of beef in Japan is
estimated by the Australian Meat and Live-Stock Corporation
to increase by 8 percent per year from 1990 to 1994, and
imported beef consumption is expected to increase 10 percent
per year in the same period (Winkler 1991, 25b).

By another

estimate, consumption is expected to reach 1.675 million
metric tons by Japanese fiscal year 1995 (April 1995 through
March 1996), of which 1.115 million metric tons, or 67
percent, will be imported (Platt and Youmans 1991, 44b).
This would be an increase of 25 percent over estimated
JY1991 levels.
What type of beef will supply this demand? It will be
perceived by the Japanese consumer as a fresh, high
quality product that is attractively packaged,
healthful, and free of residues.
It will display well
in the show case.
It will be convenient to prepare
(perhaps microwave ready) and will appeal to a growing
number of affluent, sophisticated, working women.
Processed meats, gift items, and ethnic and gourmet
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items also have opportunity.
Most importantly, beef
that tantalizes the Japanese consumer will have the
culinary attributes that appeal to the Japanese palate
(Platt and Youmans 1991, 44b).
From 1962 to 1986 the Japanese consumer has enjoyed
real growth —

at an annual rate of 3.5 percent per year —

in per-capita expenditure for beef.

For the same period,

annual real growth of 3.1 percent in monthly per-capita
income and 3.3 percent growth in fish expenditures were
recorded (Hayes et al. 1990, 206).

In real terms, then, the

growth in meat expenditures exceeded growth in income.

Not

only did the per-capita amount of beef consumed increase,
but it did so even as it became more expensive relative to
fish.

One might conclude that a pent-up demand for beef

therefore exists, and with the drop in prices expected from
a liberalized Japanese market, significant increases in percapita consumption will occur.
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CHAPTER 14
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT

Although the Japanese prefer the flavor of U.S. cornfed beef to the grass-fed beef of Australia, the latter
is perceived to be of higher guality because its shelf
life of more than 60 days is double that of most U.S.
beef.
Patrick E. Brecht, American President Lines
L td., director of special commodities
technical services (Dunlap 1991, IB).
...in the U.S. you can ship things by the half a pound.
Here you get gram sales, individually sliced beef for
shabu-shabu.
This all adds onto the cost in a way
foreign trade houses aren't used to dealing with.
A general manager for one of Japan's largest
packers, reported in the "Journal of
Commerce" (Cody 1991, 2A).

Perhaps more important than any other consideration to
the Japanese consumer is that of guality.

To develop beef

with the quality that is demanded by the Japanese consumer
is likely the largest challenge faced by a foreign producer.
Not only is imported beef generally perceived as lesser in
guality than domestic beef, but the Japanese consumer is
often not aware of the inherent differences between grassfed and grain-fed imported beef.
Further delineation can be made in defining the scale
of production in marketing the product.

Generally speaking,

94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

the Japanese prefer family-scale businesses that are small
enough to be flexible yet large enough to deliver adequate
quantities of a consistent, high-quality product.
Flexibility may vary from changing cutting practices and
packaging methods to accommodate the needs of the end-user
to supplying the quantity needed when it's needed.
Long-term relationships are extremely important to the
Japanese, and must therefore be equally important to the
supplier of the Japanese market.

Critical to a long-term

relationship is a supplier's commitment to not sell his
product to a buyer's direct competitor.

The supplier must

also be committed to meeting the buyer's delivery schedules
and special needs, including the development of a
differentiated product (Hayes et al. 1990, 171), if a long
term relationship is to flourish.
confrontation must be avoided.

By all means,

Trust is essential.

If the

supplier is willing to commit himself to this type of
business relationship, then long-term profits can be
expected and the supplier will find his interests protected
in the Japanese market (Khan et al. 1990, 75).
Developing a brand name and a product guarantee of
safety, taste and freshness may be central to successful
promotion of one's product in Japan (Khan et al. 1990, 6869).

Attributes of brand-name products which appeal to the

Japanese consumer include quality, fashion, status, and
"delicate deviation," i.e., "the expression of a modicum of
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individuality within a framework of overall conformity”
(JETRO 1990, 39, 46).

It is important for the exporter to

cater to psychological as well as material needs in
promoting his product (JETRO 1990, 69).
Once the product is developed, in order to maintain
quality, care must be taken during transportation.

For

instance, a container of chilled beef must not be allowed to
sit in the sun while waiting to be loaded, nor should it be
stored on the port-side of a ship's cargo bin in summer
where it can also be heated by the sun (interview with John
Morse, President of Zenchiku Land and Livestock Co.,
February 21, 1992).

A consistent temperature of 30 degrees

fahrenheit must be maintained throughout the product's
transport if good condition at arrival is to be assured.
Temperature monitors may be used throughout the process to
determine this.

Special packaging may also be required to

seal in moisture and to protect the product from bruising
from handling or vessel movement (Seim 1990, 124-125).
Packaging at the processing plant should consider the
demands of the end-user so that repackaging for the retail
outlet is not needed.

Likewise, the exterior packaging

should be marked in Japanese to save remarking when it
reaches Japan.
These steps, and a myriad of others like them, are
required if the supplier is to assure delivery of a quality
product.

It is this type of effort which is vital to
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establishing and maintaining a long-term relationship with a
Japanese buyer.
A critical step in product development, and one which
is imperative to assure product quality during
transportation, is shelf life.

Shelf life refers to the

limited life of chilled beef due to the présence of bacteria
and natural decomposition.

A minimum shelf life of 60 days

is necessary if the product is to remain fresh from
slaughter to port-of-departure to port-of-entry to retail
meat case and the consumer's table, or to restaurant
refrigerator and the customer's plate.

Twenty-seven to 28

days are generally required from the time the carcass is
chilled till the beef reaches the retail outlet.

With a 60-

day product life, 32 to 33 days remain for the retailer to
sell the product (Seim 1990, 129).

This is important to the

Japanese retailer because it allows them the flexibility to
withhold beef from the market if they expect a favorable
price movement (Platt and Youmans 1991, 43b).
A shelf life of 45 days has been adequate for beef
produced in the U.S. and sold domestically because of the
relative proximity of slaughter plant to supermarket.

To

achieve an extended shelf life, modifications to meat
processing methods and packaging are required.

Sanitation

at slaughter and during processing, temperature control,
handling and transportation all affect shelf life.

Not all

slaughter plants will be willing to make these adjustments.
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The producer who is interested in exporting chilled beef to
Japan, however, will need to find a packing plant which will
accommodate itself to its customer's specifications.

This

might include doing all final cuts at the supplier's packing
plant to avoid butchering in Japan.

As labor becomes more

scarce in Japan, this may become an important consideration.
The need for extended shelf-life can be cut
considerably if air transport is used.

The problem,

however, is that air transportation costs about four times
as much as ocean freight.

If the volume shipped by a given

exporter is significant, air freight becomes prohibitive.
Temperature control and handling requirements are also more
difficult with air freight (Dunlap 1991, 8 B ) .
In addition to improving shelf life, marbling must also
be improved.

To produce the highly-marbled beef required by

the premium Japanese market, at a minimum longer feeding
periods by U.S. feeders will be required.
Because marbling is the deposition of excess energy
consumed by the animal, a longer period of consumption
by the beef animal of excess energy is required to get
increased marbling.
However, marbling is not the only
site where fat is deposited.
Excess energy (in the
form of fat) is also deposited as seam fat between
muscles (intermuscular fat) and external fat under the
hide (subcutaneous fat).
Both seam fat and external
fat are generally not consumed and are removed or
trimmed during cutting, which lowers the saleable yield
of the carcass and reduces profits.
Ideally for the
Japanese market, longer feeding times would increase
marbling with no increase in seam or external fat
(Knipe et al. 1990, 154).
The trick is to do just that.

Selection of cattle

which have a genetic predisposition to marbling, and the use
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of ultrasonics to determine how well a given animal is
marbling while on feed, may be two of many tools which will
need to be explored by the U.S. producer in an attempt to
develop beef for this particular market.
Promotion may be viewed as an essential element of
product development.

The U.S. Meat Export Federation

allocated $12 million to promote U.S. beef in Japan in 1991.
Supermarkets in Japan were also beginning to place imported
beef in the center of display cases rather than at the
sides, which had a positive affect on sales (Pendley 1991,
lOA).
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CHAPTER 15
COMPETITION AND COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

There are primarily three competitors for the Japanese
beef market;

domestic producers within Japan, Australian

cattle raisers and feedlot operators, and beef producers
within the United States.

Argentina and Brazil, though

major exporters of beef, are focused primarily on European
markets.

Though the Canadian beef industry is as efficient

as the U.S. and Australia, Canadian meat packaging and
transportation is not as well developed for export as are
those facilities in the U.S.

New Zealand does export beef

to Southeast Asia but does not have the volume of the U.S.
or Australia.®
As of 1987, the U.S. had the largest share of the
imported beef market, in terms of tonnage and value, if beef
offal is included with chilled and frozen beef.

Combined

beef imports inside and outside of the stipulated quotas
were as follows:

®In 1989 there were 7.8 million cattle in New Zealand,
12.2 million in Canada, 22.4 million in Australia, 50.8
million in Argentina, 99.2 million in the United States, and
136.8 million in Brazil (Japan Statistical Yearbook 1991,
768) .
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Table 13
Australian and U.S. Share of Total Japanese Beef Market
UNITED STATES

AUSTRALIA

Total
Tons

Year
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1987

119,510
157,072
177,609
182,838
214,991
273,231
317,935

Source;

Tons
88,421
94,451
106,271
96,953
101,340
117,033
134,757

%
Share

Tons

Share

% of
Import
Market

74.0
60.1
59.8
53.0
47.1
42.8
42.4

20,544
46,432
59,173
75,746
96,780
137,774
162,997

17.2
29.6
33.3
41.4
45.0
50.4
51.3

91.2
89.7
93.1
94.4
92.1
93.2
93.7

Johnson and Fisher 1988, 149.

From 1976 to 1987, beef imported from Australia and the
United States grew by 166 percent.

Within that market, in

terms of tonnage shipped, Australia's market grew by 52
percent while that for the U.S. grew by 693 percent.
Coincident with this, Australia's market share slipped from
74 percent to just over 42 percent, due to the erosion of
its market by competitors from the United States, whose
market share grew from just over 17 percent to more than
half.
This can be attributed to two things above others.

One

is political pressure from the U.S. for Japan to open its
beef market to U.S. exports.

The other is grain-fed beef

which the U.S. has historically produced, and which is more
suitable to the Japanese palate than is grass-fed beef which
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has been Australia's mainstay.
However, if frozen and chilled beef only are taken into
account, the U.S. share of the market takes a noticeable
drop:

Table 14
Australian and U.S. Share of Japanese Beef Market:
Frozen and Chilled Beef
Value

Volume (tons)
($1 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 )

1987

1988

1988

1987

220.0

263.5

348.7

Chilled
Australia
U.S.A.
Others

59.8
52.3
6.5
1.0

78.8
64.0
13.4
1.5

Frozen
U.S.A.
Australia
Others

160.3
78.8
68.9
12.6

184.7
96.5
72.3
15.9

Total Beef

Source ;

1988

1989

799.8

1190.4

1645.2

118.4
93.7
22.8
1.9

221.8
185.9
31.9
4.0

351.0
263.9
79.9
7.2

591.1
428.7
151.2
10.6

230.3
126.7
82.9
20.7

578.0
349.0
178.4
50.6

839.3
557.3
207.8
74.2

1054.1
727.0
239.3
87.8

AGSMS 1991, 2.

The U.S. share of the chilled beef imports in 1989 was
19 percent in terms of volume and 26 percent in terms of
value.

If chilled and frozen beef imports are combined, the

U.S. share becomes 43 percent in terms of volume and 53
percent in terms of value for 1989.

In either case, the

growth of U.S. beef imports to Japan has exceeded the growth
of Australian imports.

Incidental to the Japanese market is
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"In fiscal 1991, the U.S. imported $1.23 billion in
Australian ag products, against exports of only $236
million" (Doane's 1992b).

In any event, the total market is

expected to increase which should increase sales in terms of
volume and value for all beef exporters to Japan.

Australia
Australia has smart, export-oriented beef producers who
will fight tooth-and-nail for the Southeast Asian
market — which, after all, is on the Aussies' front
lawn.
Jonathan Knutson, "Agweek Magazine" (Knutson
1990, F2).

Australia's largest export market for beef is the
United States, which imported 365,000 tons of Australian
beef in 1990, followed by Japan, which imported 200,000 tons
(Winkler 1991, 21b).

Japan began to import substantial

tonnages of beef around 1955, the bulk of which was sourced
from Australia as frozen, grass-fed beef.

The primary use

for this meat was for institutions and meat processors.

As

a result, Australia's beef became known as a low-quality
product.
Thinking that chilled beef would be better than frozen,
Japan opened its market to imports of chilled beef from
Australia in the 1970s.

Even when imported chilled, by

Japanese standards Australian beef was cheap, particularly
when compared to U.S. grain-fed beef.

In addition, because
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it was relatively cheap, Australian beef gave importers
greater opportunity for price markup, and hence a wider
profit margin, than U.S. beef.

Importers therefore promoted

Australian beef more than U.S. grain-fed beef, giving it
wider consumer exposure and higher volume sales.

U.S.

imports were then directed to specialty markets within the
table meat trade.

This remained the case until 1978, when

Japan made quantitative and qualitative adjustments to its
quota system in favor of the U.S. product in response to
political pressure from the United States.

When combined

with a growing preference by the Japanese consumer for
grain-fed beef, which more closely resembles Japanese
domestic beef, Australia has lost market share to the U.S.
(Johnson and Fisher 1988, 89-91).
In 1972 and 1973, demand for beef increased in Japan at
a time when domestic production leveled-off.

As a result,

prices for Australian beef soared and the export market to
Japan appeared to take-off.

To capitalize on this emerging

market, Australian producers began to develop a feedlot
industry, often in partnership with Japanese investors,
tailored to supplying the Japanese beef market.

Due to a

combination of factors, including the oil crisis of 1973,
accelerating inflation and rising feed costs in Japan (which
led to herd liquidations), beef prices in Japan fell
dramatically.

To protect its domestic industry, the

Japanese government first curtailed imports in 1973 and then
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closed its market to imports in 1974 for one year.
The budding feedlot industry in Australia was caught at
a vulnerable moment.

A domestic market within Australia had

not been developed for grain-fed beef, and other export
markets were not readily available.

When the Japanese

market was curtailed, and then was closed, many backers of
the Australian feedlot industry lost a lot of money.
Because of this, once the Japanese market reopened
Australian producers resisted reinvesting in the feedlot
industry.

As a result, Australia's history is one of

efficient production of grass-fat beef rather than as a
supplier of grain-fed beef.

Consequently, Australian beef

does not command the price of U.S. grain-fed beef in the
Japanese market (Johnson and Fisher 1988, 143; Winkler 1991,
26b).
Unlike the U.S. market, a strong domestic market within
Australia for grain-fed beef has not yet developed.

This

remains a detriment to Australia's grain-fed, export beef
industry since the opportunities to sell product which does
not qualify for export are limited.

The risk, therefore, is

higher than it is for the U.S. producer.
Nonetheless, Japanese investment has flowed to
Australia in order to develop a supply for the Japanese
market.

Japanese capital has been crucial in upgrading and

expanding slaughter facilities and in establishing feedlots.
With Japanese investment has come direct access to Japan's
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distribution system.

Foreign investment in Australia's beef

and meat processing industries, the bulk of which is
Japanese, has been extensive.

In fact, 3 3 percent of total

Australian slaughter is through packing plants with some
foreign ownership.

Among others, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, and

Nippon Ham have purchased feedlots in Australia to grow beef
to the specifications of their customers (Wanatabe 1991,
D2).

As of 1989, Japanese investment in Australian beef

operations reached $132 million, more than twice their
investment in the U.S.

(Time 1989).

With Japanese

investment, Australian feedlot capacity, estimated to be
600,000 head in 1991, is expected to double by 1992
(Vansickle 1991, 19).

Because of the extent of foreign

ownership, some alarm has sounded within Australia
concerning the loss of Australian control over its own beef
industry (Winkler 1991, 23b).
Australia recently introduced a new grading system
which very closely matches the Japanese system.

Called the

Chiller Assessment Scheme, the grading standard was
instituted to allow buyers, and specifically Japanese
buyers, to specify the product they want.

Like the Japanese

system, scores are assigned for marbling, meat color, fat
color, and yield.

The marbling score is identical to that

of the Japanese system, which allows Japanese buyers and
Australian suppliers to use the same criteria when defining
the product (Winkler 1991, 24b).
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Australia is currently orienting its beef trade with
Japan toward increasing its profit margins within its
existing market share of Japan's middle market, and
specifically, the home and institutional segments of that
market.

This would require raising prices of Australian

beef to price levels of U.S. imports and domestic dairy
beef.
With the financial backing of Japanese corporations,
extensive new growth in Australia's feedlot industry is
planned.

An expanded use of genetics, including the use of

Wagyu semen, is also being pursued in order to add quality
to Australia's cattle.
All of this is being done to compete for market share
at a higher market price in the Japanese market.

The

advantage that Australia has in doing so lies largely in the
evolution of Australian beef production as an export
industry.

Established primarily to service markets within

the United Kingdom, secondarily (in the 1950s) the U.S.
market, and eventually the Japanese market, Australia
developed a shelf life of 60 to 90 days for its export beef
(as opposed to 40 to 45 days for U.S. beef) as a matter of
market orientation.

Australia has had to develop a longer

shelf life to service its markets while the U.S. has not
(Hayes et al. 1990, 168).
Not only does Australia have a great deal of experience
in servicing export markets, it has a national focus to do
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so.

For example, Australia has developed the world's first

electronic health certificate (Pierce 1991, 75).

It has

also established the Australian Meat and Livestock Research
and Development Corporation, a quasi-government agency, to
conduct export research for the Australian meat industry.
This agency recently published a strategy which outlines
specific steps, including upgrading quality and price, which
Australia can take to directly compete with the U.S. for the
high-quality, grain-fed segment of the Japanese "middle
market."

This market is targeted because it represents two-

thirds of total domestic demand and offers the best
potential for continued growth (Platt and Youmans 1991,
43b).
With processing facilities located in nothern port
cities, Australian meat exporters have direct acess to ocean
transportation.

Shipping time between Melbourne and

Japanese ports has been cut to 12 or 13 days, from as long
as 27 days, due to the development of a faster shipping
link.

Average transport time from Australian ports is said

to be from 15 to 17 days (Pierce 1991, 75).
Australia currently dominates chilled beef sales to
Japan with sales of 8,000 to 12,000 tons per month compared
to chilled beef sales of 2,000 to 4,000 tons per month by
the U.S.

(1991 figures)

(Cody 1991).

Half of Australian

beef shipped to Japan is chilled, and 91 percent of chilled
beef exported by Australia is shipped to Japan.

As of 1991,
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Australia had captured about 80 percent of chilled beef
sales in Japan.

Consistent with consumer demand, however,

Australia's market share is expected to yield to higherquality, grain-fed beef sourced from the U.S.

(Pendley 1991,

6A).

Japan
I started this farm twenty-five years ago with one cow
and one-and-a-half acres of land....Over the years.
I've built up my business until today I have fifty-five
head of cattle.
Tsutomu Sameshima, a farmer near Sueyoshi,
Japan (Oka 1988b).
But as you might expect, Japanese beef is best for
Japanese.
Yaeko Shishikura, a homemaker in Chiba,
Japan (Wanatabe 1991, D2).

Though masked by its relatively high degree of
protection, Japanese agriculture has experienced a sharp
decline in comparative advantage in the postwar period
(Hayami 1988, 11).

In spite of this, and in spite of the

inherent limitations to an expanded beef industry in Japan
(farm size, cost of production, lack of feed grains and
pasture, etc.), the outlook for beef production in Japan is
not entirely bleak.

According to Hayami, beef production is

expected to become a major industry in Japanese agriculture,
especially in rougher, more remote terrain.

Beef production

in Japan for a commercial meat market is a relatively new
industry.

With an elastic demand, as prices respond to
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market liberalization, demand will rise for more product.
This should benefit the domestic producer as well as foreign
exporters.

When combined with deficiency payments,

international cooperation will be achieved and a domestic
industry will grow (Hayami 1988, 119).
Japan has also maintained steady investment in its
agricultural infrastructure, such as land improvements,
upgrading of irrigation and drainage facilities, and
construction of rural roads (Moore 1990, 9).
Perhaps the strongest advantages the Japanese producer
has are twofold:

(1) it is a domestic industry, and as such

enjoys all the attendant benefits including governmental and
popular support, direct ties to Japan's complex and
difficult distribution system, a complete lack of obstacles
inherent in the import-export trade (language,
transportation, cultural differences, etc.), and a close
geographical link to the consumer; and (2), access to a full
array of Wagyu genetics.
Because of this last point alone, the domestic Japanese
producer has a virtual lock on the very top-end of the
Japanese beef market.

Only four Wagyu bulls have been

exported from Japan, so all genetics in foreign countries
descended from those four bulls.

It is also commonly

assumed that those bulls were far from the best that Japan
had to offer.

Therefore, in terms of genetics for marbling,

Japan has no peer.
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The majority of Japan's cattle production is done by
older, semi-retired family members on farms of less than ten
head.

As previously discussed, this poses problems for the

entry of entrepreneurial talent in Japan's beef industry.
As a result, innovative practices on a significant scale in
the near future are unlikely.
Some rationalization is occurring in Japan's dairy
sector, with some benefits being realized from economies-ofscale and lower costs of production (Johnson and Fisher
1988, 136).

In the Wagyu sector, however, with market

liberalization there are fewer incentives for increased
Wagyu production due to the high costs of doing so.

That

is, as imports become cheaper, Wagyu beef will become
relatively more expensive.

It is expected that in the

longer run the Wagyu share of the Japanese beef market will
decrease from its current level of about 20 percent (Johnson
and Fisher 1988, 137).
The consensus within the Japanese beef industry is
that, at the conclusion of the three-year liberalization
phase, a deficiency payments scheme will be implemented to
replace the protection that had been granted by quotas and
price stabilization, to be administered by a restructured
Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIFO) (Johnson and
Fisher 1988, 137).

Should this be the case, the volume of

imports would be somewhat hampered since, in essence, a
certain amount of market share would be "set aside" for
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domestic producers.

However, even if this is the case, "it

is inconceivable that the government will succeed in
supporting previous levels of self-sufficiency" (Johnson and
Fisher 1988, 138).
To overcome the limitations of its domestic production
capacity, Japanese beef importers are looking to vertically
integrate by purchasing production capacity in foreign
countries.

In Australia the Japanese have purchased

ownership positions in feedlots and meat processing
facilities.

In the Pacific and Intermountain West, the

Japanese purchased Washington Beef Company, a meat
processing plant in Yakima, Washington, in 1988.

Also in

1988 the Zenchiku Corporation purchased the Selkirk Ranch
near Dillon, Montana.

Other examples in other parts of the

U.S. are readily found, such as the purchase of shares in
Iowa Beef Processors Inc.

(IBP), a major U.S. meat packer in

Nebraska, and the purchase by Japanese investors of Monterey
County Cattle Feeders Inc., which feeds an estimated 20,000
cattle for shipment to Japan, and which plans to increase
that capacity to 50,000 head (La Ganga 1990,

).

Even with its increasing presence, however, according
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, as of 1990 Japanese
ownership comprised "less than 1 percent of total investment
in U.S. farmland and agribusiness" (Farmline 1990, 10).
This percentage would be substantially higher, however, if
only cattle operations which focused on exporting carcass
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beef to Japan were considered.

For instance,

15 to 20

percent of U.S. beef exports to Japan are sourced from
Japanese-owned and Japanese-U.S. joint venture companies
(Farmline 1990, 12).
In this way the Japanese retain ownership, or at least
a significant portion of ownership, of the product from
production source to the Japanese distribution system.

It

can also
...raise, process, and package beef to the
specifications of the Japanese market in the amount
needed and distribute the beef through existing ties in
the distribution system (Khan et al. 1990, 57).
By so doing the Japanese essentially become exporters
as well as importers, and are positioned to take advantage
of the liberalized conditions of the Japanese beef market.
Japanese firms which are involved in this process, often
through joint ventures with "source" companies in foreign
countries, are also competing for import market share.
Because of their ties to the distribution system in Japan,
and the advantages they enjoy by selling in their own
country, they should prove to be formidable competitors
(Khan et al. 1990, 57).
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The United States
Even with tariffs at 70 percent..-US beef, when freed
of import restrictions in three years time, will cost
about 25 percent less than Japanese beef....
Reported in "The Christian Science Monitor"
(Oka 1983a).
At first glance, what the Japanese call a "formed
steak" looks delicious....The Japanese create this socalled steak from bits of offal — what Americans
politely call "variety meats."
For effect, a touch of
fat is added at the edge....This artistry makes it
possible for the United States to sell about 60,000
tons of offal to Japan every year, but...it has given
American beef a bad name here.
Reported in the "Los Angeles Times" (Jameson
1988a, 1).

The United States has a proven track record for being a
very large, efficient producer of grain-fattened beef.

Its

beef industry is roughly four times the size of Australia's
(roughly lOO million head in the U.S. versus 25 million head
in Australia).

It has a tremendous capacity to produce feed

grains, as well as the ability to convert those feed grains
into efficient gain ratios on very large numbers of cattle.
Though not competitive with ful1-blood Wagyu in terms of
flavor, the quality of these cattle is very good.

In terms

of production capability to service the Japanese market, the
U.S. is very well positioned.
The genetic quality of U.S. cattle, with the exception
of the narrow base of available Wagyu genetics (faced by all
countries other than Japan), is significantly ahead of
Australia's cow herd.
here, however.

A note of caution must be sounded

Australia's cattle herd was started in large
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measure by a type of Indian water buffalo, which is not
known for the marbling of its meat (interview with Dr.
Thomas Wahl, agricultural economist at Washington State
University, February 7, 1992).

The Australians have,

however, been taking advantage of the superior genetic^s
offered in the U.S. by purchasing semen for artificial
insemination.

It is expected that the "genetic deficit"

(relative to U.S. cattle) currently present in Australia's
cow herd will narrow as Australia pursues a genetic
improvement program.
Nonetheless, the U.S. is still ahead of Australia in
terms of decades-old genetic development of succulent,
grain-fed cattle.

Some would also argue that the sheer size

of the U.S. feeding and packing industry may also lend
itself to supplying custom cuts to fill Japanese orders.
Other advantages which the U.S. enjoys include its colder
climate (at least in northern-tier states), which the
Japanese believe causes better marbling, as well as "the
Japanese perception that U.S. processing facilities are very
clean and modern and that U.S. inspection systems are the
best in the world" (Michaelsen 1990, 22f).

Also,

consistently, U.S. beef is high-quality and (at least as of
1991) has name recognition.
To service the chilled-beef market in Japan, U.S.
exporters must develop an extended shelf-life in order to
avoid the high cost of air freight.

In 1990 air freight to
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Japan from the U.S. ranged from 70 cents to 90 cents per
pound.

Ocean freight ranged from 17 to 20 cents per pound

(Kendall 1990).

When weights are measured by the ton, costs

savings in transportation can be substantial if not the
largest single area of cost discrepancy.
Transport time for ocean freight from Seattle to Tokyo
is reputed to range from 7 to 10 days (compared to 12 to 17
days from Australia)
1992).

(interview with Hidetaka Iwasaki,

Transport time from California ports is close to 15

days (interview with Mr. John Morse,

1992).

In this regard

then, the U.S. appears to have an advantage over Australia.
Though the U.S. cannot compete with Australia on price,
Australia cannot compete with the U.S. on quality.

In both

categories, however, as mentioned previously Australia
expects its product to become more like the U.S. product.
While Australia has geared its market toward exports, the
U.S. market has been geared toward domestic sales.

As a

result, the U.S. has not developed the capacity to ship
chilled beef to the extent that Australia has.

A revamping

of export facilities and practices is necessary if the U.S.
is to remain competitive with Australia.
In spite of this, though Australia surpasses the U.S.
in terms of tonnage of chilled beef exported to Japan, the
rate of growth of U.S. exports of chilled beef is much
higher than Australia's.

From 1987 to 1988, Australian

shipments of chilled beef to Japan increased by 22 percent.
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followed by a 46 percent increase in 1989.

The

corresponding numbers for the United States are 106 percent
and 71 percent.

By 1991, U.S. beef occupied 75 to 85

percent of beef counterspace in Japan (Morgan 1991).
Part of the competitive advantage enjoyed by the United
States comes from its stature as the dominant political
power in the post-war period.

Japan liberalized its beef

market largely in response to political pressure from the
United States.

It is questionable if any other country

could have done the same.

Because of the persistent trade

surplus which Japan has with the United States, it is likely
that the Japanese government will insure that a substantial
percentage of its beef market will be serviced by U.S. beef.
Peter Drucker essentially likens the U.S.-Japan trade
relationship to the adage:
owned by the bank.

if one's debt is small, one is

But if one's debt is very high, one owns

the bank:
We are so hypnotized by the trade surplus that we do
not understand how dependent upon the United States
Japan has become.
In economic history, the point at
which a nation's dependence on one market becomes
economically and politically dangerous is somewhere
around 25 percent.
Japan has surpassed that point with
the United States, which buys more than 40 percent of
Japanese exports (Drucker 1990).
In addition to improving product shelf-life, export
facilities and transportation, other areas for attention
include changing the fat deposition character of U.S. cattle
(increase marbling and decrease the amount of exterior fat
which must be trimmed), and reducing package size and
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increasing package durability (Khan et al. 1990, 20).

Also,

according to a 1988 survey, the Japanese consumer often
confuses U.S. beef with Australian beef.

That is, "the

Japanese consumer's image of American beef is mostly formed
from taste experiences with Australian beef" (Khan et al.
1990, 50).
Promotional activity in Japan by U.S. beef interests
should overcome this misperception, and that promotion is
occurring.

In 1991, the U.S. Meat Export Federation planned

to sponsor five-thousand events to promote U.S. beef in
Japan through 1992.

Promotional activities would include

U.S. beef cook-offs, recipe books and cooking schools.

Also

planned was a "hookup with Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. to promote Japanese microwave ovens and American beef
dishes" (Wanatabe 1991, D2).

Apparently some positive

results occurred. According to the U.S. Meat Federation, in
1991 U.S. beef did have name recognition (Vansickle 1991b,
19).
One of the most significant advantages U.S. producers
have over their counterparts in Japan has to do with costs
of production.

Though the following figures were published

in 1988, the relative difference is likely quite similar;
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Table 15
Cost of Finishing Cattle in Japan and the U.S.
Cost of Finishing
Expenses

United States

Japan

Feeder Steer

$348.65
(600 lbs)

$1,428.91
(585 lbs)

Feed Costs

$148.57
(to gain 450 lbs,
$.33/lb of gain)

$1,537.43
(to gain 855 lbs,
$1.80/lb of gain)

Labor

$23.58
(5 hours/head,
$4.72/hr/hd)

$268.53
(32 hours/head,
$6.24/hr/hd)

Other Costs

$77.17

$278.18

TOTAL COSTS

$633.99
(1,050-lb Steer,
$60.38/cwt)

$3,513.02
(1,440-lb steer,
$243.96/cwt)

SELLING PRICE

$630.63
($60.06/cwt.
Choice str Omaha)

$3,908.88
($271.45/cwt,
Japanese nat'l
avg on 1,440-lb
dairy steer)

NET GAIN (LOSS)

($3.36)

$395.86

Source:
Note:
Note:

Sands 1988, 17.
Exchange rate ê 125 yen/$l.
Feeding period for a U.S. steer is about 5 months.
Feeding period for a Japanese dairy steer is about
16 months.

As U.S. cattle are fed to Japanese standards the costs
of production will increase, but will still fall far short
of the costs of production within Japan.

Selling price will

also increase, but is expected to increase relatively more,
by a significant margin, than the costs of production.
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CHAPTER 16
MARKET RISK

What all must do, however, is adapt products and
marketing to Japanese tastes in what is a faddish,
fast-changing market.
As reported in "The Economist" (Economist
1988b, 19).
I don't know where the other $2,100 went but somebody
got it and it wasn't me.
Similarly, neither should you
assume that the $6 difference between sirloin you
deliver for $4 per pound and the $10 per pound retail
price is your profit.
Steve Browning, Montana Livestock Exporters,
on shipping 1,450-pound live steers to Japan
@ $1,875, which sold in Japan for $4,000
(Fitzgerald 1988).
The Japanese history of beef is so marginal.
What
they've had is Kobe, which is extremely fat.
I think
our industry will make a mistake if we feel that's
where the taste is going to be.
Billy Powell, Executive Vice President of the
Alabama Cattlemen's Association (Johnson
1989, 36).

Whereas the export market will in all probability
remain Australia's primary focus in product development, the
U.S. is more likely to view the Japanese market as a
specialty market.

The primary reasons for this have to do

with the size of the U.S. domestic market and the cattle
feeding and processing industries which have evolved around
that market.

The trend in U.S. beef production has been
120
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toward leaner, less marbled carcasses. Genetic selection and
feeding programs have changed accordingly (Knipe et al.
1990, 154).

In a sense, then, beef production in the U.S.

has headed away from the type of beef demanded by the high
quality beef in Japan.

Given the changes necessary to cater

to the Japanese market, including different genetic
selection, feeding programs, processing, packaging and
transportation practices, it is unlikely that a major
movement in the U.S. to service this market will emerge.

It

is equally likely that those who are flexible enough to do
so will find it difficult to develop U.S. beef to
consistently grade well enough to qualify as premium beef in
Japan (B3 or better).
It is not unlikely that the demand for w e 11-marbled
beef in Japan will in fact shrink.

As the Japanese consume

more beef, their concern about consumption of saturated fats
may override those factors which motivate the consumer
(taste, status, tradition, etc.) to purchase highly-marbled
beef.

This may then become a declining market in absolute

as well as relative terms.

The risk in this is that by the

time the U.S. producer develops the genetic tools and feed
programs to service the premium market, that market may be
well on its way down.

The practices which the exporter

would develop in doing so, however, would in all likelihood
carry over into producing beef more appropriate to the
changing tastes of the Japanese consumer.

Of significant

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122
importance would be the contacts developed within the
Japanese distribution system.
Factors that may retard the current growth in
consumption of beef by the Japanese consumer include
declining economic growth, declining population growth,
slowing changes in dietary habits, and growing consumer
health consciousness.
Recent trends show both
population and economic growth rates to be slowing
though continuing to grow.
Little increase in demand
is expected to occur from dietary changes because
influencing factors such as urbanization have
essentially made their contribution.
The optimal diet
in terms of protein, fat, carbohydrate, and caloric
consumption has also been reached, having a potential
moderating effect on increasing demand for beef.
In
addition, increasing health awareness may retard the
growth rate of per capita beef consumption, especially
of beef that is highly marbled with fat (Khan et al.
1990, 13).
Be this as it may.

At present, the Japanese are

demanding highly-marbled beef, it has been a traditional
part of their diet for a long time, and opportunity exists
to service that market.
The financial risk involved in developing a product
which will qualify for the Japanese premium market is
considerable.

The cattle are older when they go on feed and

are fed for much longer periods, which translates into a
longer period of financial commitment than is customary in
the U.S. cattle business.

That is, the dollars spent to

develop and finish the product are much higher than
customary, and the time those dollars are invested in
developing and finishing the product is much longer than
customary.

As a result, the finished product represents a

substantial commitment of time and financial resources
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before any return is realized.
Should that finished product not be acceptable for the
targeted export market, and as a result need to be sold
domestically, if marketed through traditional channels the
animal would be discounted by the U.S. market because that
type of beef does not fit consumer preference.
monetary losses would then be incurred.

Substantial

This market

position may be avoided if specialty markets within the U.S.
can be developed.

Should this not be feasible, contracting

between all the involved parties may be necessary to
distribute the potential for loss fairly.

More importantly

would be the development of ultrasonics to determine a
carcass's condition of marbling at selected points in time
to coincide with different marketing alternatives.
All other considerations aside, shortages of
refrigerated warehouse space, and inadequate dock and
airport freight-staging areas, may constrain any rapid
increase in imports of chilled product, at least initially.
High land costs to expand these facilities may prove
prohibitive.

To what extent the Japanese palate will change

to accommodate more consumption of beef, and particularly
U.S. chilled beef, is open to debate.

In a study conducted

by a Washington State University sociologist, JapaneseAmericans who had lived in Hawaii for three generations only
consumed eighteen pounds of beef per capita, as opposed to
about seventy pounds for most Americans (interview with D r .
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Jerry Reeves, February 6, 1992).

Though this is nearly

twice the consumption by the average Japanese today, it
falls short of what some U.S. beef exporters may hope for
and expect.
Japanese consumers by-and-large favor Japanese beef.
Just how much the lower price of imported chilled beef will
affect this predilection has yet to be fully determined.

In

1991, however, Japan imported 147,116 metric tons of U.S.
beef for the first ten months of the year, down from 163,958
metric tons for the same period in 1990, for a decline of
over 10 percent.

The corresponding value of these exports

was about $800 million in 1990 and $745 million in 1991
(about a 7 percent drop)

(Cattle Fax 1992).

Even though a

decline was expected due to the stockpiling of imported beef
prior to the lifting of import quotas on April 1, 1991, the
negative movement in export volume should not be ignored.
The call for self-sufficiency in food production also
lingers (45 percent self-sufficient in beef production in
1988 vs. 90 percent in the 1960s)

(Wahl et al. 1991,

119),

which may hamper consumer enthusiasm for foreign products
despite its lower cost and favorable taste comparison.
Matthew Cohn, Pacific Rim Trade Officer for the
Department of Commerce, State of Montana, offered the
following observations (interview, July 1, 1992);
A major problem is the distribution system within
Japan.
The real profits will be made in Japan as the
product works its way through the distribution system,
with numerous markups imposed as the product winds its
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way toward the consumer.
The Japanese tend to squeeze their suppliers to the
"half-penny” in attempting to secure the lowest
possible prices.
If the Japanese are to pay a premium
price in the U.S., they must sell the product for a
premium in Japan.
For the producer to receive a
premium, then, the producer's carcasses must grade
better than B 3 .
The producer will not be able to exert any degree of
control over the product once it reaches Japan.
For
instance, imported U.S. beef, should it grade well, may
be sold as domestic Wagyu rather than as U.S. beef.
Also, beef that is sold under trademark does not insure
that producers of that beef have the trademark's
exclusive use.
For example, beef sold as "Nebraska"
beef in Japan may not be Nebraska beef at all.
It
could be anything that might pass for "Nebraska" beef.
In fact, a Japanese meat marketer may sell domestic
Japanese beef as imported beef if he thinks it may sell
better if labeled as such.
The Japanese are notorious for "changing the rules in
the middle of the game." Not that such a practice is
inherently wrong, but it is something to which most
U.S. businesses are unaccustomed.
In essence, the
Japanese operate under a different set of business
ethics than do American businesses.
Although a Japanese client may say it wants one-hundred
carcasses per month, there is no guarantee that it will
take that many, and it is highly unlikely that a U.S.
supplier will be able to secure guarantees to that
effect.
Other customers should be pursued.
Hong Kong, Taiwan,
Singapore, Guam and Hawaii are all are big markets for
Japanese tourists.
Another customer in Japan might be
beneficial, but in all likelihood Nichiro would resist
such a move.
Typically, Japanese customers want "an
exclusive" when dealing with suppliers.
Japanese
restaurants within the U.S. would also be a logical
market.
The Japanese have been known to reject a whole
container of chilled carcasses because one bit of mold
was found on one carcass.
Also, a container may spoil
because someone forgot to plug it in while it sits on
the dock.
U.S. companies which have been successful in Japan have
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done two things.
One is to team-up with a Japanese
partner.
The other is to form their own distribution
system.
Once Mr. Marchi "figures out" the product and
the attendant services (processing, transportation,
shelf life, etc.) he should do well, but the investment
to learn is significant.
Mr. Aoyama reported that, since liberalization,
Japanese dairy farmers have found it increasingly difficult
to compete with imports for the "intermediate" beef market.
Many dairy farmers are consequently transplanting Wagyu
embryos into their dairy cows in order to raise beef for the
premium market while continuing commercial milk production.
While this may bode well for most imports,

it provides

additional competition for Nichiro's targeted market.
Mr. Marchi is dealing with an uncertain demand.

Mr.

Aoyama said that initially Nichiro will want fifty carcasses
per month once a grade of B3 is consistently attained, and
eventually it will want one-hundred carcasses per month.
Mr. Yamamura placed Nichiro's demand at three-hundred per
month.

Mr. Aoyama acknowledged that demand was uncertain

since Nichiro was dealing with an uncertain market.

That

is, Nichiro has not had the product so they do not know what
the demand will be (interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 1992).
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THE MARCHI PROJECT
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CHAPTER 17
MARKET ENTRY

In terms of carcass quality as seen by the Japanese, on
a scale of l to 10 we have gone from -1 to 1, and the
Japanese want us at 5.
Jon Marchi, a rancher in Poison, Montana, who
custom feeds cattle for Nichiro Corporation,
Tokyo (interview, January 8, 1992).
When dealing with the Japanese, one personal visit to
Japan is worth one-thousand phone calls and tenthousand letters.
Y. Yamamura, President and CEO of Arrowhead,
Inc., a Tokyo trading house (Marchi
interview, 1992).

From September 1987 through January 1988, Jon Marchi,
owner of Marchi Angus Ranches of Poison, Montana, purchased,
processed and quarantined 742 live steer calves for shipment
to Japan.

Mr. Marchi had contracted with Montana Livestock

Exporters, Inc., to provide those cattle and associated
services.

The cattle were quarantined in feedlots owned by

Marchi Angus Ranches and were shipped to Japan air freight
from Seattle in three separate shipments.

The first

shipment was consigned to Naigai/Mitsui, a 50- percent owner
of Montana Livestock Exporters, I n c .

The next two shipments

were consigned to UNI-COOP.
In June of 1988, Mr. Marchi travelled to Japan to
inspect those cattle, then on feed in a Japanese feedlot.
128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
Mr. Y. Yamamura, then a Senior Managing Director of Naigai
Foods Co., Ltd., in Tokyo, assisted in making the necessary
arrangements for Mr. Marchi.

While in Tokyo Mr. Marchi met

with Mr. Yamamura, among others, to discuss the potential
for additional shipments of Montana cattle to Japan.
While in Tokyo, Mr. Marchi noted that Wagyu beef was
selling in the display case for upwards of $70 per pound,
while U.S. Choice sold for about $24 per pound.

Similarly,

Wagyu hamburger sold for $12.50 per pound compared to $8.90
per pound for U.S. hamburger.

In his conversations with Mr.

Yamamura, Mr. Marchi was told that the typical Japanese ate
high-quality beef once per month, but ate less expensive
beef once per week or even once per day.

He was also told

that the younger generation was increasingly fond of beef
and that good potential existed for beef imports that
catered to Japanese taste.
In these discussions, the expansion of the Marchi
feedlot to accommodate and feed more cattle for export to
Japan, and the acquisition of or joint venture with a
Montana packing plant to process those cattle for export to
Japan as chilled carcass beef, was also discussed.
By the end of 1988, shipping live cattle to Japan was
dropped in favor of carcass beef.

By shipping carcass beef,

excessive freight costs could be avoided.

Locating and

securing a consistent supply of quality cattle could also be
avoided.

Health problems —

which commonly occur when
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calves, usually at various stages of weaning and from a
number of different ranches, are put together at about the
same time —

would be circumvented.

Carcass beef dodged the

problem of securing quarantine space in Japan, which was
extremely limited (and as such served as a non-tariff
barrier) and which often had to be reserved years in
advance.

The end of the quota system was anticipated, and

those companies which were importing carcass beef would be
well positioned to capitalize on the new market conditions.
In December of 1988, Mr. Yamamura informed Mr. Marchi
that he had resigned from Naigai Foods and had formed a
trading company. Arrowhead Inc., in Tokyo.

Mr. Yamamura had

encouraged Naigai Foods to develop a specialty meat in the
United States in order to position itself for the
liberalization of the Japanese beef market.

Naigai was more

interested in cheaper Australian beef, and the possibility
of importing beef from Mexico, than it was in high-quality,
specialty beef.

Mr. Yamamura left

Naigai Foods in

September of 1988, and subsequently presented the idea to
Nichiro Fishery Co., Ltd.
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CHAPTER 18
NICHIRO CORPORATION

Nichiro Corporation, known as Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha
Ltd. until 1990, was established in 1914 for the purpose of
salmon fishing in northern waters.

The company lost

virtually all of its assets in World War II, after which it
began a long process of rebuilding.

In 1962 a joint venture

was formed with H.J. Heinz Co., known as Nichiro Heinz,
L t d . , which developed fishing grounds off the Sahara coast
of Africa.

In 1979 Nichiro purchased Peter Pan Seafoods,

Inc., a U.S. fish processor.

In 1985, Nichiro established

SeaBlends Food Company in Seattle, whose charge was to
produce specialty seafoods for the U.S. and foreign markets.
By 1987 Nichiro's capital had risen to 8.2 billion yen
(about $56.9 million), employed about 2,000 people, and had
consolidated annual sales of over $1.8 billion.

Of those

sales, roughly $380 million, or 21 percent, were in frozen
and chilled foods (not including fish, which accounted for
46 percent of sales).

Nichiro was one of thirty-six

companies designated by LIPC to import beef into Japan under
the quota system.
Nichiro's principal activities were:

salmon and crab

fishing; fish farming; trawl fishing; food processing; feed

131
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manufacturing; foreign trade in fish and other products, and
the distribution of those products; cold storage; and
shipping.

In 1987, Nichiro had 27 subsidiaries and 26

affiliates (Nichiro 1987; Japanese Companies 1987, 15).
According to Nichiro's 1987 annual report, it is a
"globally oriented food company...[which] seeks to
contribute to society through the supply of high-quality
food products ...."

Nichiro, according to Mr. Iwasaki, is

the third largest fishing company in Japan and is a "mid
level" beef company.

It's 1991 gross sales were roughly $2

billion, about half of which were fish.

Beef sales were

about $180 million, almost all of which were sales of
domestic (Japanese) beef.
Nichiro operates a 2,000 head feedlot through its
affiliate, Shinmei Chikusan, in Okydo, Japan.

It feeds

Holstein steers which it buys from Japanese dairy farmers,
but wants to introduce Wagyu to its feedlot operation via
embryo transplant.

It slaughters one-hundred head per month

for the Japanese meat market.

According to Mr. Iwasaki,

Nichiro also imports sixty ton of processed meat (hamburger,
which is 50 percent pork) per year from Australia, which it
buys through a Japanese trading house.
Nichiro built a new fish processing plant in Seattle in
1990, operated by its subsidiary, Nichiro Pacific, Ltd.
When it did so it overbuilt, so that it now has unused
capacity, including refrigeration space, cyrovac equipment.
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and a labor force.
transport.

It also has ships available for ocean

With its refrigeration space, Nichiro sees the

opportunity to provide U.S. beef steak, via air freight, to
Tokyo restaurants which operate under just-in-time
inventory.
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CHAPTER 19
THE MARCHI-NICHIRO FEED TRIALS

If Jon Marchi can export carcasses that will grade A3
and A4, I will be president of the company!
Hiroshi Aoyama, General Manager, Meat
Products Department, Nichiro Corporation,
Tokyo (interview June 17, 1992).

With its extensive distribution network for chilled
foods, Nichiro recognized the potential for capitalizing on
an emerging (from the standpoints of market liberalization
as well as increasing consumer demand) market in Japan,
provided the right product could be developed.

To position

itself in that emerging market, speed was of the essence.
Other Japanese companies were doing the same.

For instance,

Mr. Yamamura reported that Meiji Milk Co. was attempting to
develop premium Japanese-quality beef in Australia and
Oklahoma in order to supply the same market Nichiro had
targeted.
In addition to Nichiro's current distribution chain,
two other markets showed promise.

One was Japanese

restaurants in the United States.

The other was a

restaurant chain in Japan, to be called Steake Restaurant,
which Mr. Yamamura hoped to develop in conjunction with
Nichiro and Imperial Hotel.

Its purpose would be to sell
134
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Marchi Beef throughout Japan.

Before either could be

pursued, however, an acceptable product had to be developed.
To develop the product two things were required.
First, feed trials were necessary to determine the required
feed rations, gain ratios, feeding periods and carcass
weights.

Secondly, crucial to the process was a U.S.

producer who:
cattle,

(1) had access to high-quality Black Angus

(2) had the capability to conduct the feed trials,

(3) could arrange for slaughter according to Japanese
specifications, and

(4) most importantly, was eager to

cooperate with Nichiro in developing the product according
to Nichiro's standards.

Mr. Marchi, presented through Mr.

Yamamura and Arrowhead, Inc., offered this opportunity.
Mr. Hiroshi Aoyama, a representative of Nichiro
Corporation, visited Mr. Marchi in Poison in May of 1989
(followed by Mr. Yamamura in July).

On May 26, Nichiro

bought fifty yearling steers from Marchi Angus Ranches at an
average live weight of 929 pounds.

Selected by Mr. Aoyama

and Mr. Marchi as the best of two-hundred Black Angus which
Mr. Marchi had in his feedlot in Poison, these cattle were
then custom fed by Mr. Marchi for 193 days, till early
December, when they were slaughtered at White's Wholesale
Meats in Ronan, Montana, at an average live weight of 1298
pounds.

Average daily gain (ADG) for the 193-day feeding

period was less than 2 pounds.

The target had been 2.2 to

2.6 pounds per d a y .
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Compared to U.S. industry standards, slaughter weight
was high (most fat cattle in the U.S. are slaughtered at
1050 to 1100 pounds), the feeding period was longer (150
days is the norm in U.S. feedlots), and the ADGs were lower
(three to four pounds per day is average in a typical U.S.
feedlot).

By feeding the Nichiro cattle for longer periods

of time at slower rates of gain and to heavier weights, the
hope was to develop highly marbled beef which would grade B3
or better, and, in Mr. Yamamura's opinion, to ultimately
produce beef which would rival or at least compete with
Japan's Kobe beef (premium Wagyu, grown in the Kobe region
of Japan) or Matsuzaka beef (Wagyu raised in the Matsuzaka
region, generally of somehwat higher quality than Kobe
beef).

The hope was to have the product developed by the

time import quotas were removed (April 1, 1991), at which
time Nichiro would import one-hundred carcasses per month,
or 530 tons per year (carcass weight of 880 pounds).

Under

its LIPC quota, as one of the thirty-six Japanese firms
allowed to import beef, Nichiro's chilled, grain-fed beef
imports were limited to twenty tons per year.
In order to fill its twenty-ton quota for 1989, Nichiro
purchased an additional 6.5 carcasses from Mr. Marchi.

The

carcasses (56.5, for a total carcass weight of 21.3 tons)
were quartered, cooled and wrapped to Nichiro's
specifications.

They were then trucked to Seattle and

shipped to Tokyo via air freight as chilled carcass beef.
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The arrangements were made by Nichiro Pacific, Ltd.

(NFL), a

U.S. subsidiary of Nichiro Corporation based in Seattle.
Typical problems which surfaced in chilling and packing
carcass beef in the U.S. for shipment to Japan included
improper refrigeration and inadequate wrapping materials.
Some carcass damage often incurred as a result.
Modifications to the packing process at White's, per
detailed instructions sent by Nichiro, avoided these
problems.

Mr. Yamamura had emphasized the necessity of full

cooperation from White's so that the integrity of the
product not be compromised.
Mr. Genjiro Honda, a Nichiro meat specialist, was
present when the cattle were slaughtered at White's.

In

addition to instructing his American counterparts in the
Japanese style of carcass preparation, Mr. Honda graded the
carcasses.

The results were disappointing.

Of thirty-three carcasses graded on December 4, 1989,
none reached B3.*

One graded B1 (lower than B2).

others graded B2 (lower than B3).

All the

Carcass quality was

essentially that of Japanese Holstein and Australian beef.
The goal of matching Wagyu, let alone Kobe beef, seemed outof-reach.

Mr. Marchi reported that:

®0f a multitude of criteria involved in the Japanese beef
grading system, three are of primary importance: color of the
fat (stark white is best, yellow is worst), color of the meat
(bright pink is best, dark red is worst), and amount of
marbling (the more the better —
from 50 percent to 80
percent).
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The first carcasses were low-Choice to mid-Prime.
Bob
[Bob White, owner-operator of White's Wholesale Meats],
Doug [Dr. Douglas Gray, a meat scientist at Montana
State University], and I all thought they were great.
Bob said some were the best he'd ever seen.
But they
weren't what the Japanese wanted.
Both sides were naive.
We thought it would work.
We
all did.
The Japanese thought the Americans could do
it easily and we did too.
But we couldn't, and the
Japanese didn't give up.
All in all, the fat color of the carcasses had been
quite good, as was the color of meat.
was very pleased with both.
mediocre.

The Japanese grader

Marbling, however, was

Of the twelve grades of marbling, these carcasses

were consistently in the middle.

The feeling was that

carcasses which would grade B3 or better (i.e., B3, B4, B5,
Al, A2, A3, A4, A5) could be produced.

The challenge was

but to do so consistently, economically, and with most, if
not all, of the steers selected for a given feed trial.
These conditions had to be satisfied before Nichiro would
commit itself to importing one-hundred carcasses per month
from Marchi Angus Ranches, which it had hoped to do
beginning in April of 1991.
In the feed trial of 1988, Dr. Gray outlined some of
the difficulty of product development, and recommended
measures that should be attempted.

Problems, or

complications, which Dr. Gray mentioned include the
following:
(1) maintaining gains would get increasingly
difficult as the cattle matured;
(2)

though barley was the recommended feed, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139

potential for bloat, inconsistent feed consumption, and
acidosis were considerable;
(3) though corn was a safer feed, it tended to
produce fat which was soft and tinged with yellow;
(4)though age worked for producing
better marbling
(since marbling is the last fat deposited, the animal must
have reached structural and muscular maturity before
depositing intramuscular fat), it worked against meat color
(the older the animal, thedarker the meat) and tenderness
(the older the animal, the less tender the m e a t ) ;
(5) meat color was adversely affected by stress —
stress which could be induced simply by trucking the cattle
from the feedlot to the slaughter plant;
(6) some cattle will deposit yellow fat regardless of
what they are fed because their genetic make-up does not
allow them to process carotene well;
(7) maturity is generally reached at about 19 months
of age, and marbling occurs between 13 and 36 months, and 30
months was probably getting too old;
(8) marbling is the biggest contributor to flavor yet
the most difficult to achieve — not only is it the last of
the four fats to be deposited (external, or back-fat;
internal, or body-cavity fat; intermuscular, or seam fat;
and marbling, or intramuscular fat), it is also the first to
be lost under any sort of stress;
(9)
if the carcass was trimmed too much, it would
lose 2 percent of its weight through moisture evaporation
while in refrigeration; and
(10)
no standard efficiency factor's existed for what
Mr. Marchi was attempting to do since, to Dr. Gray's
knowledge, this had not been attempted before.
Steps which Dr. Gray

recommended for the

feeding t r i a l , in an attempt to avoid some of

initial
these

potential problems, included the following:
(1)
to achieve a carcass weight of 880 pounds, which
Nichiro wanted, the cattle should be fed to a live weight of
1430 pounds, requiring 2.6 to 2-7 pounds-per-day gain given
the time allowed; as a target, feed cattle to a live weight
of 1400 to 1650 pounds;
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(2) the cattle should be fed twice daily to maximize
consumption;
(3) the ration should eventually become 80 percent
barley in order to increase the rate of gain, increase
marbling, and to produce fat which is firm and very white;
(4) once slaughtered, electrical stimulation of the
carcass might improve meat color, and it would force the
marbling to set-up better, which could improve marbling up
to 10 percent;
(5)
slaughter the cattle as soon as possible after
transporting from the feedlot;
(6) barley and wheat are equally good in terms of
producing white fat, but barley is better for making more
fat ;
(7)
feed the cattle as much as they will eat, and keep
an 80:20 ratio of grain to roughage; at a minimum, 10
percent of the feed ration should be alfalfa hay;
(8)
feed uniform sets of cattle, and push them to get
maximum feed consumption.
Though many of these recommendations were followed, the
cattle weights at slaughter, carcass weights, gains per day,
and marbling were not satisfactory in terms of specialty
beef for Japan.

Because the meat did not fit Nichiro's

targeted market, Nichiro sold the carcasses at about 900 yen
per kilogram (approximately $2.84 per pound, using the 1990
average exchange rate).

Nichiro's cost was about 1,250 yen

per kilogram ($3.95 per pound),
per pound.

for a loss of roughly $1.11

Nichiro's total loss was about $47,000.

Nichiro Corporation thought the weight gains, and the
carcass yield (58 percent actual, 61 to 63 percent
expected), should have been better.
weight was 755 pounds.

Actual average carcass

Expected carcass weight was 880
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pounds.

Likewise, whereas the expected ADG was 2.2 to 2.6

pounds per day, actual was 1.97.
disappointed, even discouraged.

The Japanese were
The trust which Mr. Marchi

had established with Arrowhead and Nichiro Corporation
seemed to be in jeopardy.
perform as expected.

In their view, the cattle did not

For the project to continue, these

issues had to be resolved immediately.
reaffirmed.

Trust had to be

It was January of 1990.

Within ten days of receiving Mr. Yamamura's letter
outlining the above concerns, Mr. Marchi responded in
detail.

Among other items addressed, Mr. Marchi explained

that the Japanese frame of reference was the Wagyu, which
was not fed for marbling until it was structurally mature.
The Nichiro cattle in the Marchi feedlot, however, were
being fed for structural growth as well as meat development.
A lower grain-to-hay ratio had been used in order to foster
structural growth, deemed essential in order to achieve
marbling.

A grain-to-hay ratio of 80:20 would have been

more efficient in terms of weight gain, but it would not
have been the desired weight type (i.e., backfat and seam
fat instead of marbling).
hay was therefore used.

A feed ratio of 48:52 grain-toThough hay is the most expensive

and least efficient means of feeding cattle in terms of
weight gain, it was seen as necessary given the goals of the
feed trial.
To rectify this situation in the interest of developing
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a product the Japanese wanted at a cost which they felt
reasonable, and in a spirit of cooperation and shared risk,
Mr. Marchi proposed a cap on cost-of-gain.
had a cost-of-gain of $1.04 per pound.

The 1989 cattle

Mr. Marchi proposed

limiting the cost-of-gain on the next feed trial to $.83 per
pound.’

Should cost-of-gain exceed $.83, he would pay the

difference up to a live weight of 1500 pounds, with the
following conditions:

Black-white-face steers would be fed

with Black Angus, and the feeding period would be two to
three months longer (from 193 days in the 1989 trial to as
much as 250 days in 1990).
This was a significant risk for Mr. Marchi since he did
not know what the price of feed would be in 1990, although
he did expect to feed more grain than hay (thereby lowering
the cost-of-gain).

Mr. Marchi had already guaranteed death

loss not to exceed 2 percent.

Plus,

in anticipation of

providing one-hundred carcasses per month beginning in April
of 1991, Mr. Marchi had done the following:

purchased an

additional hay and grain ranch and contracted to buy yet
another; constructed one mile of new road; drilled a fourhundred foot well in order to supply high-quality water to
the feedlot; commenced construction of another feedlot;
contracted to buy an additional 110 Black Angus steer calves
’Based on its experience of feeding cattle in Japan,
Nichiro expected the Marchi steers to perform about 20 percent
better than they did.
Mr. Marchi proposed a cap of $.83 per
pound to reflect a 20 percent reduction in the actual cost-ofgain.
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on October 15, 1990; added an additional ranch employee;
and contracted with Dr. Gray for advice concerning cattle
nutrition.
Mr. Marchi reiterated that 1989 was a trial from which
they learned much, that feeding cattle to these weights was
virtually unheard of in the U.S., and that a grain ration
which excluded corn and relied strictly on barley and wheat
was largely untested.

He stressed that he had made a

substantial investment in this project in terms of time and
capital and that he was committed to a long-term
relationship with Nichiro in order to develop the product
Nichiro wanted.
Nichiro accepted Mr. Marchi's explanation and proposal,
and began to deal with Mr. Marchi directly through Mr.
Yamamura of Arrowhead, Inc.

(the Tokyo trading company),

bypassing Nichiro Pacific, Ltd.

After a number of different

scenarios were discussed, a second feed trial involving five
head began July 10, 1990.

Some notable differences

characterized this trial:

only five head were involved;

Nichiro would accept only those carcasses which graded a
minimum of B3; a feeding program would be provided by
Nichiro; the feeding period would be for nine months; and
the goal of the trial was to achieve a grade of B 4 .

From

Nichiro's perspective, the price differential between B3 and
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B4® was large enough to absorb some adverse movement in the
exchange rate as well as import duty costs and still remain
profitable.

To effectively compete as a specialty meat,

though B3 was acceptable, B4 was desired.
In addition to the cost-of-gain cap, Mr. Marchi stood
the risk of not having the carcasses grade B 3 .

Should this

be the case, in all probability the carcasses would be
heavily discounted in the U.S. market due to their excessive
fat (by U.S. standards).

The incentive for Mr. Marchi to do

so was the prospect of a one-hundred-per-month carcass
business.

In terms of assumption of risk,

it seemed as

though he were being asked to go a good deal more than half
way.

In the interests of developing trust, and in carrying

the project forward, he accepted the challenge.
The five steers were slaughtered at White's Wholesale
Meats on April 4, 1991.

Since a representative of Nichiro

was unable to attend, and since the carcasses could
therefore not be graded until they were received in Japan,
Nichiro accepted all carcasses regardless of their grade.
Live weight at slaughter was 1550 pounds and carcass weight
averaged 876 pounds, weights which essentially met the
Japanese criteria.

Average daily gain for the 266-day

feeding period (July 10, 1990 through April 3, 1991) was 2.0

'Wholesale prices in Tokyo in June, 1992, on a per-pound
basis were:
B2 § $2.50; B3 § $3.15; A3 @ $5.60; A4 @ $7; A5
@ $9. Price quotes for B4, B5, Al, and A2 were not available
(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, June 17, 1992).
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pounds, somewhat less than the target of 2.2 to 2.6 pounds
per day.

Cost-of-gain was about $.97 per pound up to 1500

pounds, which exceeded the ceiling price of $.83 by $.14 per
pound.

Consequently, Mr. Marchi credited Nichiro for the

difference per their agreement.®
The carcasses were evaluated and graded in Japan on
April 11, 1991.
two graded A2.

Of the five carcasses, three graded B2 and
The carcasses were clean and in good

condition, and the color of the meat and fat were judged to
be very good.

Marbling, however, was still somewhat

disappointing, and a moisture problem, defined as "watery"
or "drip," was detected.
Carcass sales price was about 9 percent (on average)
less than the expected sales price.

Because they could not

be sold as B3 (equivalent to Wagyu half-blood cross or
Japanese Holstein steer), they had to be sold as "regular
imported meat," such as that from Australia.
Other than the increase in carcass weight, attributable
to the extended feeding period and upward adjustment in the
grain-to-hay ratio (to 75:25 from 48:52), there was slight
difference from the first trial in terms of meat
improvement.

Nichiro recommended increasing the amount of

carbohydrates in the feed ration, increasing the quantity of

®$.9659 - $.83 = $.1359 per pound credit;
1500 pounds 1018.4 pounds = 481.6 pounds of gain per head applicable for
feed credit;
481.6 pounds x $.1359 per pound x 5 head =
$327.25 total credit.
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feed, and extending the feeding period.
All in all, however, Mr. Marchi was informed that
future carcasses would be accepted as B3 provided the
moisture problem could be solved.

The solution could be as

simple as withholding feed and water from the cattle for
twenty-four to forty-eight hours prior to slaughter, as was
customary in Japan.
A third feed trial began on October 1, 1991, with ten
Black Angus steers.

At an average age of about eighteen

months, and an average weight of 1123 pounds, these steers
began the feed trial (they had been on summer pasture
through September) at approximately the same weight and age
of most fat cattle at the time of slaughter in the U.S.

The

ten were selected as the best of 255 yearling steers
(averaging 915 pounds) and were to be fed until the
following October.

Confident that the feed trials were

making sufficient progress, Nichiro purchased the steers at
$.80 per pound, effective October 1, 1991.

As with the

previous feed trial, the steers were to be fed according to
a program provided by Nichiro.
In February of 1992, Mr. Marchi was notified that,
should the ten head grade a minimum of B3 and the moisture
problem be solved, then Nichiro's demand will expand to
three-hundred carcasses per month, considerably higher than
the one-hundred per month previously expected.

Should this

be the case, substantial expansion of Mr. Marchi's feedlot
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capacity and White's Meats refrigeration space would be
needed.

The possibility of a joint venture between Nichiro,

Marchi Angus Ranches, and White's Wholesale Meats had been
discussed in earlier negotiations.

The prospect of a joint

venture involving all three, or any two of the three
parties, remained a possibility.

In addition, should the

project prove successful, Mr. Marchi was assured that he
would be the exclusive exporter of chilled beef from the
United States for Nichiro Corporation.
Speaking for Nichiro, Mr. Yamamura informed Mr. Marchi
that Nichiro was interested in importing "U.S. Standard
meat" as well as chilled "B3 or better."

Mr. Yamamura

explained that, though Australian and New Zealand beef was
relatively cheap in Japan, it was not acceptable as table
meat because it was grass fed.

He also reported that,

though Australia was developing grain-fed beef, the
Australian product was priced the same as the U.S. product.
At the same price, the Japanese prefered U.S. beef.
Mr. Yamamura also reported that, after 1993 when the
import ad valorem tax would be renegotiated (70 percent in
1991, 60 percent in 1992, 50 percent in 1993), the expected
level was 30 percent to 40 percent.

Mr. Aoyama expects this

level to drop further, to as low as 25 percent, though it
may do so incrementally.

At this level, Mr. Yamamura claims

that Marchi beef would compete with higher quality Japanese
beef (Kobe and Matsuzaka categories) because of its
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significantly lower price.

Mr. Yamamura reported that

Nichiro hoped Mr. Marchi would be able to fill its demand
for higher-quality as well as lower-quality (U.S. Standard)
beef.

Mr. Yamamura reiterated Nichiro^s interest in making

a financial investment in the Marchi and White operations
should Mr. Marchi and Mr. White so desire.
Mr. Aoyama and Mr. Iwasaki visited the Marchi Ranch in
June of 1992.

After observing the steers Mr. Aoyama thought

they would be ready for slaughter in October, and he thought
60 to 70 percent of them (six or seven head) would grade B3.
He expected the remainder (three or four head) to grade B2
and some to grade A3.

He stated that, if the steers were

Wagyu, he would expect them to grade A3 to A4.
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CHAPTER 20
WASHINGTON STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE JAPANESE BEEF MARKET

In an attempt to increase the likelihood of success,
additional research in product development was essential.
State-of-the-art research on developing this type of beef
for the Japanese market was being conducted at Washington
State University (WSU) in Pullman, Washington.

To learn

what the researchers at WSU had learned, with the intention
of gaining insight into product development as well as
guidance on how to proceed, Mr. Marchi and Mr. Hibbard (the
author of this paper) visited WSU in February, 1992.
The team of researchers who received Messrs. Marchi and
Hibbard at WSU included:

Dr. Kristen A. Johnson, animal

nutritionist; Dr. Charles T. Gaskins, geneticist; Dr. Jerry
J. Reeves, reproductive endrocrinologist; Dr. Raymond W.
Wright, Jr., embryologist; Dan Coonrad, beef herdsmanager;
and Drs. Thomas I. Wahl, Raymond J. Folwell, and James C.
Barron, agricultural economists.

Research at WSU on this

subject had been conducted since 1989, including visits to
Texas A&M (which has pioneered research in this area) and
Japan by team members.
and a third is underway.

Two feed trials have been conducted
Much of WSU's effort in product
149
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development involved experimentation with different feed
rations, different length of feeding periods, and different
breeds of cattle.

WSU Feed Trials
In the first trial. Black Angus and Wagyu crossbreds
were put on feed at 500 to 600 pounds and fed to gain no
more than 2.2 pounds per day.

A ration of 50:50 or 60:40

concentrate-to-roughage (grain-to-hay) was fed until the
cattle reached 1,000 pounds.

From 1,000 to 1,500 pounds the

ration was increased to 80:20 grain-to-hay.

The cattle were

slaughtered once they reached 1,500 pounds.
At the beginning of the first trial, the Angus were a
full year younger than the Wagyu (six months versus eighteen
months).

At slaughter all Wagyu graded Prime plus.

One

Angus graded Choice, all other Angus graded Prime.
The results of the first trial were instrumental in
designing the second trial.

The second trial, completed in

1991, consisted of 4 Black Angus steers, 4 Longhorn steers,
and 3 Wagyu crossbred steers (two 3/4 bloods and one 7/8
blood Wagyu).

Four Wagyu crossbreds began the feed trial

but one died of unrelated causes.
The researchers found the Angus to be more efficient
than Wagyu in terms of pounds gained per pounds of ration
fed.

Whereas a Wagyu can only be fed about 1.7 percent of

their body weight in feed concentrates per day, Angus can be
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pushed to at least 3 percent (Pitts 1990, 8).

Wagyu, which

tend to be fine-boned and gentle, even docile, were less
aggressive than the Angus and Longhorn and were "out
competed" at the feed bunk.

They tended to be "finicky,"

sometimes "going off feed" for no predictable reason, all of
which translated into less feed efficiency relative to
Longhorn and Angus, which translates to higher costs-ofgain.
At the time of slaughter, the researchers thought the
cattle were not yet ready in spite of being fed for 365
days.

Nonetheless, slaughter proceeded in order to supply

the carcasses at the time required by WSU's outlet in Japan.
The cattle were slaughtered at Washington Beef in Yakima,
Washington, a Japanese-owed packing plant.

The Angus did

not marble as well as the researchers had hoped:
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Table 16
Cattle Performance, 1991 WSU Feed Trial

Initial Wt (avg lbs)
Final Live Wt
Birthdate (avg)
Avg Daily Gain (lbs)
Feed Efficiency
U.S. Grade

Angus

Longhorn

Wagyu

728
1590
Jan '88
1.72
15.8

569
1266
Mar '88
1.41
16.3

765
1585
Mar '88
1.65
15.7

Ch(0)
PPP+

PCh+
Ch+
Ch(0)

P+
P+
P+
n/a

B4
C4
B4
C4

B4
C3
B4
B5

A4
B4
B5
n/a

Japanese Grade

Source:
Note:
Note:

Johnson et al. 1991, 8b-9b.
U.S. beef grades:
Ch = USDA Choice; P = USDA
Prime.
For marbling grade: - = minimum; 0 =
average; + = maximum.
Re: Japanese beef grades, grading was done by WSU
staff, not by certified Japanese beef
graders.

Though the initial and final weights of the Black Angus
were quite close to those of the Wagyu, the Angus were about
nine months younger.

This placed the Angus at a

disadvantage in terms of structural maturity.

The Longhorn

performed quite well relative to the Angus in terms of feed
efficiency and Japanese grade.

Marbling and Carcass Development in Waayu and Angus
A primary difference in marbling between Wagyu and
Angus lies in the type of intramuscular fat each deposits.
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Wagyu tend to deposit small flecks of fat, often described
as "fine,” "feathery,” or "lacy.”
intramuscular fat in chunks.

Angus tend to deposit

In other words, whereas a

premium Wagyu steak would be peppered with bits of fat, so
that it would resemble salami in terms of fat interlaced
with meat, relative to Wagyu a premium Angus steak tends to
have more fat on the external edge with pieces of fat,
smaller in number but larger in size, broadly scattered
throughout the steak.

The premium Japanese market demands

the former.
Dr. Charles Gaskins, A WSU geneticist, believes that
Angus are genetically incapable of producing marbling
equivalent to that of Wagyu.

According to Dr. Gaskins,

genetics are the single most important factor in developing
marbling.

That is, over 50 percent of marbling is

determined by an animal's genetic make-up.

Relatively

little data has been collected regarding the genetic
marbling ability of Angus sires since that has not been a
primary consideration of Angus breeders.

In order to

collect this data, carcass identity would need to be
maintained through the cutting and grading process.
Slaughter operations in the U.S. are not currently set up to
do this.

To select Angus sires for their ability to foster

marbling in their progeny, then, is difficult at best.
Dr. Gaskins thought that marbling might be determined
by a single gene in Wagyu, which geneticists may be able to
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isolate.

In the case of Angus, however, marbling may well

not be limited to a single gene, which makes it more
difficult to isolate, and therefore more difficult to trace.
Because marbling is considered to be 50 to 70 percent
heritable,

its identification could have significant

implications for speeding the development of marbling in the
Angus breed.
According to the WSU researchers, the primary factors
which contribute to marbling are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

genetics ;
length of feeding period (the longer the better);
maturity (to an extent, the older the better); and
feed ration (70 to 80 percent Total Digestible
Nutrients, or TON).

The WSU researchers also reported that, of the beef
breeds in the U.S., the old-style Angus comes closest to
matching the marbling ability of the Japanese W a g y u . T h e
old-style Angus (popular in the 1950s) was very short and
compact, and very fat, perhaps best described as "dumpy,"
and is found only in isolated pockets.

These pockets

include one in Pennsylvania (old-style Angus owned by the
Amish), one in North Carolina, and one in Ellensburg,

^“"Certain breeds have different muscle structures which
help determine those which deposit marbling and those that do
not. The predominantly white muscle fibers of breeds such as
Charolais, Maine Anjou, Limousin and Gelbvieh use mainly
glucose or sugar as a source of energy for the muscle to
contract or relax....On the other hand, such breeds as Angus,
Shorthorn,
Jersey and Longhorn deposit high levels of
marbling.
Their predominantly red muscle fibers use fatty
acids, stored nearby as marbling, as a source of energy"
(Rester 1988, 11).
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Washington (owned by Agri-Beef).
Dr. Reeves reported that genetics also account for some
of the yellow tinge found in the fat of some feedlot beef.
Genetics may in fact have more of an influence on the degree
of yellowing than does feed.

Nonetheless,

it was

recommended that beta-carotene, found in corn and to some
extent in alfalfa, be kept out of the diet.

Dr. Reeves also

said that eighteen degrees fahrenheit was a critical
temperature.

When the temperature fell below this level,

increased energy was required in the steer's feed ration if
weight loss was to be prevented.
The WSU research team also had trouble with moisture,
or watery meat, and thought a longer dry-lot time might be
the answer.

The research staff were not in universal

agreement on this issue, however.

One thought an extended

dry-lot time, as was customary in Japan, would not have a
significant affect on reducing moisture,

and would in fact

induce stress and would therefore have an adverse affect on
marbling.

Another thought that feed ration and animal

maturity both affected water content in meat (rice straw and
older maturity causing drier meat), but that a dry stand of
twenty-four hours prior to slaughter may be the single most
effective thing one could do to prevent weepiness.

On the

other hand, Japanese producers think watery or moist meat is
primarily a factor of age (to avoid a moisture problem,
Japanese producers will not slaughter dairy cattle before
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eighteen months of age or Wagyu before twenty-four months of
age)

(Lin and Mori 1991, 112).
There were also two schools of thought among the WSU

researchers interviewed regarding in-weights and length of
feeding period.

One school maintained that if the steers

which enter the feed trial are "backgrounded"^^ for twelve
to eighteen months, then a feed-period of less than one year
should be adequate to achieve an acceptable degree of
marbling.

The other school thought that in-weights ought to

be in the 650 to 700 pound range, and that a feeding period
of four-hundred days would be necessary.

That is, one

called for starting cattle at older ages and heavier weights
and feeding for a shorter period of time, the other for
younger cattle fed for a longer period of time.

Additional

feed trials would be necessary to determine which approach
provided the best results.
Dr. Wright recommended the following as an ideal
approach to achieving high-quality marbling:

slaughter the

fat cattle at thirty months of age after a feeding period of
four-hundred days with a steer that is at least a half-blood
Wagyu (a 7/8 to 3/4-blood Wagyu is preferable).

The cross

which Dr. Wright recommended was Holstein and Angus, which

^"Backgrounding" typically refers to feeding a weaned
calf on pasture when adequate pasture is available, and hay
with modest grain supplements when pasture is not available,
for a period of time, usually several months.
In this case,
backgrounding for 12 to 18 months would put the steer at 1-1/2
to 2 years of age at the start of the feed trial.
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was then crossed to Wagyu, giving a crossbred steer which
was 1/4 Holstein,

1/4 Angus, and 1/2 Wagyu —

recommended in

part because of a Japanese preference for the Holstein-Wagyu
cross.
According to Dr. Wright, unless straight Angus are from
a high-marbling genetic line, and inadequate information
exists to determine this, they will grade B 2 .

A 3/4 to 7/8-

blood Wagyu (15/16 is considered a purebred, of which there
are about two-hundred in the U.S.) is needed if consistent
grading of B4 to A4 is to be realized.

Another researcher,

however, thought that U.S. Wagyu would

never break into the

Japanese A market simply because it

is U.S. beef.

Even if

it did, U.S. Wagyu would in all likelihood never grade A5
(the highest grade attainable) because part of the grade is
determined by local reputation.

That is, some locales in

Japan are known for producing superior beef, and beef from
those locales are automatically graded higher for that
reason.
In addition to its superior marbling ability, Wagyu
also has the advantage of the peculiar chemical composition
of its fat.

Due to the presence ofa particular enzyme

W a g y u , o n l y one-third of Wagyu fat

in

is saturated

^According to the 1991 McGregory Field Day report, Wagyu
fat was found to be lower in palmitic acid than is most U.S.
beef,
and
it was
found
to
have
"an
unusually
high
concentration
of
oleic
acid...Clinical
trials
have
demonstrated that palmitic acid increases serum cholesterol
when ingested by humans, while oleic acid does not increase
(or may actually decrease) serum cholesterol" (Ford 1991 19).
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(saturated fat has been linked to heart disease) compared to
half for typical U.S. cattle (Dorgan 1990, 6 À ) .

When

grilled, more fat is cooked out of Wagyu than from Angus.
Fat on the chilled Angus carcass is hard, but fat on the
chilled Wagyu carcass is soft.

Therefore, though Wagyu has

more untrimmable fat than does Angus, Wagyu fat is perceived
as being less of a potential health hazard than is Angus
fat.

Because of this, in Dr. Wahl's opinion,

in the long

run the type of fat rather than the amount of marbling may
be the key issue.
The common perception that Wagyu is more flavorful than
other beef was borne out by controlled and uncontrolled
taste tests.

A controlled taste test utilizing a trained

taste panel in Canada, and an uncontrolled taste test
conducted at WSU drew the same conclusions:

of the beef

fed, Japanese Wagyu was judged the most flavorful, followed
by American Wagyu, Angus, and Longhorn, in that order.
The importance of developing well-marbled carcasses has
to do with the translation of tenderness and flavor into
higher wholesale prices.

This explains why there is a

significant price increase from carcasses which grade B3 to
carcasses which grade B 4 .

As explained by D r . C ross, an

animal scientist at Texas A&M, "a 5 percent change in
marbling will increase the value of the animal by $200”
(Ford 1991, 17).
In order to achieve a carcass which would grade B3 or
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better with some degree of consistency, several criteria
seemed to emerge.

First, an animal with some degree of

Wagyu genetics, and in all likelihood, at least a halfblood, was required.

Second, a feeding period of four-

hundred days, beginning with an animal which was about
eighteen months old, and fed with a ration of 80:20 grainto-hay with a TON of 70 to 80 percent for an average daily
gain of about two pounds, was also required.

Third, in

order to avoid a moisture problem, dry-lotting the cattle
for up to forty-eight hours prior to slaughter may be
necessary.

All reasonable steps should also be taken in

order to avoid animal stress at all times.
An unknown is how well a Wagyu-Angus cross would
perform on an extended feeding trial.

A current WSU feed

trial, to be completed in April of 1993, will provide
information about the performance of this cross when the
trial is complete.

In an ideal scenario, this cross would

combine the superior marbling ability, flavor, texture, and
unsaturated fat of the Wagyu with the feed efficiency and
milking ability of the Angus.

Market Considerations
Dr. Thomas Wahl expected the tariff to decrease to
around 30 percent, but to no lower than 25 percent, and will
probably occur in increments of 2 percent per year beginning
in 1994.

Dr. Wahl expected the feeding of dairy cattle in
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Japan for beef consumption to decrease substantially in the
long run, but he also expected the Wagyu sector to remain
indefinitely.
Dr. Wahl categorized the market as having three
segments:

a high-end segment which demanded premium Wagyu,

served for business lunches and in high class restaurants;
a middle market which constituted the majority of the
Japanese restaurant trade and home s a l e s , and which demanded
beef in the quality range of B4;

and a lower market which

used frozen cuts for barbecue and other casual consumption.
Dr. Wahl expects the bulk of growth to be in the middle
market.

He expects some growth to occur in the upper market

assuming stability in Japanese tax laws regarding the
deductibility of business expenses.

Dr. Reeves, however,

expects the bulk of growth in beef consumption in Japan to
be on the lower end, in outlets such as McDonalds, where the
U.S. producer cannot compete with producers in Australia.
What is not clear is how closely growth in volume consumed
equates with the growth in value of a particular market
segment.

That is, in terms of value, smaller volume growth

in the upper-end market should outpace a much larger growth
in volume in the lower market due to the difference in value
of the meats consumed.
Drs. Wahl and Wright thought that a better market for
premium beef raised in the U.S. to Japanese standards would
be the domestic U.S. rather than the Japanese market.
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present, WSU beef which does not qualify for the Japanese
market is sold domestically at three-times the U.S.
wholesale price.

The university could sell all of its

premium beef domestically if it were not trying to service a
Japanese client.

Because of the Japanese tariffs, which

depresses the price the Japanese importer can offer to the
U.S. exporter. Dr. Wright thought that the U.S. market was
more profitable than the Japanese market."

Specialty

restaurants in the U.S. have a significant demand for this
type of beef, and at present that market is larger than
domestic supply.

In dealing with a domestic market the

producer also avoids a myriad of complexities associated
with servicing a foreign market, including communication,
transportation, and exchange rates.

The saturation point

for that domestic market, however, is unknown.
In addition to Japan, newly industrializing countries
(NICs) may be emerging markets for premium beef.

According

to Dr. Barron, as the income level of a population or
population segment rises, so does its demand for expensive
foods.

Therefore, if a premium product is developed for

Japan, additional market outlets may be cultivated in NICs.
As the price of beef declines. Dr. Wahl maintains that
mid-level consumption will increase dramatically.
question is whether the price will decline.

The

For price to

"At present, according to Dr. Wright, while the Japanese
tariff on imported U.S. beef is 60 percent, the U.S. tariff on
imported Japanese beef (Wagyu) is 3 percent.
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decline significantly, the distribution system in Japan must
be modernized.

To what extent this will happen, and when it

will happen if it does happen, is unknown.

Nonetheless, Dr.

Wahl reported that beef restaurants are doing very well in
Japan, due in part to an increase in demand for beef among
younger Japanese.

As the population a ges, consumer demand

will shift more towards beef as the consumption of rice and
fish decline.

The gap in price is expected to narrow

between beef and fish as fish gets more expensive relative
to beef.

This change in price structure reflects a

dwindling supply of fish and an expected decrease in beef
prices as import duties decline.
Dr. Wahl also believes that the Japanese could double
their per capita consumption of beef and:

(1) it would

still not be a major factor in their diet;

(2) beef

consumption would still be at a healthy level; and (3) U.S.
exports of beef would increase dramatically.
In Dr. Wahl's assessment, consistency and high quality,
and a good working relationship with a Japanese contact who
will push the exporter's product through the distribution
system, are key.

In this regard, early adopters, or those

who "get in on the ground floor," will have the advantage in
the Japanese market in terms of developing contacts and
"getting ahead on the learning curve."

Dr. Wahl sees

opportunity in pre-packaging seasoned, marinated beef in the
U.S. to serving-sizes desired by the Japanese consumer.
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Japanese labor costs will continue to increase, and it will
therefore be cheaper to cut and package beef in the U.S.
prior to shipment.
Dr. Wright indicated that beef exports to Japan are
limited to chilled, frozen, and processed beef.

In 1991,

six live cattle were shipped to Japan, total, from all
sources.
Dr. Reeves reported that air freight to Japan for
carcass beef was $.93 per pound, compared to $.19 to $.23
per pound by ship.

Ocean freight from Seattle or Oakland to

Japan takes eleven days —

which gives western states an

advantage over midwestern states.

Ultrasound
With the use of ultrasonics, cattle can be tested while
on feed to determine how well they are marbling.

If the

particular animal is found to be marbling well, then that
animal is left to continue the feed trial.

If not, then the

animal is sold before reaching a carcass type which will be
discounted in the U.S. market and which will not be accepted
in the Japanese market.
The importance of this technology to a cattle feeder
who is feeding for a select, premium market cannot be over
emphasized.

For instance, Mr. Marchi could cull those

animals which stood little if any chance of reaching a
carcass grade of B3 or better while they were still valuable
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to the U.S. market, and Nichiro could be assured of
receiving only those carcasses which met their
specifications.

Carcasses would perhaps be judged according

to three standards:

those that would meet Japanese

specifications, those that would qualify for specialty
markets in the U.S., and those that would do neither.

Each

animal could then be sorted, fed, and marketed accordingly.
Mr. Marchi sees an important place for ultrasound even if
the genetics of premium, highly-marbled beef are determined
because of variation within genetically similar animals.
To date, ultrasonics has not been developed to the
extent necessary to make these determinations with a
reliable degree of accuracy.

Though WSU researchers have

done little research with ultrasound, they are in contact
with a Canadian researcher who has, and who claims good
success, and who will conduct ultrasound tests on WSU cattle
in June, 1992.

A fair conclusion would be that ultrasonics

may be a tool of vital importance to this specialized
feeding industry, and that more research needs to be done
before it can be judged dependable and cost effective.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 21
ZENCHIKU LAND AND LIVE STOCK, INC,

[Because Zenchiku's managers understand the Japanese
market and style of doing business,] all these things
that are unique to Japan are hurdles to everyone else
but me.
John W. Morse, Jr., President of Zenchiku
Land and Live Stock, Inc. (Dennison 1990).
The Selkirk Ranch is the single largest U.S. exporter
of carcass beef to Japan.
Matthew Cohn, Pacific Rim Trade Officer,
Montana Department of Commerce (telephone
interview 1992).

In October of 1988, Zenchiku Company Ltd., Japan's
largest meat importer (Cullison 1991, IDA) with 1988
revenues of $1.5 billion (Eisenstodt 1988, 37), purchased
the Selkirk Ranch in Montana.

Located ten miles southeast

of Dillon, Zenchiku paid about $13 million for the 77,000
acre ranch (Atchison 1989).

The 1988 calf crop was included

in the purchase (the ranch reportedly runs about sixthousand cattle).

Also formerly known as the Lazy 8,

Zenchiku Land and Live Stock, Inc., was chartered as a
Montana corporation and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Zenchiku Company Ltd.

According to Mr. John Morse,

President of Zenchiku Land and Live Stock Co., the mission
for the ranch is to produce beef suitable to Japanese taste,

165
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including packaging and presentation of p r o d u c t . Z L & L is
free to pursue that mission in any manner it sees fit.
Zenchiku has six divisions through which its imported
beef must pass prior to entering the distribution system.
Each of these six divisions imposes a price markup before
the product passes to the next division.

Once the product

has passed through these six divisions, Zenchiku then deals
with fifty-four distributors, each of which is free to buy
beef from other suppliers.

To remain competitive, then,

Zenchiku must offer beef to these distributors at
competitive prices (interview with Matthew Cohn, 1992).
As a point of reference concerning price markups, Mr.
Aoyama said that wholesale price in recent Tokyo markets for
a B3 boxed carcass was 900 yen per kilogram (about $3.15 per
pound).

Once this carcass was fabricated,

it would sell to

a Japanese supermarket for a wholesale price of 1,800 to
2,000 yen per kilogram (about $6.30 to $7.00 per pound).
Once the carcass was cut-up to serving size, the per
kilogram retail price became 3,000 to 3,500 yen (about
$10.50 to $12.25 per pound)
1992).

(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama,

Markups in this scenario approach 300 percent.

ZL&L's 1989 sales were about $1.5 million.

Nearly two-

thirds of its cattle were shipped to Japan to supply a mid
range market.

ZL&L is not attempting to produce a super-

^“Mr. Morse granted an interview to Messrs.
Hibbard on February 21, 1992.

Marchi
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high grade of Japanese beef.

Rather, it sees its product

equivalent to Certified Angus Beef and better, i.e., high
Choice and above, with 30 percent of ZL&L's product
surpassing U.S. Prime.

Mr. Morse sees Zenchiku's niche as

between U.S. grain-fed beef and Japanese Wagyu.

As such it

is shipping carcasses which have as much as 40 percent
intramuscular fat, compared to 5 to 10 percent for most U.S.
beef, and 80 percent for Japanese Kobe (Balzar 1991, F6).
Included in Zenchiku Company's 1991 revenue of $2
billion are sales of beef, pork, poultry, and assorted
processed meats.

According to Mr. Morse, Zenchiku "grinds

more hamburger in Japan than anyone."

McDonalds of Japan is

one of Zenchiku's customers.
Zenchiku Co. Ltd. is not limited to purchasing U.S.
beef solely from Zenchiku Land and Livestock C o . , and in
fact, ZL&L must keep its prices competitive if it is to
market its beef in Japan.

ZL&L will also contract with

other producers, who will use ZL&L's genetics, to increase
its feedlot inventories to the levels necessary to provide
Zenchiku Co. Ltd. with a consistent supply of "Selkirk
Beef."
After being raised on the Montana ranch, the cattle are
shipped to feedlots in other states as are most calves
raised in Montana.

With its feedlot and ranch cattle, ZL&L

has a current inventory of about eight-thousand head.
Though ZL&L has had cattle in as many as four feedlots with
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"nearly mirror image results," it currently has cattle in
feedlots in Kansas and Idaho.

Mr. Morse selects feedlots

according to the type of feed a given feedlot offers.

For

instance, the feedlot in Idaho may feed corn, barley, wheat,
and/or other feed grains dependent upon whichever represents
the best value.

The Kansas feedlot feeds a milo-based

ration which includes corn.
After being fed to Zenchiku's specifications, the
cattle are processed at a relatively large U.S. plant
(seventeen-hundred per day capacity) before being shipped to
Japan.

ZL&L has had cattle slaughtered every week for the

past two-and-one-half years.

The carcasses are loaded in

refrigerated containers at the packing plants and are
shipped to Japan via ocean freight from San Pedro or
Oakland, California.

Transit time to Japan from the

slaughter house is fifteen days.

According to Mr. Morse,

ZL&L's boxed beef (some is boxed and some is shipped as
carcass quarters) has a shelf-life of ninety days.
ZL&L's minimum target is to ship one container per week
(about 30 carcasses) with a goal of 150 carcasses every two
weeks, or 300 per month.

In addition to the chilled

carcasses, Mr. Morse reports that ZL&L will also ship, as
many as 45 carcasses of boxed beef each week.
Chilled beef produced by ZL&L ranges between B2 and B4.
The Beef Marbling Score (BMS) is Zenchiku's primary
indicator of quality, however, and Mr. Morse reports that
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ZL&L's cattle have been marbling well.^®
carcass quality,

To achieve this

ZL&L weans calves at 525 to 550 pounds,

backgrounds them with rolled oats and hay at an ADG of two
pounds per day until they reach 600 to 650 pounds.

The

cattle are then fed a higher concentrate grain ration from
300 to 400-plus days.
of 1600 pounds.

Live finished weight is in the area

The goal is to produce a carcass that

weighs 950 to 1050 pounds, with 850 pounds the minimum
acceptable carcass weight.
ZL&L's carcass weights have been as high as 1345 pounds
and have been fed for as long

as five-hundred days with an

ADG of 2.48 pounds and a slaughter age of thirty months.
Growth implants are not used (nor are they in the Marchi
cattle) because they promote growth of red meat and inhibit
the formation of intramuscular fat, and consequently have a
substantial negative affect on carcass grade.

back

Final live weights will,

in Mr. Morse's opinion, settle

to 1300 to 1400 pounds.

He believes the key to

producing quality beef in the feedlot is to feed cattle to
the point where they quit gaining, and then feed for another
sixty days in order to develop the proper color in the fat
and meat.

Mr. Morse also believes that the mineral content

^®BMS scores ranged from 3 to 6 for the bulk of ZL&L's
recent two shipments preceding the date of interview.
BMS
scores of 3 and 4 qualify for yield grade 3 (as in B3) for
this one criteria of quality grade (there are 4 criteria).
BMS scores of 5 and 6 qualify for yield grade 4 (as in B4).
Refer
to
Chapter
11,
"Beef
Grading
in
Japan,"
for
clarification.
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of feedlot water affects
Mr. Morse claims no
period of 400 days.

meat color.
loss in efficiency up to a feeding

He also claims that he is able to feed

cattle to 1150 pounds for less than $.50 per pound of gain,
and to 1350 pounds for less than $.70 per pound of gain.
Mr. Morse says that he can place high quality chilled beef
in Japan at a break-even cost of less than $1.50 per pound
(C&F basis, i.e., cost includes product and freight to
Japan).

His price to the Zenchiku wholesaler has been less

than $2.00 per pound for as long as ZL&L has shipped beef to
Japan.
According to Mr. Morse, beef produced at the Montana
ranch may sell in Japan under
Selkirk Beef.

ZL&L's trademark as Certified

Mr. Morse has been pleased with the ability

of Angus to produce the quality he wants, in part because
Angus does not give up its feed efficiency in doing so.

He

does not anticipate introducing Wagyu into the ZL&L herd and
would prefer to continue use of the best available Angus
genetics for "classic" Angus herd development.
Like Mr. Marchi and WSU, ZL&L has had some experience
with a moisture problem in its meat.

Mr. Morse believes

that moisture is a function of age, average daily gain, and
days on feed more so than drinking water.

He thought no

benefit would be realized by withholding water from cattle
for an extended period of time prior to slaughter.

His

cattle are dry-lotted overnight prior to slaughter, and the
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cattle which are trucked from Kansas to a Los Angeles area
packing plant are provided with free-choice water with
electrolytes for the 1400 mile trip.
ZL&L owns an ultrasound machine but Mr. Morse has been
disappointed with its success.

He did report that

ultrasonics may be useful in determining which cattle to
sell as regular domestic U.S. cattle, but it cannot detect
which animals are developing the best marbling.
Mr. Morse expects overall beef consumption in Japan to
increase to twenty-five or twenty-six pounds by the year
2000, and that 60 to 70 percent of that increase will be in
high-quality U.S. beef.

He reported that, according to the

U.S. Meat Export Federation, beef in Japan enjoys an
elasticity factor of 2-to-l, that is, for every one-dollar
drop in price, demand will increase by two dollars.

He

reported that the Japanese dairy feeding industry is in
decline but that the Wagyu industry is stable, and that the
market in Japan for B2 and B3 carcasses has been instable
over the last twelve months.

Mr. Morse expects this

instability to continue until the market settles to its
equivalent U.S. values (plus costs).
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CHAPTER 22
SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

With its custom feeding arrangement with Nichiro
Corporation, Marchi Angus Ranches is in the unique position
of being able to sell its agricultural products (cattle,
roughage and feed grains) at cost plus a 20 percent markup.
The uniqueness of this is apparent when the particular
marketing framework of agricultural products is considered.
Historically, producers of agricultural products are price
takers, not price setters.

Cattle and feed prices are set

by a market over which no single producer has influence, let
alone control.

In a relative sense, then, by pursuing this

custom feeding arrangement Mr. Marchi is allowing himself
the opportunity to set prices for his products.
The variables with the most potential for volatility
are:

loss on costs of gain, i.e., cost per pound and

numbers of pounds gained in excess of $.83 per pound; death
loss, which may vary from 2 to 5 percent of the numbers of
cattle on feed; interest payments, which vary according to
market rate and amount of debt; amortization costs, which
are also a function of market rates and amount of land
financed; and income tax, which may be influenced by ranch

172
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operations as a whole.
Other expense items may vary due to a myriad of factors
which occupy any business climate as well as those peculiar
to ranching and feedlot operations, including prices
attainable through economies-of-scale, weather conditions,
quality of feed, and market prices for agricultural
commodities.

Income may vary due to market conditions at

the beginning of a given feed trial, when the feeder steers
are sold to Nichiro.

The degree to which Nichiro

Corporation is willing to accept markups on cattle and feed
may also affect income.
For the current feed trial (ten head, to be completed
in October 1992), net income after depreciation, interest
and taxes of about $900 is expected, for a per-head profit
of roughly $90.

Due to the small size of this feed trial,

Nichiro will not be billed for any expenses until its
completion.

This will cause modest negative cash flows in

the second and third quarters ($318 and $315 respectively)
and is not cause for concern.

Once larger quantities of

cattle are involved (from ten head per month to a potential
high of three-hundred head per month) Nichiro will be billed
monthly for yardage, feed, veterinary, transportation, and
livestock processing costs, which will mitigate potential
cash flow problems.
Best and worst case income and expense scenarios were
examined for different quantities of cattle (ten, fifty.
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one-hundred, and three-hundred head per month).

The highest

per-animal return to cash flow is expected with the present
trial, explained by the fact that all feed is raised, but is
sold at market cost plus 20 percent.

The effective markup

on raised feed then becomes 260 percent for hay (raised for
$20 per ton, sold at $60 plus 20 percent), and 300 percent
for grain (raised at $45 per ton and sold at $150 plus 20
percent).

However, the lowest per-head net income is also

for the current period.

This discrepancy is explained by

the lower costs assigned to feed production on a cash flow
basis (actual production cost) than on an income and expense
basis (market cost).

This discrepancy does not carry

through to the fifty-head scenarios due to the high
proportion of purchased feed under those models.
Under the worst case scenario for fifty head per month,
net cash balance remains positive, in excess of $80,000 for
the year, with net income (before land capitalization costs)
of nearly $70,000.

Per-head profit, after taxes, interest,

depreciation and capitalized land payments, is expected to
exceed $100.

Under the best case scenario, per head profit

(net income after taxes, interest, depreciation and
capitalized land payments) should approach $244.
Under the best case scenario for fifty head per month,
a return on assets (ROÀ) of about 22 percent is expected,
with roughly a 29 percent return on investment (ROI).

Under

the worst case scenario these ratios change to 10.5 percent
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and 14.3 percent respectively.
The current ratio and debt ratio indicate good debt
service ability, likely placing the operation in a favorable
light from a lender's perspective.

Even under the worst

case scenario, adequate cash flow should be generated to
service debt.
Per-head profit figures and financial ratios for the
50-head-per-month best and worst cases assume the operating
expenses of the current feed trail are adjusted to reflect
costs associated with feeding six-hundred head per year
(fifty head per month).

That is, it is assumed that Angus

only are fed, that all feed is sold at market price plus 20
percent, and that 60 to 70 percent of the cattle will grade
B3, thereby allowing the cattle (under the best case
scenario) to be sold at a 20 percent markup.

It also

assumes that land payments are made only on that land which
is occupied by the feedlot space required to feed sixhundred head at any given time.
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CHAPTER 23
CONCLUSION

Many producers are now beginning to think of ways to
produce beef that meets specifications, rather than
producing generic beef and then trying to sell it.
Reported in "Livestock News" (Farris 1991,
8 ).

Feeding beef for the premium Japanese market should be
a profitable venture for Marchi Angus Ranches.

Because the

Marchi Project involves developing a premium product per the
request of a large company, those cattle are sold at a
premium price, as high as 20 percent over market.

Because

the cattle are sold when they enter the feedlot, their sale
weight is something less than half their final weight.

As a

custom feeder, however, Mr. Marchi is compensated through
yardage fees and mark-ups on feed in addition to the
premiums paid for the feeder cattle.

Yardage not only

covers the overhead costs associated with feeding cattle, it
also provides a revenue stream which helps defray labor
costs.
With the Japanese market, Mr. Marchi also has more
marketing options for his feeder cattle, which provides more
potential for profit.

He also has the flexibility of
176
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deciding when a feed trial will begin and when the cattle
will be slaughtered.

With the Japanese option he has the

security of a ready market for his feed crops, which is
particularly important in those years of feed surplus when
many farmers are unable to market their crops at acceptable
prices.

As a custom feeder, he is able to sell that feed at

a predetermined price with no freight costs in any given
year.
Another advantage is the spreading of risk within the
feedlot.

Mr. Marchi retains ownership of some cattle in his

feedlot, and with the Japanese cattle, custom feeds others.
If the market falls, as it does periodically in the cattle
business, Mr. Marchi has the cushion of a revenue stream
from the owner of the custom-fed cattle.
Strictly from the standpoint of feedlot operation,
then, developing a long-term relationship with a Japanese
client on the magnitude that Mr. Marchi and Nichiro
Corporation are attempting makes good business sense.

The

profit in such a relationship, and in developing a product
which is the focus of that relationship, will be from the
flexibility, diversification, and revenue streams provided
to a custom feedlot operation as described above.

Of equal

if not greater importance are the premiums paid for the
feeder cattle (assuming the cattle make grade) and the
markups on feed.

For Marchi Angus Ranches, the profit will

likely not be in the difference between wholesale and retail
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value.

Given the new-found concern of the Japanese consumer

for cheaper prices (Ono 1992, Bl), a "windfall" may never
occur for Marchi Angus Ranches or for Nichiro Corporation.
In terms of product development, much was learned in
discussions with the WSU research team and with Mr. Morse of
Zenchiku Land and Live Stock Co.

Length of feed trial, feed

ration composition, feed trial in- and out-weights and ages,
and expected average daily gains, though not necessarily in
agreement, have provided concrete suggestions which can be
implemented.
An important step which Mr. Marchi can take to hasten
product development is to introduce genetics predisposed to
high-quality marbling into his registered Angus cow herd on
a trial basis.

Wagyu offer those genetics, as do the

classic Angus of the 1950s.

By artificially inseminating

some of his registered cows with Wagyu semen, Mr. Marchi is
now in the process of doing so.

Mr. Aoyama said that

genetics account for 75 percent of a steer's ability to
marble, with the remaining 25 percent determined by feed
(interview with Hiroshi Aoyama, 1992).

Attention to genetic

predisposition to marbling, then, appears to be crucial.
It is clear that the market in Japan for premium.beef
is growing beyond Japan's capability to service that market,
and that the U.S. is well positioned to take advantage of
that market development.

Some economists expect U.S. beef

exports to increase by about 4 percent in 1992, fueled
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primarily by the drop in the Japanese import duty from 70
percent to 60 percent (Doane's 1992a).
It can also be argued that Montana is better positioned
than many States to capitalize on this emerging market.
Montana's abundance of wheat and barley; its clean, mountain
environment; its cold winter weather; its proximity to
Seattle seaports; and its stature as the number one producer
of Black Angus cattle in the U.S.; all give it competitive
advantage in developing beef tailored to Japanese taste.
Many authorities believe that tariffs on imported beef
in Japan will decline beyond the 1993 level of 50 percent,
and some believe it will decline steadily to as low as 25
percent.

The waning of rural political strength in Japan,

combined with:

(1) a growing consumer voice for cheaper

prices and increased access to foreign goods; and (2)
external pressures from foreign governments to allow greater
market access for their products; will keep an
insurmountable political voice within Japan in abeyance.
Like Mr. Morse at Zenchiku Land and Live Stock Co., Mr.
Marchi is in the enviable position of having a well
established contact with a major Japanese food company.

Not

only does this bring a "window to the final consumer," it
also provides direct access to one of the most complicated
distribution systems in the world.

The benefit of this

should be amplified with the development of "Steake
Restaurant," where Mr. Marchi will get very direct feedback

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

180

on consumer acceptance of the Marchi-Nichiro product.

As

with Mr. Morse, so many of the barriers which impede foreign
access to the Japanese market simply don't exist for Mr.
Marchi.

The "functional integration" (Smith 1990) implicit

in producers, packers, processors and retailers pushing
toward a common goal will be instrumental in the timely
development of an acceptable product.
Much progress has been made.

Much more needs to be

made before the Marchi Project has any real and lasting
economic significance for Marchi Angus Ranches, for Montana,
and for Nichiro Corporation.

To continue progress toward

the goal of providing three-hundred premium (B3 and better)
carcasses per month as a profitable business for Marchi
Angus Ranches, a number of things should occur.

These

include the following:
(1) Genetic improvement.
The use of Wagyu and
possibly "classic" Angus genetics should (and is) be
pursued with some degree of urgency.
(2)
Expand facilities.
Additional feedlot space, and
additional feed mill capacity will be required to
service the numbers of cattle necessary to provide the
expected quantity.
Refrigeration space at White's
Wholesale Meats will also need expansion. To raise the
capital necessary for these investments in capital, a
joint venture with Marchi Angus Ranches, White's
Wholesale Meats, and Nichiro Corporation may need to be
pursued.
(3)
Load containers at the packing plant for ocean
freight.
To be competitive, freight costs must be
reduced once a significant quantity of carcasses begins
to be shipped on a regular basis.
Shelf-life would
also be improved by doing so.
(4) Vacuum-pack pre-seasoned, serving-sized portions
of beef for microwave use.
With the increasing numbers

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181

of working women in Japan, this ready-to-use, premium
product would cater to a growing market.
(5) Failing numbers three or four above, Nichiro
Pacific, Ltd. should pursue fabricating the carcasses
in its Seattle facility.
This would include cutting,
packaging, storing, and shipping the finished product
to outlets in Japan.
(6) Develop a trademark.
Like Certified Selkirk Beef,
Marchi beef should be readily identifiable to the
Japanese consumer.
Particular attention should be
given to how the product is presented.
In developing a
trademark, it must be mutually agreed that only beef of
well-defined quality be acceptable for branding.
(7) Develop a collaborative, working relationship with
the research team at Washington State University.
Mr.
Marchi is well on the way toward doing so.
Each will
benefit from the information exchange implicit in such
a relationship, which should assist in product
development in a cost-effective manner.
(8) Research concerning the use of ultrasonics in
determining carcass marbling should continue.
Should
funding permit, Mr. Marchi may collaborate with Montana
State University in doing so. Research completed or
underway at other institutions should be investigated.
Should this technology be developed, not only would a
feedlot operator have more options available in
marketing cattle, he would also have more efficient
costs-of-gain.
(9) Consideration should be given to feeding heifers
as well as steers.
Though heifers tend to grade better
than do steers under the Japanese grading system (Mr.
Aoyama said that virgin females graded highest in terms
of quality), lower feed efficiencies of heifers may
make it uneconomical to feed them to premium weights.
(10) Renegotiate the $.83 cap on cost-of-gain.
As
Wagyu genetics are introduced into the cow herd,
efficiencies of gain will likely decline.
Costs will
therefore increase.
Mr. Marchi should not be expected
to accept this risk unilaterally.
(11)
Locate secondary or auxiliary markets.
either be domestic or foreign.
The venture is not without risk.

These may

However, enough has

been learned to warrant further feed trials, hopefully
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involving more cattle so the results may have real
statistical significance.

Mr. Yamamura's concern about

developing an acceptable product to be in place as the
import duty declines should be heeded.

There is concern

that, in spite of Mr. Marchi's and Nichiro^s best efforts,
other enterprises undertaken by other concerns in other
parts of the U.S. and in Australia may gain the advantage of
the early adopter.
A number of concurrent feed trials,

involving more

cattle in each trial (20 to 30), and different bloodlines,
ages, feed rations, daily gains, and length of feed period
would provide more information in a shorter period of time.
Much of this research is being conducted at WSU, but may be
augmented by coordinated feed trials with the Marchi
operation.

A joint venture between Nichiro and Marchi Angus

Ranches, established to provide the necessary capital and to
spread the financial risk involved in such an undertaking
and hopefully the financial reward, may be required.

An Investor's Perspective
Under the best case scenario, ROA is expected to be 22
percent.

Though this compares favorably with the current

returns of the stock and bond markets, it may not be
competitive with other businesses seeking venture capital.
There is also a significant degree of risk.

Given the

reputation of Japanese businessmen as tough negotiators, the
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expected 20 percent markups on market price of feed and
feeder cattle may not materialize.

Carcass grades may not

be satisfactory in terms of quality or consistency, and
Nichiro may decide to abandon the project or change its
goal.

For instance, should carcasses which consistently

grade B3 or better not be attainable, Nichiro may change its
focus to the intermediate market.

If this were the case, it

may not be necessary to pay premiums to secure high quality
cattle.
It is significant that the income and expense
projections are based on historical costs associated with
feeding Angus steers for Nichiro.

These projections assume

that Angus cattle, or cattle of similar performance, will
continue to be fed and that an acceptable number will grade
B3.

Once Wagyu genetics are introduced and the cow herd is

altered significantly in order to accommodate the Nichiro
enterprise, a number of crucial measures will change.

The

livestock breeding herd, and the land necessary to carry
that herd, will be added to assets (property, plant and
equipment).

Liabilities and owners' equity will increase in

like measure, though to which degree for each category is
uncertain.

As a result, ROA will decrease in response to

this increase in total assets and a decrease in net income.
That is, total income will likely show no significant
change with the addition of Wagyu, at least initially.
Expenses, however, are expected to increase due to the
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higher costs-of-gain for the less feed-efficient Wagyu.

In

spite of the increased cost associated with Wagyu, without
these genetics it may well be that total income will decline
due to an inability to have significant numbers of cattle
grade well (relative to Japanese grading standards and
Nichiro's goal), thereby precluding a 20 percent premium.
Not only may Wagyu be necessary for Marchi Angus Ranches to
maintain this premium, but with satisfactory development of
Wagyu genetics premiums exceeding 20 percent may be
attainable.
Once the cow herd, or a significant portion of that cow
herd, is dedicated to the Nichiro operation by changing its
genetic structure for that purpose, capitalized land costs
will increase substantially.

This will reduce net cash

flows as those land payments are made, and it will reduce
net profit (net income after taxes, interest, depreciation
and amortized land payments).

A worst case scenario of

fifty head per month will likely show a net profit between
break-even and $20,000.

The best case may register a net

profit of about $100,000.
A venture capitalist who is motivated primarily by
high rates of return would likely not be attracted by the
Marchi enterprise.

For an investor who is motivated in part

by creating a value-added product in Montana, however, the
Marchi-Nichiro enterprise may be quite appealing.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Summary of Financial Data, Nichiro Steer Operation

Best Case
First
12 months

Worst Case

50 hd/month

50 hd/month

CASH FLOWS (S)
Receipts:
Total
Per head

21,920
2,192

1,400,500
2,334

1,289,500
2,149

Disbursments (1);
Total
Per head

15,000
1,500

1,252,200
2,087

1,209,100
2,015

6 ,920
692

148,300
247

80,400
134

23,870
2,387

1,531,065
2,552

1,411,065
2,352

22,010

1,267,115

2,201

2,112

1,283,855
2,140

894
89

151,170
252

69,126
115

Net Cash Flow:
Total
Per head

INCOME & EXPENSE ($)
Income:
Total
Per head
Expenses :
Total
Per head
Net Income:
Total
Per head
Net Income/Income:

3.75%

9.87%

4.90%
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(1)

Page ise

For the 50 head per month scenarios, cash disbursements for
the worst case exceeded cash disbursements for the best case,
which resulted in lower Net Incomes Before Interest and Taxes
(NIBIT). This in turn allowed for substantial reductions in
income tax, as follows:
Change in Cash Disbursements
increase in cash disbursements,
worst case over best case
tax reduction
net reduction in cash disburse
ments, for worst case

50 hd/mo
11,600
54,700
43,100

Total and per-head cash disbursements are therefore lower
for the worst case scenario than they are for the best case
scenario.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Financial Ratios — Nichiro Steer Operation
50 head per month (Best Case)

LIQUIDITY:
Working Capital (1)
Current Ratio (2)

$670,000
3.48

LONG-TERM DEBT SERVICE ABILITY:
Debt Ratio (3)

0.60

Debt/Equity (4)

1.48

PROFITABILITY :
Return on Assets (5)

21.87%

Return on Investment (6)

28.94%

(1)

Working capital = current assets - current liabilities.

(2)

Current Ratio = current assets

/ current liabilities.

(3)

Debt ratio = total liabilities

/ total assets.

(4)

Debt/equity = total liabilities / owners' equity.

(5)

Return on assets = (net income before interest and income
tax / total assets.

(6)

Return on investment =
net income before interest and income tax + (interest expense
X (i-tax rate)] / long-term liabilities + equity.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Financial Ratios — Nichiro Steer Operation
50 head per month (Worst Case)

LIQUIDITY;
Working Capital (1)
Current Ratio (2)

$670,000
3.40

LONG-TERM DEBT SERVICE ABILITY:
Debt Ratio (3)

0.60

Debt/Equity (4)

1.48

PROFITABILITY:
Return on Assets (5)

10.54%

Return on Investment (6)

14.341

(1)

Working capital = current assets - current liabilities.

(2)

Current Ratio = current assets / current liabilities.

(3)

Debt ratio = total liabilities

(4)

Debt/equity = total liabilities / owners' equity.

(5)

Return on assets = (net income before interest and income
tax / total assets.

(6)

Return on investment =
net income before interest and income tax + (interest expense
X (1 - tax rate)] / long-term liabilities + equity.

/ total assets.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Pro Forma Balance Sheet, Nichiro Steer Operation
50 head per month
ASSETS
Current Assets:
Cash and cash equivalents
Investments
Accounts receivable
Livestock (feeder cattle)
Feed inventory

$55,000
10,000

260,000
540,000
75,000

Total Current Assets
Property, Plant and Equipment
Feedlot, scale, fences and Imprvmnts
Equipment and vehicles
Total Depreciable Assets
Less accumulated depreciation

$940,000
200,000

80,000
280,000
18,000

Net depreciable assets

262,000
5,000

Land
TOTAL ASSETS

LIABILITIES AND OWNERS' EQUITY
Current Liabilities:
Accounts payable
Notes payable
Current maturities on long-term oblig.

$1,207,000

$100,000

130,000
40,000

Total Current Liabilities

$270,000

Long-term Liabilities

450,000

Total Liabilities

$720,000

Owne rs' Equ ity:
Capital stock
Additional contributed capital
Retained earnings
Total Stockholders' Equity
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND OWNERS' EQUITY

200,000

250,000
37,000
487,000
$1,207,000
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Pro Forma Statement of Income and Expenses, Nichiro Steer Operation
November 1, 1991 through October 31, 1992
INCOME:
Sale of steers: 10 strs § 1122.5# § $.80
Sale of feed:
57 ton grain mixture @ $180
20 ton hay @ $72
mineral
Yardage: $.50 x 10 strs x 360 days
Veterinary care: 10 strs § $15
Transportation ;
Marchi to White's @ $3 per head
White's to Seattle i $.06 per pound
Livestock processing fees:
slaughter § $25 per head
packaging and handling § $20 per head
meat inspection: 10 hours § $18

$8,980
$10,260
1,440
50

1,800
150
30
530

560

250
200
180

630

TOTAL INCOME

OPERATING EXPENSES:
Cost of steers: 10 strs § 1122.5 #§ $.80
Cost of feed:
57 ton grain mixture @ $150
20 ton hay § $60
Ranch labor:
animal handling, feeding, facility mntnc.
payroll taxes
Ranch supplies
Veterinary care:
medicines
vaccinations
needles, syringes, misc. supplies
Feedlot maintenance (materials,tools)
Feedlot utilities
Brand inspection
Telephone, fax, postage
Legal and accounting
Travel
Membrshps., pubis., mktg.

11,750

$23,870

$8,980
$8,550
1,200

9,750

40
10

50
10

40
65
15

120
200
150
10
20
50
50
50
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Transportation :
March! feedlot to White's @ $3 per head
White's to Seattle @ S.06 per pound

30
530

560

Livestock processing costs :
slaughter @ $24 per head
packaging and handling @ $20 per head
meat inspection: 10 hours § $18

240
200
180

620

Commission of Trading House ($1per live cwt)
Insurance
Loss on cost of gain (excessabove $.83/#)
Livestock death loss
Property tax
Depreciation
TOTAL EXPENSES
NET INCOME BEFORE INTEREST ANDTAXES

110
80
650
100
100
350
$22,010
1,860

Interest expense

370

Allowance for income tax

596

NET INCOME

$894
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis — Best Case (1)
Pro Forma Statement of Income and Expenses, Nichiro Steer Operation
Years 2 through 5
10 hd/mo
1993
INCOME:
Sale of steers
Sale of feed
Yardage
Veterinary care
Transportation :
Harchi to White's
White's to Seattle
Lvstk. processing fees
slaughter
pkg and hndlg
meat inspection
TOTAL INCOME

OPERATING EXPENSES:
Cost of steers sold
Cost of feed:
grain
hay
Labor :
general ranch work
payroll taxes
Ranch supplies
Veterinary care:
medicines
vaccinations
supplies
Feedlot mntnc. and sup
Feedlot utilities
Brand inspection
Phone, fax, postage
Legal and accounting
Travel
Membrs, pubis, mktg
Transportation :
Harchi to White's
White's to Seattle
Lvstk. processing costs
slaughter
pkg and hndlng
meat inspection
Commission

50 hd/mo
1994

100 hd/mo
1995

300 hd/mo
1996

$129,600
140,400
21,600
1,800

$648,000
702,000
108,000
9,000

$1,296,000
1,404,000
216,000
18,000

$3,888,000
4,212,000
648,000
54,000

360
7,200

1,740
36,000

3,300
72,000

9,000
216,000

3,000
2,400
350

14,400
11,400
525

26,400
20,400
700

72,000
54,000
875

5306,710

$1,531,065

$3,056,800

$9,153,875

$108,000

$540,000

$1,080,000

$3,240,000

102,600
14,400

513,000
72,000

1,026,000
144,000

3,078,000
432,000

500
100
600

7,500
1,500
2,400

15,000
3,000
3,600

30,000
6,000
7,200

600
960
240
400
500
140
1,200
600
720
300

3,000
4,800
1,200
1,000
600
690
4,500
1,800
2,700
400

6,000
9,600
2,400
2,000
800
1,380
6,000
2,100
3,900
500

18,000
28,800
7,200
4,000
1,000
4,140
10,800
2,700
5,400
600

360
7,200

1,650
36,000

3,000
66,000

8,100
180,000

2,880
2,400
350
1,380

13,200
10,800
525
6,900

24,000
19,200
700
13,800

64,800
50,400
875
41,400
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Insurance
Loss on cost of gain
Livestock death loss
Property tax
Depreciation
TOTAL EXPENSES
NIBIT (2)
Interest expense
Allowance for income tax
NET INCOME

(1)

Page 193
720
1,800
2,160
1,200
3,600

2,550
3,600
10,800
6,000
18,000

4,500
5,400
21,600
12,000
36,000

11,700
8,100
64,800
36,000
108,000

$255,910

$1,267,115

$2,512,480

$7,450,015

50,800

263,950

544,320

1,703,860

4,800

12,000

60,000

120,000

18,400

100,780

193,728

633,544

$27,600

$151,170

$290,592

$950,316

ASSUMPTIONS
Income: steers and feed sold at cost plus 20 percent; yardage
e $.50 per head per day (360 days); veterinary care at cost;
modest markups on transportation and livestock processing.
Expenses: costs for hay § $60 per ton and grain $ $150 per ton
remain constant; economies of scale (lower per-unit costs)
for ranch supplies, transportation, slaughter, packing and
handling, and insurance.
Assumed a reduction in pounds per head exceeding the cap on
cost of gain ($.03 per pound, from 500 pounds for 10 head
per month to 75 pounds for 300 head per month). Livestock
death loss § 2 percent throughout; property tax § $10 per head;
income tax § 40 percent. Other increases are assumed to be
consistent with increases in livestock volume.

(2)

NIBIT = Net Income Before Interest and Taxes
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HARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis — Worst Case (I)
Pro Forma Statement of Income and Expenses, Nichiro steer Operation
Years 2 through 5
10 hd/mo
1993
4C0ME:
Sale of steers
Sale of feed
Yardage
Veterinary care
Transportation :
Harchi to White's
White's to Seattle
Lvstk. processing fees
slaughter
pkg and hndlg
meat inspection
5TAL INCOME

50 hd/mo
1994

100 hd/mo
1995

300 hd/mo
1996

$108,000
140,400
21,600
1,800

$540,000
702,000
97,200
9,000

$1,080,000
1,404,000
172,800
18,000

$3,240,000
4,212,000
453,600
54,000

360
7,200

1,740
36,000

3,300
66,000

9,000
180,000

3 ,000
2,400
350

13,800
10,800
525

25,200
19,200
700

68,400
50,400
875

$285,110

$1,411,065

$2,789,200

$8,268,275

$540,000

$1 ,080,000

$3 ,240,000

513,000
72,000

1 ,026,000
144,000

3,078,000
432,000

7,500
1,500
5,000

15,000
3,000
8,000

30,000
6,000
11,000

3,000
4,800
1,200
1,000
800
690
4,500
2,000
3,500
500

6,000
9,600
2,400
2,000
1,000
1,380
6,000
2,500
5,000
750

18,000
28,800
7,200
4,000
1,300
4,140
10,800
4,000
8,000
950

1,740
36,000

3,300
66,000

9,000
180,000

13,800
10,800
525
6,900

25,200
19,200
700
13,800

68,400
50,400
875
41,400

OPERATING EXPENSES:
Cost of strs sold
$108,000
Cost of feed:
grain
102,600
hay
14,400
Labor :
500
general ranch work
payroll taxes
100
Ranch supplies
1,000
Veterinary care:
medicines
600
960
vaccinations
240
supplies
Feedlot mntnc. and sup
400
600
Feedlot utilities
140
Brand inspection
Phone, fax, postage
1,200
600
Legal and accounting
Travel
720
300
Membrs, pubis, mktg
Transportation :
360
Harchi to White's
7,200
White's to Seattle
Lvstk. processing costs:
3,000
slaughter
2,400
pkg and hndlng
meat inspection
350
1,380
Commission
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Insurance
Loss on cost of gain
Livestock death loss
Property tax
Depreciation

Page 195
720
1,800
3,240
1,440
3,600

2,700
9,000
16,200
7,200
18,000

5,100
18,000
43,200
14,400
36,000

14,400
54,000
162,000
43,200
108,000

$257,850

$1,283,855

$2,557,530

$7,615,865

27,260

127,210

231,670

652,410

Interest expense

4,800

12,000

60,000

120,000

Allowance for income tax

8,984

46,084

68,668

212,964

$13,476

$69,126

$103,002

$319,446

TOTAL EXPENSES
NIBIT (2)

NET INCOME

(1)

ASSUMPTIONS
Income; steers sold at break-even ; feed sold at cost plus 20
percent; yardage § $.50 per head per day {360 days) for 10 head
per month, decreasing incrementally (minimum of $.35 per head
per month) as quantity increases; veterinary care, transpor
tation and livestock processing at cost.
Expenses: costs for hay @ $60 per ton and grain § $150 per ton
remain constant; though to a lesser extent than the "best
case" scenario, economies of scale (lower per-unit costs)
were assumed for ranch supplies, transportation, slaughter,
packing and handling, and insurance.
No reduction in pounds per head exceeding the cap on cost of
gain was assumed (500 pounds per head § $.03). Livestock death
loss from 3 percent for 10 head per month to 5 percent for 300
head per month. Property tax § $12 per head; income tax § 40
percent. Increases in other categories assume less favorable
pricing or increase in volume purchased. Allowance for income
tax declined due to lower NIBIT.

(2)

NIBIT = Net Income Before Interest and Taxes
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Statement of Cash Flows, Nichiro Steer Operation
November 1, 1991 through October 31, 1992 (1)
Quarters (2)
1st

2nd

3rd

Total
12 mos.

4th

CASH RECEIPTS (per head):
Sale of steers
Sale of feed
Yardage
Veterinary care
Transportation
Livestock processing fees

$898
0
0
0
0
0

SO
0
0
0
0
0

SO
0
0
0
0
0

$0
980
180
15
56
63

$898
980
180
15
56
63

Total Cash Receipts

$898

$0

SO

$1,294

$2,192

$200

$200

$225

$825

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

18
10
0
10
10
9
0
0
1
0

0
0
18
4
11
9
3
0
2
1

0
0
11
1
7
6
3
143
2
0

18
10
29
19
29
33
6
143
5
1

1
0
1
6
4
0
2
1
0
2
1

1
0
0
5
3
0
3
0
5
1
2

1
0
0
3
3
1
2
0
0
1
0

4
6
2
20
15
1
10
2
5
5
5

0
0

0
0

3
53

3
53

CASH DISBURSEMENTS (per head):
Cost of steers sold (3)
$200
Cost of feed purchased:
hay
0
0
grain
Cost of feed raised:
fertilizer
0
seed
0
irrigation
0
4
fuel, oil, grease
equipment maintenance
1
labor
9
misc. supplies
0
0
grain processing
Ranch labor
0
Ranch supplies
0
Veterinary care:
medicines
1
vaccinations
6
supplies
1
Feedlot mntnc. and sup.
6
Feedlot utilities
5
Brand inspection
0
3
Leases
Telephone, fax, postage
1
Legal and accounting
0
Travel
1
Membrshps, pubis, mktg
2
Transportation :
March! to White's
0
White's to Seattle
0
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Lvstk. processing costs:
slaughter
pkg and hndlng
meat inspection
Commission
Insurance
Interest
Amortization of land pmts
Property tax
Income tax
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0
0
0
11
2
10
15
5
15

0
0
0
0
2
9
16
0
15

0
0
0
0
2
9
16
5
15

24
20
18
0
2
9
16
0
15

24
20
18
11
8
37
63
10
60

$298

$318

$315

$569

$1,500

ST CASH FLOW (per head)

$600

($318)

($315)

$725

$692

^SH BALANCE (per head)

$600

$282

($33)

$692

$692

Total Cash Disburs.

(1)

10 head on feed

(2)

Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter

(3)

1:
2:

3:
4:

November 1 through January 31
February 1 through April 30
May 1 through July 31
August 1 through October 31

Production cost is based on the break-even, total (or economic)
cost of raising steer calves for export to Japan as carcass beef.
Production costs were calculated as follows: $.90 per pound up
to 500 pounds ($450), plus $.60 per pound from 500 to 1125 pounds
($375), for a total production cost of $825 for an 1125 pound
steer.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis — Best Case (1)
Statement of Cash Flows, Nichiro Steer Operation
1994: 50 head per month
Quarters (2)
1st
CASH RECEIPTS (lOOOs):
Sale of steers
Sale of feed
Yardage
Veterinary care
Transportation
Lvstk. processing fees
Total Cash Receipts
CASH DISBURSEMENTS (1000s)i
Cost of steers sold:
steers raised (3)
steers purchased (4)
Cost of feed purchased:
hay
grain
Cost of feed raised (5):
fertilizer
seed
irrigation
fuel, oil, grease
equipment maintenance
labor
misc. supplies
grain processing
Ranch labor
Ranch supplies
Veterinary care:
medicines
vaccinations
supplies
Feedlot mntnc. and sup.
Feedlot utilities
Brand inspection
Leases
Telephone, fax, postage
Legal and accounting
Travel
Membrshps, pubis, mktg
Transportation:
Harchi to White's

2nd

3rd

4th

Total
12 mos.

$148.5
156.4
27.0
2.3
0.0
0.0

$148.5
156.4
27.0
2.3
0.0
0.0

$148.5
156.4
27.0
2.2
0.0
0.0

$148.5
156.3
27.0
2.2
37.7
26.3

$594.0
625.5
108.0
9.0
37.7
26.3

$334.2

$334.2

$334.1

$398.0

$1,400.5

$10.3
113.4

$10.3
113.5

$10.3
113.4

$10.3
113.5

$41.2
453.8

0.0
122.6

0.0
122.6

0.0
122.6

0.0
122.6

0.0
490.5

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.3

1.7
1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.0
0.3
0.0
0.6
0.3

1.7
0.9
2.5
1.3
1.5
2.0
0.4
1.9
0.8
0.3

0.0
0.0
3.0
1.3
2.0
2.1
0.4
1.9
0.9
0.4

3.4
1.9
5.5
3.6
5.5
6.1
1.1
3.8
2.9
1.3

0.8
1.2
0.3
0.2
2.5
0.2
0.0
1.1
0.4
0.6
0.1

0.8
1.2
0.3
0.2
2.5
0.2
0.0
1.1
0.5
0.7
0.1

0.7
1.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.2
5.0
1.1
0.4
0.7
0.1

0.7
1.2
0.3
0.3
0.5
0.1
5.0
1.2
0.5
0.7
0.1

3.0
4.8
1.2
1.0
6.0
0.7
10.0
4.5
1.8
2.7
0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.5

1.7
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White's to Seattle
Livestock processing i
slaughter
pkg and hndlng
meat inspection
Commission
Insurance
Interest
Amort, of land pmts
Property tax
Income tax
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9

9

9

9

36.0

3 .3
2.7
0.2
1.8
0.6
3.0
1.3
3.0
25.2

3.3
2.7
0.1
1.7
0.7
3.0
1.2
0.0
25.2

3 .3
2.7
0.1
1.7
0 .6
3.0
1.3
3 .0
25. 2

3 .3
2.7
0.1
1.7
0.7
3.0
1.2
0.0
25.2

13.2
10.8
0.5
6.9
2.6
12.0
5.0
6.0
100.8

$307.6

$307.7

$320.4

$316.4

$1,252.2

NET CASH FLOW (1000s)

$26.6

$26.5

$13.7

$81.6

$148.3

CASH BALANCE (1000s)

$26.6

$53.1

$66.7

$148.3

$148.3

Total Cash Disburs.

;:

(1) ASSUMPTIONS
Receipts: steers and feed sold at cost plus 20 percent; yardage
§ $.50 per head per day; other cash receipts are reimbursements
at cost.
Disbursements; all cash disbursements are based on costs that
are known or on costs that can be reasonably expected under
normal operating conditions.
(2)

Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter

1:
2:
3:
4:

November 1 through January 31
February 1 through April 30
Hay 1 through July 31
August 1 through October 31

(3)

No more than 50 raised steers, based on a resident herd of 100
mother-cows. Production costs were calculated as follows: $.90
per pound up to 500 pounds ($450), plus $.60 per pound from 500
to 1125 pounds ($375), for a total production cost of $825 for an
1125 pound steer.

(4)

Purchased steers are bought at weaning at 500 pounds § $.90 per
pound. Cost of gain from 500 pounds to 1125 pounds § $.60 per
pound.

(5)

Feed raised for feedlot consumption is produced at average costs
of $20 per ton for hay and $45 per ton for grain. 1200 tons of
hay and 150 tons of grain are raised by Harchi Angus Ranches, for
total feed production of 1350 tons.
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MARCHI ANGUS RANCHES
Sensitivity Analysis — Worst Case (1)
Statement of Cash Flows, Nichiro Steer Operation
1994: 50 head per month
Quarters (2)
1st
CASH RECEIPTS (lOOOs);
Sale of steers
Sale of feed
Yardage
Veterinary care
Transportation
Lvstk. processing fees
Total Cash Receipts
CASH DISBURSEMENTS (1000s)i
Cost of steers sold:
steers raised (3)
steers purchased (4)
Cost of feed purchased:
hay
grain
Cost of feed raised:
fertilizer
seed
irrigation
fuel, oil, grease
eguipment maintenance
labor
misc. supplies
grain processing
Ranch labor
Ranch supplies
Veterinary care:
medicines
vaccinations
supplies
Feedlot mntnc. and sup.
Feedlot utilities
Brand inspection
Leases
Telephone, fax, postage
Legal and accounting
Travel
Membrshps, pubis, mktg
Transportation :
Marchi to White's

2nd

3rd

4th

Total
12 mos.

$123.7
156.4
24.3
2.3
0.0
0.0

$123.8
156.4
24.3
2.3
0.0
0.0

$123.7
156.4
24.3
2.2
0.0
0.0

$123.8
156.3
24.3
2.2
37.7
25.1

$495.0
625.5
97.2
9.0
37.7
25.1

$306.7

$306.8

$306.6

$369.4

$1,289.5

$10.3
113.4

$10.3
113.5

$10,3
113.4

$10.3
113.5

$41.2
453.8

0.0
122.6

0.0
122.6

0.0
122.6

0.0
122.6

0.0
490.5

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.9

1.7
1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.0
0.3
0.0
0.6
1

1.7
0.9
2.5
1.3
1.5
2.0
0.4
1.9
0.8
1

0.0
0.0
3.0
1.3
2.0
2.1
0.4
1.9
0.9
1

3.4
1.9
5.5
3.6
5.5
6.1
1.1
3.8
2.9
3.9

0.8
1.2
0.3
0.2
3.0
0.2
0.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.2

0.8
1.2
0.3
0.2
3.0
0.2
0.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.1

0.7
1.2
0.3
0.3
1.0
0.2
6.0
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.1

0.7
1.2
0.3
0.3
1.0
0.1
6.0
1.2
1.0
0.5
0.1

3.0
4.8
1.2
1.0
8.0
0.7
12.0
4.5
4.0
3.5
0.5

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.5

1.7
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9
White's to Seattle
Livestock processing costs:
slaughter
3.5
2.7
pkg and hndlng
meat inspection
0.2
Commission
1.8
0.7
Insurance
Interest
3.0
1.3
Amort, of land pmts
3.6
Property tax
Income tax
11.5

9

9

9

36.0

3.4
2.7
0.1
1.7
0.7
3.0
1.2
0.0
11.5

3.5
2.7
0.1
1.7
0.6
3.0
1.3
3.6
11.5

3.4
2.7
0.1
1.7
0.7
3.0
1.2
0.0
11.5

13.8
10.8
0.5
6.9
2.7
12.0
5.0
7.2
46.1

$297.0

$296.1

$310.6

$305.2

$1,209.1

NET CASH FLOW (1000s)

$9.7

$10.7

($4.0)

$64.2

$80.4

CASH BALANCE (lOOOs)

$9.7

$20.3

$16.3

$80.4

$80.4

Total Cash Disburs.

(1) ASSUMPTIONS
Receipts: steers sold at cost; feed sold at cost plus 20 percent;
yardage § $.45 per head per day; other cash receipts are
reimbursements at cost.
Disbursements: Increases in ranch supplies, feedlot utilities,
leases, legal and accounting, travel, marketing, slaughter,
and insurance. A reduction in taxes is due to lower NIBIT.
(2)

Quarter
Quarter
Quarter
Quarter

1:
2:
3:
4:

November 1 through January 31
February 1 through April 30
May 1 through July 31
August 1 through October 31

(3)

No more than 50 raised steers, based on a resident herd of 100
mother-cows. Production costs were calculated as follows: $.90
per pound up to 500 pounds ($450), plus $.60 per pound from 500
to 1125 pounds ($375), for a total production cost of $825 for a
1125 pound steer.

(4)

Purchased steers are bought at weaning at 500 pounds @ $.90 per
pound. Cost of gain from 500 pounds to 1125 pounds § $.60 per
pound.

(5)

Feed raised for feedlot consumption is produced at average costs
of $20 per ton for hay and $45 per ton for grain. 1200 tons of
hay and 150 tons of grain are raised by Harchi Angus Ranches, for
total feed production of 1350 tons.
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NICHIRO CORPORATION
Pro Forma Profit and Loss —
Scenario I
November 1992
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Carcass Sale in Japan (wholesale)

COST:
Nichiro's cost, FOB SeaTac:
10 carcasses § 1800 lbs @ 60% yield § #2.03/lb

$21,924

Airfreight to Tokyo:
10,800 lbs § S.80/lb

8,640

Ad valoreum tax (import duty):
10 head @ 1125 lbs 8 $.80 8 70% tariff (1)

6,300

Total Cost, 10 Carcasses FOB Tokyo

$36,864

REVENUE:
Sales price (wholesale):
4898 kg 8 60% B3 8 900 yen/kg (2)
4898 kg 8 40% B2 8 700 yen/kg
Total Revenue, 10 Carcasses Wholesale Tokyo

NET PROFIT (LOSS)

$20,345
10,549
$30,895

($5,969)

NER PROFIT (LOSS) PER HEAD

($597)

(1)

Ad valoreum tax based on price at which Nichiro purchased the
steers (October 1991).

(2)

Conversion factors used:

2.205 lbs/kg; 130 yen per dollar.
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NICHIRO CORPORATION
Pro Forma Profit and Loss —
Scenario II
November 1992

Page 203

Carcass Sale in Japan (Wholesale)

COST:
Nichiro's cost, FOB SeaTac:
10 carcasses @ 1800 lbs § 60% yield @ #2.03/lb

$21,924

Airfreight to Tokyo:
10,800 lbs e $.80/lb

8,640

Ad valoreum tax (Import duty):
10 head § 1125 lbs § $.80 § 70% tariff (1)

6,300

Total Cost, 10 Carcasses FOB Tokyo

$36,864

REVENUE:
Sales price (wholesale) (1):
I carcass
§ A3 § 1600 yen/kg (2)
3 carcasses § A2 § 1300 yen/kg
3 carcasses ? 83 § 900 yen/kg
3 carcasses § B2 @ 700 yen/kg
Total Revenue, 10 Carcasses Wholesale Tokyo

$6,028
14,694
10,173
7,912
$38,807

NET PROFIT (LOSS)

$1,943

NET PROFIT (LOSS) PER HEAD

$194

(1)

Ad valoreum tax based on price at which Nichiro purchased the
steers (October 1991).

(2)

Carcass weights § 489.8 kg (1080 lbs).

(3)

Conversion factors used:

2.205 lbs/kg; 130 yen per dollar.
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